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Preface and acknowledgements 
The growing complexity of conflict dynamics and security challenges in the 
post-Cold War world require greater cooperation and coordination among states 
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transboundary, or transnational dimensions such as conflicts, pandemics, deser-
tification, drought, climate change, drug, arms, and human trafficking. This has 
further influenced many states to embrace regionalist norms, approaches, and 
mechanisms. 
The emergence of the African Union (AU) as an important peace and secu-
rity actor represents a renewed commitment of African states to the regional-
ist approach in this context. The AU’s primary mechanism for promoting peace 
and security is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), designed to 
function in collaboration with the regional economic communities (RECs) and 
regional mechanisms. However, the RECs, mostly set up to promote economic 
integration, have increasingly taken up a prominent role in conflict resolution 
and peace support operations as evident in the recent peace processes across the 
continent. 
The intervention of the ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis was the first success-
ful one by the sub-regional organisation in post-Cold War Africa. It is interesting 
to note that the lessons learned from the peacekeeping and mediation efforts of 
ECOWAS in the early years of the ECOMOG contributed to the consolidation of 
mechanisms for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in West Africa. 
More recently, other RECs on the continent have replicated the ECOWAS “suc-
cess story” in conflict mediation, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. For example, 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played important 
roles in the resolution of conflicts in the greater Horn of Africa (GHOA). IGAD, 
set up initially to address environmental degradation, drought, desertification, 
and famine, has now taken on board development, regional integration, conflict 
management, peace, and security roles on a regional basis. The records of IGAD 
and ECOWAS on promoting peace, stability, and development in their respective 
regions are mixed. The lessons from ECOWAS intervention in West Africa as 
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of Africa aptly show that the involvement of RECs in regional peace and security 
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to the efficacy of regional integration. However, many issues present themselves 
in the RECs’ engagement with the regional integration and peacebuilding pro-
cesses in Africa. This calls for an examination of the structure, roles, and perfor-
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mendations that are likely to strengthen their capacity to address the peacebuild-
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Regional economic communities and 
peacebuilding in West Africa and the Horn of 
Africa 
Victor Adetula, Redie Bereketeab, and Cyril Obi 
Introduction 
The view that peace and development are intrinsically linked has continued to fea-
ture prominently in mainstream discourses about global governance and conflict 
transformation. Many African countries are either dealing with internal conflicts 
or have just come out from civil war which has far-reaching consequences for 
development. In 2019, there were active armed conflicts in 15 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic 
(CAR), Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan (SIPRI, 
2020, 8). Most of these conflicts were internationalised and overlapped across 
states and regions “as a result of the transnational activities of violent Islamist 
groups, other armed groups and criminal networks” (SIPRI, 2020, 8). The com-
plexity of conflict dynamics and emerging security challenges at the regional and 
global levels require greater cooperation and coordination among states and non-
state actors. The current waves of globalisation, coupled with other compelling 
cross-cutting issues such as the global campaign against terrorism and the impact 
of climate change, are already feeding into consensus formation and international 
coordination on a regional basis. Admittedly, there are growing signs of push-
back from populist and nationalist groups in some countries. Notwithstanding, 
the realities on the ground across Africa have contributed to the need and desire 
for regional collective security systems and conflict management mechanisms on 
the continent. 
Regional efforts to address threats with transnational dimensions such as 
cross-border conflicts, pandemics, erratic weather changes leading to droughts 
or flooding, natural disasters, and transnational crimes have led to the adop-
tion of coordinated approaches and mechanisms. The Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975, and the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), established in 1996, are the cases used in 
this book to examine the structures, roles, and performance of African regional 
economic communities (RECs) in peacebuilding. ECOWAS comprises Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo; and 
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the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) comprises Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. IGAD 
was created as a successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and 
Development (IGADD) which had initially been set up in 1986 to address natural 
resource management and development issues in the Horn of Africa. 
The use of comparative analysis and case study approach to assess the per-
formance of the RECs regarding peacebuilding is desirable both in universal and 
specific contexts. Reference to the global context is in terms of the imperative 
of regionalist solutions in a world that has become increasingly interconnected, 
characterised by the changing dynamics of violent conflict, and driven by less 
altruistic motives. Most of the global powers have been increasingly retreating 
from active engagement outside their immediate geographical locations. Also, 
traditional global platforms for the maintenance of international security such as 
the United Nations (UN) are overstretched, even as multilateralism is in retreat 
because of growing populism and nationalism in some of the world’s hegemonic 
states. Consequently, regional institutions have become increasingly relevant and 
visible. 
This relevance has also resonated with the idea of “African solutions to African 
problems” which underpins the notion of the African Renaissance. According to 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni the concept of an African Renaissance is based on the idea of 
“African struggles against colonialism and imperialism as well as within the ter-
rain of African initiatives to unite Africa, and set Afro-modernity afoot” (2020, 
2). It cohered with early pan-Africanist thinking, and more recently, the thoughts 
of scholars like Ayittey (2014), who referred to “African solutions to African 
problems” as being aimed at stopping the imitation of models from outside the 
continent, and at looking inwards for solutions based on African experiences and 
traditions. In the view of Fantu Cheru (2002), the concept had to do with abandon-
ing dogmatic approaches to development and governance, learning from local/ 
homegrown successes and a new kind of African politics. 
In the 1990s, former South African President Thabo Mbeki advanced the con-
cept of an African Renaissance and promoted its integration into the thinking that 
informed a pan-African effort to reposition the continent in an emerging post-Cold 
War order. This thinking was key to the establishment of the New Partnership 
for African Development in 2001, the (re)birth of the African Union (AU) in 
2002, and the launching of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
in 2002 – all initiatives encapsulating the collective search for an Africa-initiated 
and -driven response to the depredations of colonialism, imperialism, and globali-
sation. In the words of Lobakeng (2017), “African solutions to African problems” 
was marked by the search for “a viable solution towards a united, prosperous and 
peaceful Africa.” It emphasised the centrality of African solidarity, norms, insti-
tutions, and mechanisms as solutions to the structural and emerging challenges 
facing African peace, governance, and development, and in placing the continent 
on a path towards greater global reckoning in the 21st century. 
Thus, the emergence of the AU as an important actor represented a renewed 










on the continent. The AU’s main mechanism for promoting peace and security is 
the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which involved decision-
making on issues related to “prevention, management and resolution of crisis, 
conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction, and development.” The APSA also repre-
sented a significant paradigm shift in the AU’s normative framework from “non-
interference to non-indifference,” paving the way for the AU to intervene in any 
member state where genocide, human right violations, and crimes against human-
ity are committed. The AU officially recognises the RECs as the representative 
regional associations of African states. Initially, African RECs were established 
to promote economic integration. But they have increasingly taken up a prominent 
role in conflict resolution and peace interventions as evident in the recent peace 
and security processes across the continent. This recognition of RECS as the 
“building blocks” for African continental integration was formally acknowledged 
in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty) of 
1991 and the AU Constitutive Act of 2000. APSA was designed to function in 
collaboration with the RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). 
Conceptualising regional integration and peacebuilding 
Regional integration 
Integration simply refers to units coming together to satisfy objectives which they 
cannot meet when they act independently. It is, therefore, a process that hastens 
the achievement of certain objectives in the interest of a larger body. Regional 
integration is a process of cooperation by countries drawing on historical and 
geographic commonalities to come together to achieve a set of shared goals: eco-
nomic and political. Usually, regional integration entails a formal agreement lay-
ing out the principles, goals, and targets of such cooperation arrangements. As 
a process, integration involves the shifting of loyalties, expectations, and politi-
cal activities towards a new and larger centre whose institutions and processes 
demand some jurisdiction over those of the national states. The extent of such 
a transfer of loyalties and authority enjoyed by the new centre depends on the 
level and goals of integration schemes, as well as the socio-economic and political 
ramifications that the implementation of integrative policies generate within and 
between the integrating units (Adetula, 2014, 193). 
Often, “regional integration” and “regional cooperation” have been used
interchangeably. However, there is a difference between the two in qualitative
and quantitative contexts. While “cooperation” may be employed to identify
loose forms of interstate activity designed to meet some commonly experi-
enced needs, “integration” refers to a much more formal arrangement that
involves some political and economic sacrifices, as well as commitments, con-
cessions, processes, and political will, to redefine participation in the interna-
tional economy (Axline, 1977; Ihonvbere, 1983). It is within this context that
regional integration is conceptualised as a dialectical unity of social, economic,
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about the similarity and difference between the two notions continues to this
day. However, there seems to be an agreement that regional integration can be
regarded as a process or as a state of affairs reached by that process. According
to Fritz Machlup, the more difficult question is what is being integrated – peo-
ple, areas, markets, production, goods, resources, policies, or something else?
(Machlup, 1976, 63). The conception of economic integration as the progressive
elimination of trade and tariff discrimination between national borders shows it
as a state of affairs and a process. The foregoing notion and many concepts, mod-
els, and theoretical formulations that derived from the experience of European
integration have long dominated the principle and practice of regional integra-
tion. Based on these restrictive conceptualisations and formulations on regional
integration, many self-styled common markets, federations, unions, and com-
munities have emerged with their motives, agendas, contents, and mechanisms
of operation. Many organisations are pursuing regional integration as strictly an
“economic agenda” or “tariff matter” which leaves out some critical issues of
development broadly defined. 
In the context of the global South, regional integration is an extremely com-
plicated and varied phenomenon which is conditioned by socio-economic and
political dynamics different from those in the global North. In other words, the
experience of European integration is significantly different from that of the regions
of the global South. The universalist claim that the European theories of regional
integration are applicable on a worldwide basis without regard for regional differ-
ences is deficient. Similarly, the failure to engage the worldwide setting in which
regional integration takes place, while nevertheless recognising the importance of
exogenous factors as contributing variables, constitutes a contradiction.
As Daniel and Nagar (2014, 9) observe, 
Although an institutional framework towards regional integration exists in 
Africa, implementation of many of the protocols signed over the past five 
decades has often been hampered by ineffective coordination between the 
African Union – and before then, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – 
and Africa’s “sub-regional bodies.” 
Beyond this, they have faced challenges linked to the leveraging of national 
sovereignty over regional interests, weak institutions, poor governance, com-
petitive rather than complementary intra-African trade, poor funding, inter-REC 
competition, and low levels of domestication of regional policies, standards, and 
regulations. Gill (2009, 702) offers a critical theoretical perspective to regional 
integration. He is critical of the role of the West in “imposing and sustaining 
a discursive hegemony over regionalism” in the global South, which drives a 
“modernist” conception of regional integration. He argues that “African regional-
ism has been pursued, both theoretically and empirically, in terms of a neoliberal, 
free market and Westphalian state model built upon the experiences, values and 
norms of European integration,” which is “limited and structurally inappropriate” 









 While the critique above has some merit, it does not address the role of region-
alism in Africa adequately, particularly since the end of the Cold War, and within
the context of the growing importance of the peace, security, and development
nexus. We argue in support of a new perspective that requires broadening the
conceptual and theoretical treatment of regional integration to include areas and
dimensions neglected by the orthodox approaches to regional integration based
mostly on the processes and experiences of regional integration in the global North.
The discourse on regional integration generally has been influenced by history, 
and by the connection of regionalism to political and socio-economic develop-
ment, and to security processes. Regional integration as a strategy of development 
has Western roots connected to the vision of a post-Second World War order, in 
which regional organisations, working with the United Nations, were expected 
to play a critical role in the maintenance of international peace and security (see 
Chapter 2). Admittedly, this global setting may have influenced the discourse 
about development in Africa where regional integration as a development strat-
egy became appealing to the elites, and where by the 1950s it was incorporated 
into anti-colonial struggles and efforts towards some forms of “African unity” 
(Adetula, 1999). 
Upon gaining independence, many African countries, in the pursuit of regional 
integration, acknowledged development as a strategy for reducing dependency and 
underdevelopment. Many African leaders invested their energies in working for 
African unity by building pan-African institutions and seeking to defend Africa’s 
political and economic independence. In this regard, motives for regional coop-
eration and continental integration included broad economic, social, and political 
interests, the need for greater international bargaining power, economic prosper-
ity by pooling resources and by connecting markets across national frontiers on a 
regional scale, and the quest for “African unity” fired by the ideals of pan-African-
ism. Many African countries favoured the gradualist approach to African unity, 
which subsequently resulted in the establishment of the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) in 1963. Since its creation in 1958, the United Nations Economic 
Commission of Africa (UNECA) has played a significant role in the discourse 
on African development. The OAU and UNECA worked together towards pro-
moting African development and economic integration through sub-regional 
groupings (Adetula, 1993). These developments are part of the background of 
the emergence of the African RECs, such as the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 
the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), 
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), ECOWAS, the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), as well as laudable regional economic initia-
tives such as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), the Final Act of Lagos, the African 
Economic Community (AEC), and, more recently, the African Continental Free 
Trade Area (AfCFTA). 
The AU replaced the OAU in 2002 when the Consultative Act of the African 
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institutions, popular participation, and good governance. It also protects human 
rights and promotes sustainable development and the integration of Africa. The 
AU seeks effective collaboration and partnership with the RECs in the execu-
tion of its mandates. In this regard, the AU has formally acknowledged the eight 
African RECs as building blocks for African continental integration under the 
1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). However, 
the performance of several intergovernmental organisations in Africa in relation 
to regional cooperation has not been impressive. 
At the African continental level, there have been noticeable movements 
towards increased integration including the efforts of its countries as well as the 
renewed interest in pan-Africanism, which culminated first in the establishment 
of the African Economic Community (AEC) and later in the inauguration of the 
AU. Beyond this, the institutional innovativeness of ECOWAS since the 1990s 
has demonstrated the ways regionalism has flexibly responded to threats to peace 
and security in West Africa, enabled collaboration with non-state actors, and envi-
sioned an “ECOWAS of the Peoples” (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5). In the same way, 
some of the challenges faced by IGAD also point to the limits of state-led regional 
integration efforts and their implications for peace and security in the Horn of 
Africa (see Chapters 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15). It is within the continuum 
between conflict, its prevention, its management, and its resolution that African 
RECs engage and connect to a project of peacebuilding. 
Peacebuilding 
At different times in history, societies have experienced peacebuilding practices
in multiple forms. However, peacebuilding as a theoretical construct and devel-
opment practice assumed prominence only recently, and its early development is
often associated with Johan Galtung (1976). Conceptually, peacebuilding links
security and development “to offer an integrated approach to understanding and
dealing with the full range of issues that threatened peace and security” (Tschirgi,
2003, 1). Thus, the peacebuilding process includes the prevention and resolution
of violent conflicts, consolidation of peace once violence has been reduced, and
post-conflict reconstruction to avoid a relapse into violent conflict. Conceived
in this way, peacebuilding addresses “the proximate and root causes of con-
temporary conflicts including structural, political, socio-cultural, economic and
environmental factors” (Tschirgi, 2003, 1). The UN with its emphasis on such
issues as disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR);
rule of law; security sector reform (SSR); and refugee return and reintegration is
regarded in some circles as aligning with some of the critical elements of peace-
building, if not with a broader context that underscores inclusive development
with a focus on human security. This perspective presents peacebuilding practices
beyond the cessation of violence and hostilities to include deep consideration for
the key indicators of sustainable peace and development (see Diehl, 2006; Mason







The UN’s An Agenda for Peace is a significant landmark in global conscious-
ness on peacebuilding enterprises within the human security framework. The 
former Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros-Ghali, referred to peacebuilding 
as “actions to identify and support structures which will tend to solidify peace 
to avoid a relapse into conflict” (United Nations, 1992). Thus, peacebuilding is 
associated with the “construction of a new environment,” most probably in a 
post-conflict environment (UN General Assembly, 1993). However, the seeming 
restriction of peacebuilding to actions and activities that promote peace in the 
post-conflict phase began to wane within the UN circle in 1995 when Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali, in the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, expanded the 
notion of peacebuilding to include preventive actions. The Brahimi Report further 
improved on the conceptualisation of peacebuilding by presenting it as “activities 
undertaken on the far side of the conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace 
and provide tools for the building of those foundations on something more than 
just the absence of war”. The submission made by the UN Secretary-General’s 
Policy Committee (UNSGPC) in May 2007 further advanced the conceptual treat-
ment of peacebuilding by declaring that peacebuilding practice within the UN 
system involves “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or 
relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict 
management and to lay the foundations for a sustainable peace and development” 
(2007). 
As part of the Western hegemonic agenda, peacebuilding is constructed as a 
post-conflict project connected to an integral part of universalising neoliberal val-
ues and norms. Additionally, peacebuilding interventions offer excellent oppor-
tunities for hegemonic states, as well as international and regional organisations, 
to convert post-conflict societies and other societies under stress into “modern” 
cultures guided by liberal or neoliberal values. According to Omeje (2019, 4), 
modern post-conflict peacebuilding involves mobilisation of efforts and 
resources to rebuild social life at three inter-related levels: (a) rebuilding the 
state and its governance and service delivery institutions, (b) rebuilding the 
economy to support the state and society, (c) rebuilding the society to resus-
citate the fabric of social and community life. 
He goes on to observe that many critics observe the “one-size-fits-all” bias inher-
ent in neoliberal peacebuilding, and its macro-level perspectives on conflict and 
peace (Omeje, 2019, 5). 
The direct contrast to the neoliberal approach to peacebuilding is the “popular 
progressive” model, which is based on the culture, history, and social and politi-
cal structures and forces of conflict and post-conflict societies (see Chapter 3). 
This is also a departure from mainstream peacebuilding and its focus on post-
conflict societies. Its approach to peacebuilding is “maximalist” (Omeje, 2019, 5), 
spanning the “entire conflict spectrum,” including pre-conflict, conflict, and post-
conflict phases. Accordingly, peacebuilding is better conceptualised and practised 
as an “integrated process whose elements include prevention and resolution of 
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conflict, consolidation of peace, once violence has been reduced through system-
atic mediation and reconciliation, and post-conflict reconstruction, with a view to 
avoiding lapses that lead to violent conflict” (Adetula, 2015, 57). 
The regional integration and peacebuilding nexus 
The idea that regional organisations have a key role to play in maintaining peace 
and security is not a recent development. The founding fathers of the United 
Nations proposed an international collective security system that allows regional 
organisations to manage conflicts in their respective regions. Thus, Chapter VIII 
of the Charter of the United Nations provides for such regional arrangements 
to complement the UN Security Council, which has primary responsibility for 
maintaining international peace and security. However, no enforcement action 
shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the 
authorisation of the Security Council, except for measures against an enemy state. 
Also, regional arrangements and agencies are expected to have adequate capacity 
to undertake such action, which of course should either be on the initiative of the 
states concerned or referred by the Security Council. 
The strategic withdrawal of Western powers from Africa in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War had its consequences. The outbreak of violent conflict 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the shock generated by the Rwandan genocide, 
which could have been prevented had the world paid more considerable attention, 
convinced African leaders that the time had come to take the continent’s destiny 
into their own hands. As earlier noted, this spurred them to create a new set of 
innovative norms, principles, and mechanisms aimed at connecting African unity, 
self-reliance, and regional integration to the quest for collective peace, security, 
and development. 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established 
in 1975, pioneered the first regional peace intervention by an African regional 
economic community when civil war broke out in Liberia in 1989 (Adetula, 
2005; Obi, 2009, 121). ECOWAS established a regional peacekeeping force, the 
ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to bring an end to the conflict 
in Liberia, and has since continued to link regional integration to peace and secu-
rity in other countries in the West Africa sub-region: Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Guinea Bissau, and Mali (see Chapters 6, 7, and 8). This laid the foundation for 
building some of the most sophisticated regional conflict prevention and peace-
building norms, mechanisms, and frameworks on the continent. Currently, there 
is variation in conflict management performances by the African RECs generally. 
Their relative success helped in recognising the complex and multiple linkages in 
African conflicts and contributed towards regional approaches to peacebuilding 
imperatives. 
Usually, regional organisations have acted as first responders during peace-
keeping missions before UN forces have intervened. They share in the respon-
sibility for the maintenance of peace and security. For example, regional 




operations active in 2017 (SIPRI, 2018, 103). During that year, African regional 
organisations conducted seven multilateral peace operations: four by the AU and 
three by the RECs (SIPRI, 2018, 107). Fewer multilateral peace operations were 
recorded in 2018, with 60 missions and operations globally, out of which 33 were 
conducted by regional organisations (SIPRI, 2019, 147–148). In 2019, there were 
61 active multilateral peace operations, 20 of them in sub-Saharan Africa (SIPRI, 
2020, 3, 8). The strategic importance of continental and regional organisations 
in the chain of global responses to threats to peace and security is fast gaining 
recognition. 
Most of the conflicts in the Sahelian region, particularly those in Mali, are 
recent examples of how the conflict in one place can spread through the mobility 
of fighters and the proliferation of arms. The flow of armed men and resources 
from a post-Ghaddafi Libya into northern Mali transformed a Tuareg campaign 
into a massive separatist movement. Arguably, the jihadists, insurgents, and other 
militant groups in the Sahel benefitted from the inflow of disbanded fighters and 
arms from Libya. For instance, at the outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria, there was concern that the conflict in Mali would spill over into the coun-
try. In 2012, President Idriss Déby of Chad expressed his fears that Boko Haram 
could destabilise the Lake Chad basin. He called on countries adjoining northern 
Nigeria to institute a joint military force to tackle the militants. In 2013, when 
Mali faced a similar situation, Chad sent troops to support French troops to drive 
al-Qaeda allies out of northern Mali. 
In relation to IGAD and the Horn of Africa, the regional dimension of the con-
flict in Somalia is further complicated by the fact that Somalis are spread across 
the Horn but most noticeably in Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and of course Somalia. 
It is plausible to argue that developments in Somalia at any given time are likely 
to provoke responses and reactions from “the Somali nations” scattered across 
East Africa in solidarity. Also, conflicts and instability in the Great Lakes region, 
particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sudan, and neighbour-
ing South Sudan, have had implications for the countries of the Horn. IGAD has 
played an active role in conflict prevention and mediation in various conflicts in 
the region (see Chapters 9, 10, 14, and 15) and remains active in restoring peace to 
Somalia, as well as in ongoing negotiations directed towards bringing about peace 
between the warring factions in South Sudan. The physical and demographic 
features of Africa and the porosity of its borders make it easy for insurgencies, 
and environment-induced conflicts, to assume a regional character. It is in this 
context, for instance, that climate change, desertification, famine, and drought 
are considered threats to regional peace and security in West, East, and Central 
Africa – and have become the focus of RECs’ efforts towards conflict prevention 
and the restoration of peace. 
The foregoing underscores the point that while most post-Cold War conflicts in 
Africa have been intra-state in nature, they had much broader ramifications. These 
include the destabilisation of neighbouring states and sub-regions because of the 
mobility of fighters, the proliferation of arms, disruption of economic activities, 
instability, internal displacement, and massive inflows and outflows of refugees. 
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The complex and multiple linkages in African conflicts have made regional 
approaches to peacebuilding imperative. Most of the conflicts in the Sahelian 
region, the Lake Chad basin, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes region have 
regional dimensions. It is within this context that African RECs, working with 
African leaders and civil society groups, and with the support of international part-
ners, have directed their energies towards peacebuilding as a critical component 
of regional integration and development. Of note in this regard is the collabora-
tion between the UN, AU, international donors, and RECs, which despite existing 
challenges has recorded some modest successes in West Africa and the Horn of 
Africa. As the chapters of this volume aptly demonstrate, there is a lot that African 
RECs can learn from each other’s experiences in relation to the conceptualisation 
and operationalisation of the nexus of peace and regional integration. 
ECOWAS and IGAD in comparative perspective 
The case studies in the book examine two African RECs: ECOWAS and IGAD. 
Both have in place programmes and activities for promoting peace and security 
in their respective regions. While ECOWAS started out in 1975 (and adopted a 
revised treaty in July 1993) as a regional economic integration program of 16 West 
African states, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development 
(IGADD) was initially established in January 1986 to “combat desertification 
and the effects of drought on food security and rural livelihoods” (Bereketeab, 
2019, 139). Following changes attendant to the end of the Cold War, the emerging 
peace, and the security challenges on the continent, both organisations expanded 
their mandates to cover peace and security-related issues (Adetula, Bereketeab, 
and Jaiyebo, 2016, 21, 29–30; Obi, 2009, 120). 
In July 1993, ECOWAS leaders endorsed the ECOWAS Revised Treaty 
which extended economic and political cooperation, including the creation of 
new institutions: a court, an economic and security council, and a parliament. Of 
note was the introduction of a structure for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, 
the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) – with 14 components, 
including early warning, democracy, and political governance – as well as the 
ECOWAS Standby Force. ECPF has contributed to the success of ECOWAS both 
in terms of the ways it aligns with the AU’s APSA, and the ways it has partnered 
with the AU and the UN in mediating conflicts in the region and restoring peace 
to Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali. 
The lessons learned from the ECOWAS intervention and the ECOMOG peace-
keeping efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone contributed to the consolidation of 
mechanisms for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in West Africa. More 
recently, other regional economic communities (RECs) on the continent have 
replicated the example of the ECOWAS “success story” in mediation, conflict 
prevention, and peacebuilding. Of note is the role IGAD has played in mediating 
and resolving conflicts in the Horn of Africa. IGAD, along the lines of ECOWAS, 
expanded the basis of its regional integration agenda to include conflict manage-




IGAD’s role in the Horn of Africa underscores some of the successes, as well as 
the challenges, RECs face in the promotion of regional peace and security. 
In the case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development 
(IGADD), which was formed in 1986 with the responsibility for coordinating 
regional resource issues – tackling drought, desertification, and food security-
related issues in the Horn of Africa – the heads of state amended the organisation’s 
charter, and changed its name to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) in March 1996. They also expanded its mandate to include “conflict pre-
vention and resolution, economic cooperation and integration” (Bereketeab, 2019, 
139; also see Chapter 11). Bereketeab further notes that IGAD focused on three 
overarching objectives, “food security and environmental protection; promotion 
and maintenance of peace and security; and humanitarian affairs, economic coop-
eration and integration” (Bereketeab, 2019, 139). IGAD’s membership now con-
sists of eight countries that include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, 
Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. 
The experiences and the challenges facing ECOWAS and IGAD in the quest 
for sustainable regional peacebuilding examined in this book relate to the lack of 
adequate resources and capacity in logistics, weaponry, and technical and profes-
sional expertise. Others include the lack of political will among decision-makers 
of member states, competing national interests, and external interference. The 
book interrogates the claim that resource and capacity deficits partly explain the 
tendency of African RECs to rely on external funding and technical support. 
Dependence on external funding may compromise the integrity, legitimacy, and 
ownership of peace mediation, peace operations, and peacebuilding processes. 
Also, the divergence of interests among member states, coupled with the strategic 
interests of powerful donor states, can undermine the consensus necessary for the 
effectiveness of the RECs in their respective regions. 
The records of IGAD and ECOWAS in promoting peace, stability, and devel-
opment in their respective regions are mixed. The chapters in this book offer a 
balanced analysis of the successes and challenges facing both organisations. Both 
RECs play critical roles in peace mediation, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, 
and peacebuilding. Apart from examining the status, roles, and performances of 
ECOWAS and IGAD in regional peace and security, the book explores new ideas 
and actions that are likely to strengthen their capacity to address the challenges 
facing both regions effectively. 
From the foregoing, while ECOWAS and IGAD have expanded their man-
dates in response to emerging changes in their regional contexts, they have also 
experienced certain challenges that have limited their capacity to effectively 
deliver on all aspects of their expanded mandates. In the case of ECOWAS, sev-
eral commentators and analysts have identified institutional and financial weak-
nesses as among the factors hobbling the organisation (Adetula, Bereketeab, and 
Jaiyebo 2016, 24; Obi, 2009, 120). This creates a level of dependency on external 
sources of funding and support, and provides an opportunity for external hegem-
onic actors such as France, the UK, the US, and the EU to leverage their influence 
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It has also been pointed out that ECOWAS has achieved its successes in terms 
of conflict management, peace, and security at the expense of economic integra-
tion and development (see Chapter 6). As pointed out by Sesay, 
the neglect of the economic integration aspects of ECOWAS, evidenced in 
its failure to meet vital community targets and in particular, its inability to 
execute community-wide projects, has left West Africa behind other regions 
in economic development and human development index. 
(Sesay, 2016) 
Another challenge is the weak political will of some of the leaders, who also tend 
to leverage personal, national, or external relationships over regional interests. 
This in many ways undermines the cohesion of the organisation, including its 
capacity to pool internal resources and to act decisively in the face of crises or 
emergencies within the region. 
IGAD has also not been without weaknesses of its own. According to 
Bereketeab (2019, 140), the factors that contribute to its challenges include “its 
structure, dependence on external funding, the lack of capacity to achieve optimal 
results in relation to its stated goals, and Ethiopia’s dominance of the organisa-
tion” (also see chapters 9, 13, 14, and 15). He goes on to identify the structural 
problems facing IGAD, including how these adversely affect its “flexibility, per-
formance and efficiency,” and the influence of donors, operating under the rubric 
of the IGAD Partners Forum (Italy, Canada, UK, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
the US), over the organisation. In his view, external involvement undermines 
IGAD’s autonomy and legitimacy, and like ECOWAS its capacity to embark on 
certain actions. Also like the case of ECOWAS, IGAD’s effectiveness is con-
strained by the lack of political will on the part of some political leaders. As 
Bereketeab (2019, 144) explains, 
IGAD is only as strong as the leaders of a state allow it to be and can engage 
in peace mediation only where the member-states are willing. Evidence of 
this can be seen in the way Ethiopia blocked IGAD from engaging in the 
Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict. 
Also, IGAD’s weaknesses have accounted for some of the inconsistencies and 
limited successes in mediation efforts in several countries of the region, including 
Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia (see Chapters 9, 10, 13, and 14). 
While Ethiopia may be perceived as a hegemonic player in the IGAD region 
(and Uganda and Kenya to a lesser extent), the same cannot be said of Nigeria, 
which is ECOWAS’s largest donor, but which does not exert hegemonic influence 
over the regional organisation (Udo and Ekott 2013). Also while ECOWAS has 
been able to build a strong partnership with civil society organisations in setting 
up a sophisticated early warning system and election monitoring processes (see 
Chapters 4 and 5), “IGAD is perceived as a weak link with regard to civil soci-




process” (Bereketeab, 2019, 148). However, many analysts are of the view that, 
in spite of the relative successes of ECOWAS and IGAD in the area of peace and 
security – ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire, 
and IGAD in Somalia and the Sudan–South Sudan War – both RECs seem to have 
achieved this at the expense of effective economic integration. However, it has 
also been observed that ECOWAS has during the same period developed a more 
sophisticated peace and security architecture, as well as stronger mechanisms and 
connections with civil society, while IGAD has yet to overcome external inter-
ventions, build strong mechanisms, and foster an effective level of participation 
by civil society in its peace and security institutions and processes. As the chap-
ters of this volume aptly show, both organisations have a lot to learn about, and 
from, each other, and have great potential to expand the frontiers of peacebuilding 
in their respective regions. 
Structure and organisation of the book 
This book is structured in four parts. Part I focuses on the introductory overview 
and conceptual dimensions, legal and theoretical, of peacebuilding in West Africa 
and the Horn of Africa, and its relevance to the regional integration–peacebuilding 
nexus. It is followed by Part II, which explores ECOWAS’s evolving approach to 
regional peacebuilding in West Africa, particularly the shift from a state to a par-
ticipatory, and people-centred, paradigm. In Part III, the chapters provide analy-
ses of institutional approaches to ECOWAS peacebuilding, one exploring the role 
of a regional power, and the other exploring the role of international cooperation 
partners. In Part IV, which is the largest section of the book, there are case stud-
ies based on analyses of how ECOWAS–member state and IGAD–member state 
relations impact and shape peacebuilding, peace, and security in West Africa and 
the Horn of Africa, as well as the prospects for the future. 
In Chapter 2, “RECs and peacebuilding in Africa: analysis of legal framework 
and concerns for international law,” Olugbemi Jaiyebo and Victor Adetula ana-
lyse the legal challenges that RECs face in expanding their original mandates 
beyond economic development to include peacebuilding roles. In this regard, the 
authors also interrogate “the legal impetus that supranationality gives the African 
Union and other RECs in furtherance of their peacebuilding mandate,” and show 
how “the existing legal infrastructure puts the RECs at an advantage over the UN 
and other external actors in the areas of right of access to the theatre of conflict, 
enforcement of ceasefire agreements, discipline, and oversight of international 
personnel.” 
In Chapter 3, “Peacebuilding in Africa: popular–progressive versus neoliberal 
approaches,” Redie Bereketeab critiques the conceptual underpinnings of neo-
liberal peacebuilding, and makes a case for a progressive alternative. The chap-
ter discusses neoliberal peacebuilding as an interventionist paradigm designed to 
rebuild post-conflict societies along the lines of liberal/modern societies based on 
the universalisation of Western values, norms, and models. It notes that neoliberal 
peacebuilding is “unsustainable and dysfunctional as it is an external imposition 
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and fails to cohere with specific realities of the particular society,” and calls for 
a more viable option that should ideally utilise “domestic resources and infra-
structures such as cultural, social, historical, structural, institutional, indigenous, 
etc. authorities” of African societies. On this basis the chapter makes a case for 
progressive peacebuilding as an alternative to the imposition of interventionist 
neoliberal policies on Africa’s conflict-affected states. 
In Chapter 4, “Towards a human security-centred approach to peacebuilding: 
ECOWAS’s experiences and lessons,” Remi Ajibewa and Jubril Agbolade Shittu 
provide an in-depth analysis of ECOWAS’s efforts to transition from a state-cen-
tred to a people-centred approach to regional peace and security. The chapter pro-
vides a clear explanation of the introduction of institutional, structural, and human 
security approaches to regional peacebuilding, consistent with the tenets of the 
ECOWAS Vision 2020, which was adopted in 2007, to transform the organisation 
from an “ECOWAS of States, to an ECOWAS of Peoples.” The authors engage 
with some of the challenges ECOWAS has faced in this regard and propose some 
solutions for addressing them. They conclude that these experiences and les-
sons, particularly those regarding its inclusion of civil society organisations in its 
agenda for human security and people-centred integration, should be shared with 
other African RECs. 
Following this, Chapter 5, by Chukwuemeka Eze, “Civil society organisations 
and the ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda: a case study of the West African 
Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP),” is based on a case study of WANEP’s 
engagement and partnership with ECOWAS in the areas of people-centred conflict 
prevention, conflict management, and mediation. It unpacks the factors that drive 
civil society engagement with ECOWAS in West Africa. The chapter examines 
the ECOWAS–civil society partnership in the context of the successful realisa-
tion of ECOWAS’s Vision 2020 but notes that much work still needs to be done. 
In Chapter 6, Amadu Sesay, writing on “ECOWAS and the limits of peace-
making in West Africa,” provides a succinct analysis of the organisation in rela-
tion to “the significant progress in the areas of conflict prevention, management, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement in West Africa.” The chapter 
also provides a historical perspective on the evolution of ECOWAS, and notes 
that ECOWAS’s “venture into the realm of peacemaking and peace support oper-
ations is in many ways fortuitous,” and concludes that, while it turned out to be a 
“successful security community,” it “failed to promote economic development in 
the member-states.” 
Chapter 7, “ECOWAS and triangular cooperation for peacebuilding in West 
Africa: challenges and prospects from the Liberian and Sierra Leonean expe-
riences,” by Kehinde Olusola Olayode, provides critical insights into how the 
contributions of partnerships framed within a South–South triangular coopera-
tion framework impacted peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The chapter 
examines the experiences (and prospects) of bilateral and multilateral partnerships 
for international peacebuilding support in West Africa, against a background of 
the overstretching of ECOWAS’s limited capacities and resources. Drawing on 
ECOWAS relations with the United Nations, the African Union, India, Brazil, and 
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the South Africa forum (IBSA), as well as other Western powers and non-Western 
emerging powers, the author unpacks the challenges facing South–South triangu-
lar cooperation with Liberia and Sierra Leone. While noting the bright prospects 
of triangular cooperation, a compelling case is made for better coordination by 
donor states and organisations. More fundamentally, the author proposes greater 
ownership, capacity, and control by ECOWAS member states over the region’s 
peacebuilding agenda. 
Oshita A. Oshita and Warisu Oyesina Alli, in Chapter 8, “Nigeria’s role in 
the ECOWAS Peace and Security Agenda for West Africa,” explore Nigeria’s 
pivotal role in shaping the organisation’s role in promoting peace and security 
in West Africa. They examine Nigeria’s regional leadership credentials and how 
they played into its provision of the human and material resources necessary for 
ECOWAS’s peace interventions across the region. After reviewing Nigeria’s 
immense contributions to ECOWAS’s mediation peacekeeping, peace support 
operations, and peace and security architecture, they argue that, given the coun-
try’s economic challenges, the burden of mobilising human and material resources 
needs to be equitably shared among member states. 
In Chapter 9, “The IGAD–Eritrea impasse: future prospects in light of recent 
developments,” Senai W. Andemariam explores the tensions underpinning 
Eritrea–IGAD–AU relations, and attributes these to Eritrea’s view that Ethiopia 
had used its dominance of IGAD to marginalise the country, hence the decision to 
suspend its membership of the organisation. Thus, while Eritrea was able to return 
to the AU in 2011, the same effort to reactivate its membership of IGAD was 
rebuffed, partly due to Ethiopia’s opposition. The author engages with Eritrea, 
making a case for economic integration as a step towards resolving the political 
issues preventing the reactivation of its membership of IGAD. 
Chapter 10, by Nureldin Satti, “Lessons to be learned from IGAD’s involve-
ment in the Sudan peace process (1993–2005),” critically examines the various 
aspects of IGAD’s mediation and peacemaking efforts in Sudan, and how this 
impacted the outcome of the peace process. It analyses the context within which 
IGAD mediation engaged the two conflicting sides, the government of Sudan and 
the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, as well as international 
partners, culminating in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA). The author unpacks the role of the various stakeholders which even-
tually contributed to the secession and independence of South Sudan in 2011. 
Drawing on lessons from IGAD’s involvement, he argues for minimising external 
influences “by ensuring the financial, technical and intellectual independence of 
IGAD.” 
In Chapter 11, Kizito Sabala, writing on “Kenya’s diplomacy and international 
relations within the IGAD region on matters of peace and security: growth, devel-
opment, and prospects,” focuses on the country’s contribution to IGAD’s peace 
and security agenda. The author addresses the evolution of Kenya’s engage-
ment with IGAD in relation to peace and security, zeroing in on the conflict in 
Somalia, the Sudan–South Sudan War, the CPA followed by the independence of 
South Sudan, and the conflict that engulfed Africa’s youngest state. The chapter 
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concludes by examining the prospects of Kenya’s diplomacy noting its strategic 
interests in peacebuilding and stabilisation efforts in the IGAD region. 
This is followed by Chapter 12, “Uganda and the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD),” in which Kasaija Phillip Apuuli provides an in-depth 
analysis of Uganda–IGAD relations, with an emphasis on the latter’s peace and 
security programs. Of note is the attention paid to Uganda’s involvement in peace 
processes in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, and the IGAD’s Conflict Early 
Warning System (CEWARN). The chapter also provides explanations for IGAD’s 
non-intervention in conflicts in Uganda, the accumulated arrears of Uganda’s 
IGAD membership dues, as well as the country’s ambivalent relationship with 
Sudan and Ethiopia and its unilateral involvement in the war in South Sudan. This 
also suggests how divisions within IGAD member states weaken the organisation, 
and how Uganda’s membership of the East African Community may also under-
mine its commitment to IGAD. 
In Chapter 13, “Peacebuilding in the context of Ethiopia–IGAD relations,” 
Kassahun Berhanu unpacks this complex relationship, particularly Ethiopia’s 
position as a pivotal state within the region, and how the perception of the state as 
a US ally has made it a target of terrorist and extremist groups in the region. The 
chapter argues that such perceptions have wider implications for regional peace-
building efforts, particularly for those who question Ethiopia’s motives within the 
Horn. The author highlights some of Ethiopia’s contributions towards strengthen-
ing IGAD’s peacebuilding roles but notes the challenges that the Ethiopia–Eritrea 
rivalry pose for the organisation. 
Mohammed Haji Ingiris, in Chapter 14, “The big elephant in the room: the 
meddling and machinations of IGAD and Ethiopia in Somalia,” interrogates what 
he describes as the “Ethiopianisation of IGAD.” The author unpacks the role of 
Ethiopia as a hegemonic regional actor in the Horn of Africa, and its “intrusion 
into Somali affairs,” using the politics of IGAD peacebuilding. He provides an 
overview of the changing relationship between Somalia and IGAD, and the evolu-
tion of Ethiopia’s influence over the latter during the various mediations, conflict 
management, peace operations, and peacebuilding processes in Somalia. In con-
cluding, the author does not foreclose the possibility that the Somali people will 
someday regain control of the politics of nationhood and peacebuilding in their 
country. 
Jacob D. Chol explores in Chapter 15, “‘You don’t own peace’: the coward 
state, South Sudan, and IGAD relations,” the relationship between IGAD and the 
government of South Sudan. The chapter provides an overview of IGAD’s media-
tion in the South Sudan conflict, including the complications arising from this, the 
weakness of the South Sudanese state, as well as the competing interests of neigh-
bouring countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. The author then explores 
ways for improving relations between IGAD and the government of South Sudan 
based on confidence and trust-building. 
There is a consensus by all the contributors to this volume that although 
ECOWAS and IGAD have achieved some levels of success, both RECs have a 
lot to learn from each other in their quest to connect peace and security to their 
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regional integration projects. There is a concern in some circles that regional 
peace and security gains have eclipsed regional economic integration in Africa. 
The challenge, therefore, is to continue to strengthen existing regional peace and 
security mechanisms and processes, while equally prioritising the consolidation 
of regional economic integration by ECOWAS and IGAD in West Africa and 
the Horn of Africa. African RECs will for the foreseeable future play a key role 
in addressing the structural, economic, political, and institutional challenges that 
militate against peace and development in Africa. Addressing these challenges 
in West Africa and the Horn of Africa will require not just an “ECOWAS of the 
People” and “IGAD of the People,” but an “Africa of the People,” consistent with 
vision underpinning Agenda 2063. 
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2 Regional economic communities 
and peacebuilding in Africa 
Analysis of legal framework and concerns for 
international law 
Olugbemi Jaiyebo and Victor Adetula 
Introduction 
The original mandates of African regional economic communities (RECs)
were tilted towards economic objectives with less attention to peacebuilding.
However, the hardcore purpose of the RECs could only be realised if the regions
were peaceful and secure. Prevalence of violent conflicts in Africa, particularly
since the end of the Cold War, as well as growing awareness about peace as a
precondition for development, motivated African states to expand the mandates
of the RECs to include responsibility for ensuring regional peace and security.
Also, the changes and developments in the international system, such as the
seeming retreat of the great powers from active involvement outside their imme-
diate regions, played a crucial role. An apparent shift in the strategic interests of
the global North away from Africa reinforced the necessity for African solutions
to African problems. 
RECs now function as part of the continent-wide peace and security archi-
tecture that is managed essentially by the African Union (AU) within the United 
Nations’ mandate to promote global peace and security. This function spans the 
entire peace process spectrum from conflict prevention to peacebuilding, pertain-
ing to matters such as effective delivery of public goods to citizens and measures 
to achieve sustainable peace between parties in conflicts that ordinarily should 
be the responsibility of the state. Adherence to international law is a precondi-
tion for generating political and moral legitimacy. Consequently, the involve-
ment of external actors in the domestic affairs of the conflict-affected countries 
requires definite legal frameworks and clear normative standards. What are the 
legal frameworks for the new roles of RECs, and what is the extent of compli-
ance with international law? With a focus on the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), this chapter examines the legal frameworks through which the African 
Union and African RECs engage the complexities of peacebuilding. Additionally, 
the chapter demonstrates how the existing legal infrastructure puts the RECs at 
an advantage over the UN and other external actors in the areas of right of access 
to the theatre of conflict, enforcement of ceasefire agreements, discipline, and 
oversight of international personnel. The chapter concludes that the future of 
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peacebuilding in Africa depends on the transformation of Africans RECs into 
functional supranational institutions. 
Frameworks for continental and regional interventions 
When initially incorporated into the lexicon of international law, “peacebuild-
ing” encapsulated actions supporting processes and structures that strengthen 
and consolidate peace to avoid a relapse into conflict (United Nations, 1992). 
Peacebuilding is closely associated with the purpose of the UN to maintain global 
peace, which prioritises conflict prevention (United Nations, 2015). Attempts to 
harmonise the UN peacebuilding components gave rise to the idea of a peace-
building architecture for the UN. Eventually, the UN Peacebuilding Commission 
(PBC) was created by concurrent resolutions of the Security Council and General 
Assembly to coordinate and reinforce the UN peacebuilding architecture.1 
The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the AU’s primary 
mechanism for promoting peace and security. APSA has the mandate to promote 
and develop strong partnerships for peace and security with the AU, the United 
Nations, and other international organisations. Vital elements of APSA include 
the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System 
(CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), and the 
Peace Fund. The PSC serves as a collective security and early-warning arrange-
ment to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflicts and crises in Africa. 
Its mandate includes the development of policies and action required to ensure 
that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent takes 
place within the framework of the Union’s objectives and priorities. 
The PSC promulgated the African Union Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
and Development (PCRD) to guide improvements in the timeliness, effectiveness, 
and coordination of activities in post-conflict countries, and to lay the foundation 
for social justice and sustainable peace. The PCRD is a product of wide consul-
tation that involved all African RECs and their state members. It acknowledges 
the dependence of its successful implementation on the active engagement of 
regional groupings and their institutions and envisages regional guidelines for its 
implementation and regional focal points to support its processes. 
The PCRD is a tool to: a) consolidate peace and prevent relapses into violence; 
b) address the root causes of conflict; c) encourage and fast-track the planning 
and implementation of reconstruction activities; and d) enhance complementari-
ties and coordination between and among diverse actors engaged in PCRD pro-
cesses.2 The end state of the PCRD is one where peace, law, and order prevail; the 
humanitarian situation has stabilised and populations are able to meet their basic 
needs; political mechanisms and institutions have been established to prevent and 
manage conflict through peaceful means and to institutionalise equitable partici-
pation in political and socioeconomic life; and access to justice is ensured and 
human rights are guaranteed. 
Paragraph 4 (b) of the African Union’s PCRD states that the intervention pro-
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of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, determine that a situation warrants 
attention, or when parties to a conflict have demonstrated the political will to 
resolve differences through political negotiation, or have ceased hostilities, or 
have signed a peace agreement. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
of the African Union gave official recognition to eight sub-regional economic 
communities: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA); the East African Community (EAC); the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS); the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); 
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).3 The peace and 
security infrastructure of the AU has continental application and each of the eight 
RECs has endeavoured to align the contents and provisions of their legal frame-
works with the AU’s framework.4 
The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) is the platform for 
peacebuilding in the ECOWAS region.5 The ECPF is a 
comprehensive operational conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategy
that enables the ECOWAS system and member states to draw upon human
and financial resources at the regional (including civil society and the pri-
vate sector) and international levels in their efforts to creatively transform
conflict. 
(ECOWAS, 2008, Article 7) 
It places primary responsibility for peace and security on ECOWAS member 
states (ECOWAS, 2008, Preamble). It comprises 14 components that span a chain 
of initiatives designed to strengthen human security and incorporate conflict pre-
vention activities (operational and structural), as well as aspects of peacebuild-
ing (ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, para. 42). The 14 components 
are early-warning; preventive diplomacy; democracy and political governance; 
human rights and the rule of law; media; natural resource governance; cross-bor-
der initiatives; security governance; practical disarmament; women, peace, and 
security; youth empowerment; the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF); humanitarian 
assistance; and peace education (the Culture of Peace).6 
ECOWAS has embarked on several peace initiatives since the ECPF came into 
effect, without any reference to the application or implementation of the frame-
work. For example, ECOWAS recognises that the increasing incidence of clashes 
between farmers and pastoralists, rural banditry, electoral violence, and ethnic 
and religious violence in Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Mali 
are matters of urgent concern that require preventive interventions (ECOWAS, 
2016). However, there is no record or at best very little evidence of ECOWAS’s 
involvement at the level of mediation or active negotiation or physical deploy-
ment, for instance, in conflicts in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, northern Ghana, 
the Tuareg uprising in Niger, or the separatist agitations in the Casamance region 
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states, thereby revealing the weak commitment of ECOWAS member states to 
the normative elements of human security enshrined in the ECPF (Ismail, 2011). 
The supranational status of ECOWAS integrates the ECPF into the laws of 
ECOWAS member states and therefore has the potential to resolve the contra-
dictions inherent in the interface of peacebuilding and sovereignty. The ECPF 
incorporates the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (1999), and the Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance (2001). “Without prejudice to other regional and 
international legal instruments, the Mechanism and the Supplementary Protocol 
on Democracy and Good Governance provide the principal basis and justifica-
tion for the ECPF” (ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, paras 36–39). 
Article 53 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security abrogated incompat-
ible provisions of the 1981 ECOWAS Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance 
in Defence and the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression. The ECPF resolved, at 
least theoretically, the contention between regime security and human security in 
favour of the latter, thereby negating the propositions that the defence and mili-
tary protocols were mere “regime protection” strategies to serve the interests of 
ECOWAS leaders and “insure” them against external and internal security threats 
(Francis, 2009). 
ECOWAS is imbued with the necessary supranational powers (acting on behalf 
of and in conjunction with member states, the AU, and the UN), as well as the 
legitimacy to intervene to protect human security in three distinct ways, namely: 
a. The Responsibility to prevent – actions taken to address the direct and root 
causes of conflicts that put populations at risk. 
b. The Responsibility to react – actions taken in response to grave and compel-
ling humanitarian disasters. 
c. The Responsibility to rebuild – actions taken to ensure recovery, reconstruc-
tion, rehabilitation, and reconciliation in the aftermath of violent conflicts, 
humanitarian or natural disasters. 
(ECOWAS, 2008) 
In their search for a mandate and legitimacy to intervene to protect human secu-
rity, the drafters of the ECPF took refuge in “moral obligations” that are “beyond 
legal instruments and guidelines.” The regulation should have equipped the 
moral imperatives with legality and transitioned morality to law. Predicating the 
mandate and legitimacy on morals rather than law undermines the very legit-
imacy the ECPF seeks to establish. ECOWAS’s ability to generate consensus 
on its moral imperatives would have added momentum to the process of recog-
nising Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a legal duty of member states in the 
West African sub-region. R2P adjusts state sovereignty by declaring that for a 
state’s sovereignty to be respected, the state must demonstrate responsibility 
to its citizens. A logical consequence is that interpretations of laws of occupa-
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inappropriateness in all circumstances of coercive use of force to effect political 
change in another state; while on the other, there is evidence that where the use 
of force does occur, there is an emerging obligation to intervene and contribute to 
reconstruction (Arcila, 2007). 
IGAD has the primary task of coordinating efforts to address regional resource 
issues. It was formed in 1996 to replace the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Drought and Development (IGADD).7 Its membership consists of six coun-
tries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. In Article 6A of 
the “Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development” 
(IGAD Agreement), there is a solemn reaffirmation of the principles of non-inter-
ference in the internal affairs of member states, the peaceful settlement of inter- 
and intra-state conflicts through dialogue, and maintenance of regional peace, 
stability, and security. The principles in Article 6 of the IGAD Agreement are pat-
terned after the OAU model in vogue during the Cold War era. The IGAD prin-
ciples of non-interference and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts only 
through dialogue stand in conflict with the AU Constitutive Act which is designed 
to meet contemporary challenges of peace and security on the African continent. 
The Horn of Africa is bedevilled by serious inter- and intrastate conflicts. The 
IGAD Secretariat established a peace and security division and, in 2003, the 
IGAD Heads of State tasked the Secretariat with developing a comprehensive 
peace and security strategy. 
In April 2005, IGAD adopted the memorandum of understanding and budget 
for the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). IGAD 
is confronted with the problem of lack of funding. None of the member states is 
rich enough to provide support in the way that Nigeria supported the operations 
of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. Hence, the accomplishments of IGAD have been marginal compared with 
either the ECOWAS or the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Notwithstanding its challenges, IGAD has been engaged in complex reconcilia-
tion work in the region and cooperates closely with APSA. 
The SADC’s security infrastructure is provided for in the Protocol on Politics,
Defence, and Security. The Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) provides a frame-
work for defence cooperation and lays a foundation for establishing a security
community. In response to the African Union’s efforts to establish an African
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the SADC has established a standby
brigade (SADCBRIG) with policing (SADCPOL) and civilian components.
The SADCBRIG is designed with capabilities to rapidly undertake the follow-
ing types of operations: observation missions, peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing including complex multidimensional peace operations, peace enforcement,
robust peace support operations, and humanitarian interventions in grave circum-
stances. The brigade was formally launched, and troop requirements have been
met, and they have agreed on a common peace support doctrine. A permanent
planning element (PLANELM) has been established at the SADC Secretariat for
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The strengthening of peace, security, stability, and good governance is speci-
fied in the aims and objectives of COMESA.8 In 1999, COMESA Authority man-
dated its Ministers of Foreign Affairs to meet annually to deliberate on matters 
regarding the promotion of peace, security, and stability in the regional economic 
community (May 1999 Fourth Summit). The Union of the Arab Maghreb (AMU) 
had no explicit mandate on peace and security in its Constitutive Treaty, but the 
objectives of the treaty include ensuring regional stability and enhancing policy 
coordination. In 2012 member states began developing strategies to combat ter-
rorism and organised crime, and to enhance cooperation in the region (United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2013). To date, the AMU has not 
engaged in substantive conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. While the 
goal of CEN-SAD is the creation of an open market and an area of freedom and 
solidarity, it has also instituted the Mechanism for Prevention, Management, and 
Resolution of the Conflicts (CENSAD Report, 2011). 
In January 2012, the EAC adopted the Protocol on Peace and Security as 
well as the EAC Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution Mechanism. 
The EAC Peace and Security Protocol identified over 20 objectives for fostering 
regional peace and security, including combating terrorism and piracy; peace sup-
port operations; prevention of genocide; disaster management and crisis response; 
management of refugees; control of proliferation of small arms and light weap-
ons; and combating transnational and cross-border crimes. The EAC Conflict 
Prevention, Management, and Resolution Mechanism also includes initiatives for 
the prevention of conflicts where early-warning systems are an integral part of the 
peace and security workings of EAC. The EAC infrastructure has yet to be tested. 
The ECCAS Protocol of Peace and Security established the Security Council 
in Central Africa (COPAX). COPAX has three vital organs: the Commission for 
Defence and Security, the Central African Early Warning System, and the Central 
African Multinational Force. In furtherance of the COPAX Protocol and the 
Mutual Assistance Pact, FOMAC was established in February 2000 as ECCAS’s 
multinational non-permanent standby force. In October 2009, ECCAS adopted 
the Protocol Relating to the Strategy to Secure ECCAS’s Gulf of Guinea and 
the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government on Maritime Safety and 
Security to promote the regional maritime security in the Central African region 
in 2013. ECCAS has been active in efforts to restore order, stability, and security 
in the region. ECCAS was present in the CAR from 2008 to 2013 with the Peace 
Consolidation Mission in the CAR or MICOPAX (Meyer, 2015). 
Of the 54 member states of the AU, 309 belong to two of the eight AU-recognised 
RECs, ten10 are parties to three RECs, and 14 have obligations to only one of 
the eight AU-recognised RECs.11 Membership of multiple RECs was an initial 
hindrance to the attainment of peace on the continent. ECCAS, for example, 
is formed by states that are also members of the SADC, EAC, COMESA, and 
CEN-SAD. Over time, however, there has been increasing collaboration between 
RECs and the AU and between RECs within and across regions. In July 2008, 
the Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (established by CEMAC 
in 2002 to promote peace and security in the conflict-inflicted Central African 
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Republic) was transferred to ECCAS, a parallel organisation within the region, 
and made a part of COPAX (Meyer, 2015). The General Secretariat of CEN-SAD 
has cooperation agreements with COMESA and ECOWAS on security, among 
other issues. The CEN-SAD Secretariat General and ECOWAS Commission are 
expected to invite each other, as observers, to their meetings (CENSAD Report, 
2011). EAC, IGAD, COMESA, the European Union, and the Indian Ocean 
Commission established a regional action plan against piracy to ensure regional 
maritime security (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2013). The 
AU recognises RECs as official representatives of regional associations of African 
states that have increasingly taken up prominent roles in conflict resolution and 
peace support operations. Admittedly, African RECs have different degrees of 
engagement and success in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes. The 
deepening economic and social crises in many African countries, as well as the 
frequency, intractability, and spill-over effects of violent conflicts, place massive 
moral obligations on the RECs to act. In the not-too-distant future, these develop-
ments might stimulate the emergence of new African international law. 
Humanitarian intervention as a legal framework and a political tool used by 
the international community is still a controversial issue in world politics and has 
been criticised as a new form of imperialism by the global North to exploit the 
global South (Halistoprak, 2015). The principle of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of member states is central to the UN; how will it be reconciled with the 
exigencies of the principle of R2P as enshrined in the ECOWAS and AU conflict 
management frameworks? The differences in the approaches to the principle of 
R2P adopted by these organisations could generate problems when logistics and 
resource constraints demand a handover by ECOWAS and/or the AU to the UN. 
Coordination among RECs, the AU, and the UN 
A review of the legal instruments of the UN, the AU, and RECs shows the pos-
sibilities of coordination and cooperation on peacebuilding. In 2007, the UN 
General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/61/296 on cooperation between 
the UN and the AU, requesting the UN system to intensify its assistance to the 
AU, especially in terms of putting into operation its PSC. The UN seconded a 
staff member to provide support for the AU’s Panel of the Wise. Since 2008, the 
UN Secretariat and the AU Commission have progressively enhanced interac-
tion with regular consultative meetings. On 1 July 2010, the General Assembly 
consolidated and upgraded UN’s interface with the AU by creating the UN Office 
to the AU, headed by an Assistant Secretary-General. The office was formally 
inaugurated on 22 February 2011 and integrated the peace and security presences 
in Addis Ababa: the UN Liaison Office, the AU Peace and Support Team, the 
UN Planning Team for AMISOM, and the administrative functions of the Joint 
Support and Coordination Mechanism of the AU–UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
(Security Council Report, 2011). These culminated in the 2017 Joint UN–AU 
Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. The partnership 
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mechanisms such as the Joint Task Force on Peace and Security, the UN–AU 
Annual Conference, the AU Permanent Observer Mission to the UN, and the UN 
Office to the AU. There is, on the one hand, the cordial working relationship 
between the UN Secretary-General and AU Commission Chairperson and, on the 
other hand, functional day-to-day working relationships between special envoys, 
focal points, and other staff. Cooperation on mediation is particularly advanced, 
and relationships on electoral support and the “Silencing the Guns” initiative are 
growing, but the partnership is weakest on peacebuilding and post-conflict recon-
struction (Forti and Singh, 2019). 
The founding document of the PBC envisaged a role for regional and sub-
regional organisations in the work of the commission and anticipated that the PBC 
would serve as a vehicle to develop REC capacity in peacebuilding processes. 
The PBC is engaged in six IGAD and ECOWAS member states: Sierra Leone, 
Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, the Central African Republic, and Guinea, with 
Sierra Leone and Burundi being the first two PBC focus countries. The experience 
has been that the approach to peacebuilding continues to be compartmentalised 
and the first decade of the PBC’s existence has made minimal contributions to the 
peacebuilding capabilities of the regional and sub-regional organisations of the 
focus countries. 
Effective global–regional partnership is possible through increased consulta-
tion, cooperation, and collaboration but the dominant actors must change their 
orientations and become more supportive of a regionalist approach in the pursuit 
of international security and peace (Adetula, 2015). The UN Security Council 
(UNSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) relationship has 
been quite dynamic to say the least. The case of Côte d’Ivoire was revealing in 
some respects. African states were generally uncomfortable with the way UN 
and French forces carried out the military operations that resulted in the arrest of 
President Laurent Gbagbo. Both the chair of the AU and Thabo Mbeki, former 
President of South Africa and AU mediator for Côte d’Ivoire, declared the mili-
tary intervention as unjustified. For Mbeki, what happened in Côte d’Ivoire was 
simply “the UN entrenching former colonial powers on our continent” (Mbeki, 
2011). UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon defended the UN intervention, claim-
ing that the forces acted strictly within the framework of the responsibility to 
protect (R2P), based on UNSC Resolution 1975 of 30 March 2011 (Schori, 2015). 
The case of Libya demonstrated how a lack of consultation could hamper the 
development and consolidation of a global–regional partnership on peace. The 
UN and AU had different perceptions and interpretations of the issues involved in 
the conflict, and made no effort to coordinate their conflict-resolution strategies. 
Ultimately, the AU felt deliberately side-lined and this was interpreted as a con-
spiracy to ignore African efforts to resolve the conflict. The response to the mili-
tary coup in Guinea-Bissau also pitched the AU, European Union (EU), and the 
UN against ECOWAS, whose mediation resulted in the setting up of a transitional 
government that the other organisations would not recognise (Adetula, 2015). The 
indications are that the AU wants to be recognised as the leading regional organ 
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the UN Security Council, which does not appear prepared to cede its mandate 
of maintaining global peace and security to regional organisations (Bam, 2012, 
8). Additionally, the UN’s post-conflict peacekeeping approach, which requires 
a ceasefire agreement and prior consent of parties to the conflict, does not lend 
itself easily to the realities of African conflicts, as was experienced in Rwanda, 
Darfur, and Somalia (Adetula, 2015). Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act gives 
the AU the right to intervene in a member state according to “a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity.” These provisions give the AU a right of access to thea-
tres of conflict that other external actors do not have. The AU is also uniquely ena-
bled to implement strategies for the prevention of violent conflicts. It is a radical 
departure from the principle of non-interference embodied in the United Nations 
Charter. 
Other areas of growing tension that may impact continuous cooperation 
between African countries and the UN system include the unrepresentative-
ness of the UN Security Council and the misuse of prosecutorial discretion at 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). Further to UN Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolutions 1593 (2005) and 1970 (2011), arrest warrants were issued for Omar 
Al Bashir, Sudan’s Head of State, in 2009 for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and in 2010 for genocide, and Muammar Gaddafi, the Head of State 
of Libya, in 2011 for crimes against humanity. The AU passed a resolution of 
non-cooperation with respect to the arrest warrants. The ICC filed findings of 
non-compliance against the African states that received the Heads of States. In 
rejecting the ICC’s findings of non-compliance, the AU reaffirmed that by receiv-
ing President Bashir, the Republic of Chad, Kenya, and Djibouti were discharging 
their obligations under Article 23 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and 
Article 98 of the Rome Statute as well as acting in pursuit of peace and stability 
in their respective regions (African Union, 2011). The tipping point was when the 
prosecutor filed charges against the President and Vice President of Kenya. The 
AU condemned the move and fiercely asserted immunity for all serving Heads of 
State on the continent (African Union, 2013). 
African leaders have sought to address some of the asymmetries in UN–Africa 
relations by demanding for the reform of the security council by making it more 
representative of all regions of the world. However, the resistance of the perma-
nent members of the Security Council to demands for the restructuring exempli-
fies the desire for the preservation of the status quo by the P5 that dominates the 
UNSC, and by extension the architecture of global security (Adetula, 2015). It 
should, however, be acknowledged that concerted continuous efforts have been 
made to streamline and enhance the effectiveness of international peacebuilding 
processes. 
Conclusion and lessons learned 
Regional economic communities, particularly the AU, have been increasingly 
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a renewed commitment of African states to the regionalist approach to peace and 
security. However, while the dominant international relations discourse in the 
post-Cold War era acknowledges complex interdependence as one of the defining 
characteristics of the global system and tends to favour the regionalist approach in 
the management of inter-state relations, states are still generally protective of their 
sovereignty despite the overwhelming impact of globalisation processes (Jaiyebo 
and Adetula, 2013). 
African regional organisations have made appreciable progress in ensuring 
peace and security in Africa. In 2017, African continental and regional organi-
sations deployed seven multilateral peace operations on the continent (SIPRI, 
2018, 107). Each of these operations had its own success stories and challenges. 
Some of the main lessons include the need to strengthen the legal and institutional 
frameworks for regional collective peace and security systems, clarify roles, and 
guide the harmonisation of existing strategies and programmes. International reg-
ulations, such as the requirement of a formal invitation in the case of the United 
Nations and the rule of engagement that peace troops must remain neutral and 
only exercise a minimum of violence, limit the effectiveness of multilateral peace 
operations and need to be reviewed. 
The interface of sovereignty with peacebuilding interventions by external 
actors is a slippery terrain. Peacekeepers and other personnel deployed to provide 
essential services in the conflict zones sometimes have to relate to the population 
in much the same way that governmental actors do within a country. This becomes 
a critical consideration with transitional administration, where the international 
operation acts as a state (Zwanenburg, 2004). With governmental functions 
upheld only with the assistance of external actors, pragmatism drives questions of 
sovereignty to the rear. The government is in a state of extreme vulnerability and 
the only restraint on external actors is their sense of self-restraint. The vital ques-
tion of how to ensure accountability at all levels must be attended to. 
There is considerable clarity in international law on the responsibility of the 
state for its actions, for the actions of organs acting on its behalf, including inter-
national organisations, and for the actions of organs of other states placed at its 
disposal. Article 6 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility (Draft Articles) provides that the conduct of an organ placed at 
the disposal of a state by another state shall be considered an act of the former 
under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the 
governmental authority of the state at whose disposal it is placed.12 Article 7 of 
the Draft Articles states that the conduct of an organ of a state or of a person or 
entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be 
considered an act of the state under international law if the organ, person, or entity 
acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions. 
Within the context of peacebuilding, the host state bears residual responsibility 
for the actions of the entire peacebuilding team. For the avoidance of all doubts, 
Article 8 of the Draft Articles states that the conduct of a person or group of per-
sons shall be considered an act of a state under international law if the person or 
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of, that state in carrying out the conduct. The direct responsibility of interna-
tional organisations in international law is in its formative stages. The Drafting 
Committee of the International Law Commission has considered Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of International organisations. See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.632 of 
4 June 2003.13 
The responsibilities of private companies and consultants for illegal acts 
committed in the course of peacebuilding are also becoming clearer. Unlike 
international responsibility, which is legal, the accountability of international 
organisations can present itself in different forms: legal, political, administrative, 
or financial (Zwanenburg, 2004). The accountability of international organisations 
is said to comprise three interrelated and mutually supportive components: (i) the 
extent to which international organisations, in the fulfillment of their responsibili-
ties as established in their constituent instruments, are and should be subject to 
or exercise forms of internal and external scrutiny and monitoring, irrespective of 
potential and subsequent liability and responsibility; (ii) tortious liability for inju-
rious consequences arising out of acts or omissions not involving a breach of any 
rule or norm of international and institutional law (e.g., environmental damage as 
a result of lawful nuclear or space activities); and (iii) responsibility arising out of 
acts or omissions which constitute a breach of a rule or norm of international and 
institutional law (International Law Association, 1998). Since the 1965 agreement 
between the United Nations and Belgium relating to the settlement of claims 
filed against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian nationals,14 the United 
Nations has developed protocols for when and how claims can be made against it 
for wrongs committed in the course of its mission.15 
The AU under APSA has the mandate to “develop policies and action required 
to ensure that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the con-
tinent takes place within the framework of AU’s objectives and priorities.” The 
critical point to note is the supranational legal implication of these policies. In 
terms of effective oversight and discipline of peacebuilding personnel, the poli-
cies will affect the national law of the host state that is enforceable within the legal 
system of the host state or the community legal framework. The international 
mechanisms and protocols regulating the liabilities of continental and regional 
organisations in peacebuilding on the African continent have barely been tested. 
Closely related is the involvement of civil society in peacebuilding activities.
The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation
(Arusha Declaration) characterises Africa as having an “over-centralisation
of power and impediments to the effective participation of the overwhelming
majority [in decisions regarding] social, political, and economic development”
and calls for “the full and effective participation of the people in charting their
development policies, programs, and processes” (UNECA, 2016b). Both AU
and ECOWAS peace and security infrastructure make liberal accommodation
for civil society organisations. Article 20 of the PSC protocol gives a broad role
to civil society in supporting the work of the PSC. Civil society organisations
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reports to the PSC via the AU Commission, provide information to AU field mis-
sions, and address the PSC on invitation. Civil society involvement helps to bring
a broad range of social and political interests to the negotiating table, making the
process more inclusive and participatory. However, if governance above the level
of the nation-state is to be legitimate in a democratic era, mechanisms for appro-
priate accountability need to be institutionalised (Grant and Keohane, 2005). 
Other challenges include the lack of adequate resources. Peace operations are 
costly, and the AU and RECs lack adequate financial resources for effective inter-
ventions. In the case of the AU, there are three sources of funding generally: 
ordinary budget funds, voluntary contributions from member states, and other 
sources, notably support from international donors and partners. Operationalising 
APSA has mainly been dependent on partner support. This has severe implica-
tions for sustainability, predictability, and flexibility. The AU budget faces arrears 
in contributions. In the past, rich and powerful countries, notably Algeria, Angola, 
Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, contributed a significant proportion of the AU 
budget. 
Dependence on external funding for peacebuilding interventions by the AU 
and RECs may compromise the integrity, legitimacy, and ownership of the 
peacebuilding processes. In 2012, the AU Commission chairperson, Nkosazana 
Dlamini Zuma, pushed for a more self-sufficient AU to end the dependence on 
external funding. The proposed recommendations by the AU Reform Committee, 
which include the establishment of the jointly financed peace fund and reform in 
the areas of AU administration, infrastructures, and logistics, represent positive 
developments. 
Peace and security are inextricably linked to development. The slogan “African 
solutions to African problems” should be applied to financing peacebuilding ini-
tiatives from within the continent. The legal frameworks favour African RECs as 
first responders to trouble spots on the continent but the resources to actualise the 
lofty ideals must be readily available. 
Notes 
1 Article 7(b) of S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005), and Article 7(b) of A/RES/60/180 (30 
December 2005) provide for the participation of regional and sub-regional organisa-
tions in the PBC. 
2 African Union Policyon Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (2006), para-
graph 8. 
3 See Assembly/AU/Dec.112 (VII) Doc. EX.CL/278 (IX) 
4 For example, the ECCAS protocol establishing COPAX was formally ratified in 
January 2004 to include defense and security mechanisms aligned with the African 
Union’s Peace and Security Architecture. Also the ECOWAS ECPF is consistent with 
the AU’s Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development. 
5 ECOWAS Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08. 
6 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, para. 42. The 14 components are: early-
warning; preventive diplomacy; democracy and political governance; human rights and 
the rule of law; media; natural resource governance; cross-border initiatives; security 
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the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF); humanitarian assistance; and peace education (the 
Culture of Peace). 
7 Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) (1986). 
8 Article 3(d) of the treaty establishing COMESA. 
9 Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South 
Sudan, Kingdom of Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
10 Angola, Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda. 
11 Algeria, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, 
the Kingdom of Lesotho, Liberia, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, and 
South Africa. 
12 Article 4 (1) of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
states that the conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of that state under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial, or any 
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organisation of the state, and what-
ever its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the 
state. Article 6 provides that the conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a state 
by another state shall be considered an act of the former under international law if the 
organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the state at 
whose disposal it is placed. 
13 The Drafting Committee of the International Law Commission considered Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations. See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.632 
of 4 June 2003. 
14 Agreement between the United Nations and Belgium relating to the settlement of claims 
filed against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian nationals of 20 February 
1965, 535 UNTS 199. 
15 The UN Status of Forces Agreements are always explicit on these issues. See also the 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Financing of the United Nations Protection 
Force, the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, the United 
Nations Preventive Deployment Force, and the United Nations Peace Forces head-
quarters; administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations: financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations of 
20 September 1996, UN Doc. A/51/389. 
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This chapter examines two approaches to the theoretical framing of peacebuilding 
and its implications for Africa. The first is short-term peacebuilding that follows a 
war. The second is long-term peacebuilding that relates to the gradual construction 
of the socio-economic and political institutions of societies. Drawing from critical 
analysis, this chapter makes a case for progressive peacebuilding as an alternative 
to the neoliberal peacebuilding dominant in Africa. It examines the two strands 
of peacebuilding: popular progressive and neoliberal. Popular progressive peace-
building is historical, contemporary, and futuristic.1 In this trajectory and evolu-
tion there exists a continuous time horizon of connecting the past, present, and 
future. Peacebuilding as a theoretical and empirical notion has assumed growing 
prominence following the collapse of the Cold War (Curtis and Gwinyayi, 2012; 
Call and Wyeth, 2008; Harrison, 2010). The reason for the growing prominence 
of peacebuilding is related to the rise of the neoliberal interventionist ideology 
that replaced Cold War order (Harrison 2010). Neoliberal triumphalist disposi-
tion embarked on a proselytising mission of humanity along neoliberal values 
and norms. Western values and norms were elevated to universal ones that every 
member of humanity should strive for (Tom 2017). This proselytisation propelled 
an aggressive, interventionist approach to peacebuilding. Peacebuilding not in 
tune with neoliberal ideology was perceived not only as untenable but also as a 
danger to world peace (Zaum, 2012, 47; Hutchful, 2012, 81). 
Peacebuilding intervention offered an excellent opportunity to convert societies 
under stress into liberal societies geared along a Western model. Referring to this, 
Roland Paris (2002, 638) notes, “Without exception, peacebuilding missions in 
the post-Cold War period have attempted to ‘transplant’ the values and institutions 
of the liberal democratic core into the domestic affairs of peripheral host states.” 
He also designates it “mission civilisatrice,” reminiscent of the European impe-
rial powers’ duty to civilise dependent populations. Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, 
Libya, Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, and South Sudan are cases of the neoliberal peacebuilding and state-
building intervention (Paffenholz, 2015; Tom, 2017; Call and Vanessa, 2008; 


















was considered to be that their dose of “universal” values and norms was too low. 
The remedy for the dysfunctionality of fragile societies was an international inter-
vention with the intention of restructuring and rebuilding post-conflict countries 
along the lines of neoliberal values and norms. 
Critics argue that neoliberal peacebuilding is unsustainable and dysfunctional 
as it is an external imposition and fails to cohere with the specific social, cul-
tural, historical, economic, political, and ethnic realities of the particular society 
(Harrison, 2010; Paffenholz, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2011; Lederach, 1997). Functional 
and sustainable peacebuilding rests on the culture, history, social and political 
structures, and forces of the respective society (Tom, 2017). It should draw on 
proven domestic institutions, mechanisms, and authorities (Richmond, 2011). 
This chapter consists of seven sections. The following section provides an over-
view of peacebuilding. Section three analyses neoliberal peacebuilding. Section 
four discusses popular progressive peacebuilding. Section five analyses state 
emancipation and societal pacification. Section six discusses state-building and 
peacebuilding drawing upon some African cases. Finally, section seven provides 
concluding thoughts about how to deepen sustainable peacebuilding in Africa. 
Peacebuilding: a broad overview 
Peacebuilding is perennial and gradual. It is intimately and dialectically con-
nected with culture, history, socio-economics, structures, institutions, traditions,
the authority of the particular society, and moral and ethical imperatives. It is
about integration, cohesion, and developing commonalities and peaceful coex-
istence within a limited territory under the umbrella of a common state. Boutros
Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support struc-
tures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse
into conflict” (quoted in Barnet, 2006, 87).2 Four theoretical conceptualisations
of peacebuilding run through the mainstream literature: (i) structural violence
theory, (ii) transformation relationship theory, (iii) protracted social conflict the-
ory, and (iv) relationship-building (conflict resolution) theory (Paffenholz, 2015,
859). Peacebuilding is often defined as “efforts at national, local, or international
levels to consolidate peace in war-torn societies” (Call, 2008, 6). Ultimately,
durable peacebuilding concerns the development of the will to live together
based on shared overarching values, interests, emotions, cognitions, goals,
and expectations, as well as mutual acceptance, cooperative interaction, com-
mon security, complementarity, and the institutionalisation of mechanisms for
problem-solving (Gawerc, 2006, 442). In other words, it concerns the protracted
process and project of state- and nation-building (Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako,
2016; Zaum, 2012).
Post-Cold War and post-conflict neoliberal interventionist peacebuilding on 
the other hand attempts to shape and reshape African societies along the Western 
model of societal formation. This neoliberal conception, instead of bringing 
peace, however, produced more conflicts and instabilities (Steinberg, 2012; 
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rebuilding post-conflict African societies along liberal/neoliberal models and for-
mations failed is because these models disconnect societies from their historical 
and social foundations. Similar to how uprooted trees with exposed roots face 
difficulties to grow again, post-conflict societies disconnected from their founda-
tions find it difficult to build peace and stability. In this context, connecting to 
one’s roots is a sine qua non for peace, stability, and development (Mazrui and 
Wiafe-Amoako, 2016). Therefore, the proposition is to seek alternative models 
based on the idiosyncratic specificities of societies in Africa as a prerequisite to 
durable peacebuilding. This might sound anachronistic in the era of globalisation. 
Note should be taken, however, that “globalization is increasingly becoming more 
synonymous with re-colonisation” (Shittu, 2015, 44). 
Peacebuilding is more than the absence of war, known as negative peace (Oda, 
2007; Gawerc, 2006). Positive peacebuilding is concerned with multidimensional 
non-war-related social issues such as provision of services, equitable distribution 
of resources, development, building ethnic relations, and poverty alleviation. The 
rights to education and health, mutual respect, and recognition are other dimen-
sions of positive peacebuilding (Curtis, 2012; Maiese, 2003). Positive peace is a 
step further than negative peace; that is, if negative peace constitutes the neces-
sary conditions, positive peace constitutes the sufficient conditions for functional 
and sustainable peace and peacebuilding. 
The Westphalian order with its basic tenets of respect of national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and non-interference brought relative peace and stability
in the state world system (Watson, 1990; Osiander, 2001; Teschke, 2002). The
post-Cold War order that disrupted the Westphalian order, on the other hand,
spurred uncertainty, disorder, inequality, social rupture, conflicts, and wars as
evidenced in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia (Cordesman,
2016; Held and Urlichsen, 2011). In the post-Cold War and post-Westphalian
eras state sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial integrity were (and are)
presumed to be eroded. Hence, “there are indications of a gradual shift away
from horizontal, and thus intergovernmental or Westphalian, to a more verti-
cal, and thus supranational or post-Westphalian, structure of the global order”
(Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl, 2014, 570; Tuluianu, 2013). This order-induced
Western hegemony has so far proven to be a recipe for intrusion, conflicts, wars,
and instability. The defining characteristics of the new world order have become
rather chaotic, induced by disequilibrium in global humanity as a result of domi-
nation by certain sections of that global humanity as defined by mono-polarity
(Harrison, 2010). 
Profound and sustainable peacebuilding requires going beyond administrative, 
technical, and legal subscriptions; and endorsing the basic sociological dimen-
sion of societal construction of state- and nation-building in Africa. It is through 
evolutionary (without subscribing to unilinearity) protracted societal formation 
that durable and genuine peacebuilding can be achieved. It is also certain that this 
profound societal construction could not be undertaken by external intervention. 
Africa is in need of genuine domestic nation and state construction that ensures 






The literature of peacebuilding connects peacebuilding with liberal and democratic 
values (Call and Wyeth, 2008; Call, 2008). Two core values of liberal democracy 
are liberal formal elections and a market economy (Paris, 2002). A growing body 
of evidence testifies that neoliberal peacebuilding is not working (Richmond, 
2006; Barnet, 2006; Paris, 1997; Jarstad and Belloni, 2012; Tom, 2017), particu-
larly in Africa. Neoliberal peacebuilding rests on premises of reconstructing war-
damaged societies of non-Western societies along the lines of a Western model 
(Harrison, 2010; Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009; Tom, 2017). The spread 
of neoliberal values and norms in the post-Cold War world is the main preoc-
cupation of Western powers. The sociological concepts of socialisation, interna-
tionalisation, and externalisation, as an epistemological frame, may help to depict 
the universalisation process (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Appelrouth and Edles, 
2008; Easa and Fincham, 2012). Socialisation refers to the “in-learning” process 
of socially accepted and established knowledge, information, norms, values, and 
praxis; while internalisation relates to the internal assimilation of the “learned-in”. 
This pertains to the “I, me” distinction. Externalisation, on the other hand, relates 
to bringing out what has been internalised. The latter refers to the objectifica-
tion of the subjective, inter-subjectivity. Once it is externalised or objectified, it 
assumes universality whereby no singular person or society could claim owner-
ship. At a global systemic level, this socialisation works in the same vein as at 
a social–psychological level, through operations of learning, internalising, and 
externalising Western values and norms so that they become global or universal 
values and norms. 
This is translated into what is today commonly known as liberal peacebuilding. 
Roland Paris (1997, 56) notes that it 
is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment 
that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic 
organisation into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflicts: in 
other words, pacification through political and economic liberalisation.
 He further notes: 
To the extent that peacebuilding agencies transmit such ideas [about what a 
state should look like and how it should act] from the core to the periphery of 
the international system, these agencies are, in effect, involved in an effort to 
remake parts of the periphery in the image of the core. 
(Paris, 2002, 639) 
International organisations including the UN, INGOs, NGOs, donors, the WB, 
and the IMF are agents engaged in the transmission and diffusion of neoliberal 
values and norms (Chandler, 2013, 19). They are part of what is called the liberal 
NGO peacebuilding enterprise (Paffenholz, 2015, 860) who mediate neoliberal 
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local and international peacebuilding practitioners. Post-conflict constitution is 
drafted by Western experts and usually contains concepts such as free and fair 
elections, civil liberties, judicial independence and due process, etc. and is later 
endorsed by national legislation (Paris, 2002, 644). Accordingly, the restructuring 
and reconfiguration of the state takes place. Local peacebuilders are to be social-
ised in these neoliberal norms and values, and to ultimately internalise them as 
universal values and norms. 
In short, the successful processing of the trinity – socialisation, internalisa-
tion, and externalisation – eventually produces universality. Once the processing 
is complete, it assumes the status of “taken for granted” whereby no one will be 
able to question it. It is considered sacrosanct and questioning it is tantamount of 
committing a sacrilegious act. Neoliberalism, since the end of the Cold War, has 
been engaged in a systematic and concerted universalisation, through peaceful 
and coercive means, of Western norms and values, making them uncontested, uni-
versal epistemic bodies (Tom, 2017). The effort is not only limited to theoretical 
or ideological dissemination, but also to practical operation through, for instance, 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and in some cases military invasions 
that aim to limit the state (Barnet, 2006, 89), or to bring regime change using and 
supporting centrifugal forces (Chetail and Jutersonke, 2015, 7). 
The pervasiveness of the neoliberal ideology in the post-Cold War era has led 
some to talk about neoliberal revolution (Harrison, 2010). The connotation of 
revolution is intended to express the profound change it seeks to bring about, as 
Harrison notes: 
This is the essence of social engineering: neoliberal intervention aims to 
destabilise existing habits (expressed within neoliberal discourse as a hos-
tility to bureaucracy and a desire for good governance, for example) and to 
produce notions of conduct based on efficiency, transparency and utility. 
(Harrison, 2010, 75) 
The peacebuilding project as prescribed by liberalism is expected to promote mar-
ket economy and electoral multiparty democracy. The year 1990 was a watershed 
moment in the triumphant neoliberal discourse. Liberal discourse was replaced by 
aggressive neoliberal discourse. This aggressive discourse picked up momentum 
and currency following the September 11 attack on the United States (Harrison, 
2010; Barnet, 2006, 87). Some also call the aggressive interventionist venture a 
“post-modern imperialist scheme” (Henderson, 2015, 256–257). 
Post-Cold War peacebuilding was based on neoliberal democracy and mar-
ket economy norms and values. Now a range of non-state actors – IOs, NGOs, 
CS, opposition, etc. (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 7; Barnet, 2006) – 
have been mandated to play active roles in neoliberal peacebuilding. This is so 
because the state is not to be trusted (Tom, 2017, 66). A concerted assault against 
the state was therefore unleashed, and concepts such as predator state, criminal 
state, patrimonial state, etc. were popularised (cf. Hyden, 2013; Englebert, 2000; 










the characteristic features of neoliberal peacebuilding are formalist, technical, 
and administrative by nature (Chandler, 2013). As formalist, it is grounded on 
predetermined and imported premises. It usually includes in its shopping lists 
actions such as reforming the security forces, police, intelligence, and army, 
while demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) are also prominent 
(Conteh-Morgan, 2004; Curtis and Dzinesa, 2012; Barnet, 2006). This reformist 
approach focuses on technical and temporary post-conflict solutions. It neglects 
the profound political nature of conflicts and the concomitant peacebuilding. 
Emphasising this, Thania Paffenholz (2015, 861) notes “International liberal 
peacebuilding becomes an inherently conservative undertaking, which seeks man-
agerial solutions to fundamental conflicts over resources and power.” Admitting 
the political nature of conflict and peacebuilding would mean seeking political 
and enduring measures as solutions instead of technical and temporary ones, as 
well as indulging in the root causes of the conflicts. A peacebuilding that follows 
peace agreements is constrained by the need to consolidate and institutionalise 
the deal, even if it is deficient in certain aspects. In addition, overdependence on 
external experts that devalue indigenous knowledge, experts, and authorities char-
acterises the process. External actors’ prerogatives of defining issues and deciding 
who should be included and involved in the peace process are other constraints 
of neoliberal peacebuilding. This denies ownership and agency to the subjects 
(Curtis, 2012). 
Donors have increasingly assumed prominence as a mechanism of bring-
ing together needed resources to achieve peacebuilding. There is no irrefutable 
evidence, however, that donors and external resources will guarantee peace and 
peacebuilding. This is another indication of the neoliberal intervener’s concern 
with conflict and post-conflict situations where the attention is on prevention of 
the resumption or escalation of violent conflict. This short-term focus of neolib-
eral peacebuilding is an indication of the unsustainability of neoliberal-driven 
peace (Tom, 2017). 
Failed or unstable societies are perceived to be a threat to international security 
(Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 3; Barnet, 2006, 87; Tom, 2017). Dealing 
with this security threat presupposes mending of the failed societies; regime 
change is followed by imposed nation-building (Downes, 2011; Caplan, 2007). 
This conceptualisation provides Western powers with legitimate rights to inter-
vene. The interventionist measures come with and foster their own conceptions 
and models of peacebuilding. No attention is paid to indigenous conceptions, 
institutions, mechanisms, and practices of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. 
Even if attempts to pay attention are made, they fall short of meeting the impera-
tives of indigenous instruments of peacebuilding to achieve sustainable peace. 
Another dimension of the shopping list is that it is usually facilitated by exter-
nal actors. The preoccupation of external mediators is chiefly with short-term
security and stability. The serious consequence of the imposition of an external
solution is that it is selective. It is selective in choosing agendas, issues, and
domestic actors to be involved (Newnan, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 4). This
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addressing root causes; instead, it treats proximate causes and may end up deal-
ing with symptoms (Young, 2012). It focuses only on the combatants (Young,
2012); therefore, a range of actors and interests that undermine the sustainability
of the peace deal, or post-war reconstruction, are excluded, thereby producing
regimes devoid of wide legitimacy (Barnet, 2006, 103–104; Menkhause, 2012).
Elements that will ensure lasting solutions such as social reconciliation, broad
participation, inclusiveness transformation, and democratisation are paid scant
attention. The welfare of citizens and development are markedly absent from
the solutions (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009; Conteh-Morgan, 2004).
Above all, it is criticised of being driven by and promoting self-interests and
alien ideologies and perspectives, at the expense of indigenous mechanisms,
institutions, perspectives, and authorities. The post-Cold War neoliberalism is
also criticised of dissociation with classical liberalism; noting this, Issa Shivji
writes that 
Margaret Thatcher [claimed] “there is no such thing as society. There are 
individual men and women, and there are families.” The individualism of 
neoliberalism is narcissist. It is not even the enlightened individualism of 
liberalism which stood for individual freedom and the flowering of the indi-
vidual. Neoliberalism knows only one freedom – freedom to choose from 
commodities on offer.3 
Finally, it is uncertain if neoliberal peacebuilding addresses issues such as 
power, legitimacy, representation, and participation (Newman, Paris, and 
Richmond, 2009) that are vital for enduring peace and functional peacebuilding. 
Neoliberalism’s drive of a globalism that engenders totalitarian universalism, 
without the corollary benefits for non-Western societies, only produces a segmen-
tary hierarchised unequal global citizenry. This will not lead to peace, stability, 
and security in Africa. 
Popular progressive peacebuilding 
Now I will examine an alternative to neoliberal peacebuilding: popular progres-
sive peacebuilding. Popular progressive peacebuilding relates to a long-term 
evolutionary development of peace. Peace, in this conception, is historical, con-
temporary, and future-oriented. It strides along the past–present–future contin-
uum. Furthermore, in a broad and fundamental way, it concerns the profound 
project of nation and state formation. In this sense, it is an antithesis of neolib-
eral peacebuilding. Basically, popular progressive peacebuilding deals with the 
evolutionary construction and reconstruction of society. The concepts of popular 
and progressive denote the dialectics between popular and progress. The “popu-
lar” expresses the people-centred nature of peacebuilding, while “progressive” 
connotes the long-term, continuous, and future-oriented nature of peace and 
peacebuilding. There are a number of dimensions that need to be taken into con-
sideration, in order for popular progressive peacebuilding to fulfil its aims. 
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The basic premises of popular progressive peacebuilding are the embrac-
ing of holistic, national, regional, and local ownership; indigenous institutions, 
authorities, and mechanisms; and inclusive bottom-up and top-down strategies 
(cf. Richmond, 2011; Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2011). Local ownership of 
the agendas, processes, solutions, long-term institution-building, negotiations, 
bargaining, compromises, reconciliation, participation, and transformation are 
other aspects of popular progressive peacebuilding. It is a domestic process, 
home-grown, not oriented towards a winner or loser outcome. According to Isaac 
O. Albert, peacebuilding in Africa rests on the “commitment to cultural values, 
beliefs, and norms as the people on the one hand and role expectation on the 
other” (Albert, 2008, 40). This confers legitimacy on the process (Jackson and 
Rosberg, 1984). 
These are fundamental prerequisites for functional and sustainable peace. 
Peacebuilding from this perspective is exclusively domestic or home-grown (cf. 
Paffenholz, 2015). Any external involvement could only serve as an additional 
supporting toolkit. Neoliberal peacebuilding is proving to be the antithesis of 
popular progressive peacebuilding because its interventionist policies lead to 
state fragility, failure, and collapse. Popular progressive peacebuilding endorses 
the view that “actors are shaped by the socio-cultural milieu in which they live” 
(Conteh-Morgan, 2004, 234). In other words it is culture- and context-contingent. 
Popular progressive peacebuilding initiated after a bloody war should aim at 
society-building. Society-building/reconstruction necessarily involves restor-
ing destroyed values, norms, institutions, structures, and relations (Curtis, 2012, 
4–5). Society-building/reconstruction cannot rest on borrowed values and norms 
(as per neoliberal subscriptions). If the state of anomaly is replaced by a state of 
normalcy, only then could sustainable and functional peacebuilding be ensured 
(Tom, 2017). A grassroots-based peacebuilding would celebrate the defining of 
societal structures, norms, and values such as communalism, collectivism, and 
solidarity (Conteh-Morgan 2004, Gawerc 2006). Methodological collectivism 
instead of methodological individualism is the imperative of peacebuilding as 
a popular progressive alternative. It aims at restoring the balance, the equilib-
rium. “Among African societies, symbols and rituals are key to an effective and 
permanent peacebuilding/reconstruction process” (Conteh-Morgan, 2004, 241). 
A characteristic feature of popular progressive peacebuilding is engagement in 
a protracted discussion until consensus is reached among all citizens. The social 
fabric of peace rests on the moral authority and wisdom of elders whose guidance, 
oversight, decisions, and leadership propelled by time immemorial, by proven 
praxis and ethos, are accepted and obeyed. Mediations and verdicts handed down 
by elders are binding and fully implemented. The reason they are accepted and 
obeyed is because they strive to restore social cohesion, harmony, and equilib-
rium; not to punish, isolate, and marginalise the guilty. Guilt is not an individual 
act, but rather a collective one, and punishment and reward are also collective acts 
that aim at restorative justice (Tom, 2017, 78–82). 
The focus is a restorative instead of a retributive peace. In this focus cultural 
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Familial connections, community networks, trust, dignity, integrity, and respect 
are variables that create cohesion. These elements strongly contribute to the suc-
cess of conflict mediation and abide by the verdicts passed by mediators. Both 
the mediators and the mediated are required to show impeccable social and moral 
integrity; otherwise they lose face in the community. 
Neoliberal [liberal] peacebuilding “may be socially atomizing, hegemonic and 
lead to the valorization of predatory state elite who gain easy access to an interna-
tional economic and political cartography” (Oliver P. Richmond quoted in Curtis, 
2012, 16). It therefore runs against the aggregating, egalitarian, and collective 
African values and norms. These values and norms certainly reinforce functional 
and sustainable peace. 
Neoliberal peacebuilding, as state-centred, is confined to global and national 
state levels. This ignores the sub-national, the marginalised, the peripheries, the 
indigenous, and the traditional and cultural context of common people. Popular 
progressive peacebuilding, on the other hand, is people-centred, pervasively 
inclusive, and straddles all social strata. 
State emancipation and societal pacification 
as requisites for peacebuilding 
It took several hundred years for the predecessor of the post-colonial state to 
emancipate itself and pacify the society under its control (Young, 1994, 15–16). 
The major challenge for the post-colonial state, in its formation, has been to 
emancipate itself and pacify its societies. Emancipation means ensuring sover-
eignty. A sovereign state enjoys both internal and external legitimacy in govern-
ing citizens in its domain and in dealing with other states (Young, 1994, 28–29). 
Legitimacy has sociological and legal dimensions. While sociologically it may 
refer to the internal, legally it refers to the external (Schaar, 2000; Jackson and 
Rosberg, 1984; Henderson, 2015). Nevertheless, the hard reality is that the situ-
ation in post-colonial Africa, far from mono-sovereignty where the state has the 
benefit of absolute sovereignty, is characterised by duality of sovereignty. The 
emancipation of a state demonstrates the emergence of a matured, developed, 
peaceful state; a state that is capable of building the society and societal insti-
tutions, the mechanisms and infrastructures, that foster peace and thrust peace-
building forward. Peacebuilding in this sense may presuppose the pacification of 
societal groups. 
The premise of the emancipation of the state relates to the emergence of three 
interrelated situations: (i) autonomy of the state, (ii) that the state stands above 
societal groups, (iii) establishment of state hegemony over society (Bereketeab, 
2011). State autonomy means the independence of the state to exercise legiti-
mate authority and control over society without interference from other societal 
agencies. The legitimate exercise of authority in turn presupposes the standing 
of the state above societal groups where it proves its neutrality and equal treat-
ment of societal groups: class, ethnic, religious, gender, generational, linguistic 







society arising through the instrumentality of coercive and administrative appa-
ratuses (Callaghy, 1984; Weber, 1948) is arguably perceived as an indication of 
the evolvement of a modern state. Yet, its hegemonic position should serve soci-
ety. Ultimate power lies in society. In sum, then, the three situations constituting 
emancipation characterise an evolved modern state. The evolution of a modern 
state, in turn, is an outcome of the pacification of society and the emancipation of 
a state that heralds peace and enhances peacebuilding; after all the state is prima 
facie a peacebuilder. 
State-building presupposes the emancipation of the state from society in that 
societal groups need to be subordinate to an omnipresent and omnipotent state. 
State emancipation engenders submission of society to the will of the former. The 
state assumes its hegemonic position by subordinating centrifugal societal forces. 
A state that has not gone through this process is presumed to be weak, because 
it still shares its authority with other centrifugal forces. “The development of a 
modern state depends above all on the gradual emancipation of established politi-
cal structures from society” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, 4–5). According to this 
understanding, a properly emancipated state could easily be institutionalised, lack 
of proper institutionalisation being another source of state weakness and source 
of conflict and instability. 
The non-emancipation of states in Africa is attributed partly to the nature of 
the colonial state – a state both arbitrarily and poorly bureaucratised (Chabal 
and Daloz, 1994, 4). Rightly, Chabal and Daloz trace the non-emancipation of 
the state to its colonial foundation. They contend that the non-emancipation is 
because the state did not sprout from the womb of society. Being an alien body, 
it simply floated above society. It did not spring from the local society as such; 
therefore, the issue of its emancipation was rendered irrelevant. Hence, a non-
emancipated state cannot engender peace, and peacebuilding encounters unsur-
mountable hurdles. As an instrument of oppression and exploitation the colonial 
state had, as its reason d’etre, the extraction of resources on behalf of the society 
back at home, and not concern in the institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of 
local institutions and structures which are salient pre-requisitions for state eman-
cipation and peacebuilding. 
The concept of dual sovereignty (Tilly, 1978) appropriately captures the con-
dition in many states in Africa. Duality of sovereignty implies the prevalence of 
parallel loci of power competing for legitimate dominance, and existing side-by-
side, impeding the emergence of conditions that lead to the absolute hegemony 
of a central state. The prevalence of mutually exclusive centrifugal forces that 
engender parity (symmetry) between state and society render the state-building 
process highly feeble. The state–society relation in Africa, broadly expressed, 
could be defined as still, both functionally and structurally infused. There is also 
no clear delineation and differentiation between society and state, which is a char-
acterising feature of a modern state. The clear delineation between state and soci-
ety in the process of peacebuilding fulfils two objectives. The first objective is that 
the state as both war-maker and peacemaker is checked and counter-checked by 
society. The second objective is that society as the ultimate powerholder carves its 
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own space without the meddling of the state unlike, the case where state–society 
fusion prevails. This space is then used by society to make sure peacebuilding is 
advanced through the generation of a harmonious, pacified, integrated, and ami-
cable relationship (Paffenholz, 2015, 859). 
In the conventional view, the evolvement of a modern state therefore presup-
poses, among other things, the separation of the state from society (Young, 1994; 
Chabal and Daloz, 1999). The process of separation duly involves two interrelated 
processes, notably state emancipation and societal pacification. This clear deline-
ation is presumed to have a contributing effect to peace and peacebuilding. 
Meanwhile, the pacification of society entails two dimensions, internal and 
external. In the internal dimension, the most salient condition of the evolution of 
the state deals with the domination of the state which presupposes the submis-
sion of society. The variables of domination and submission as expressions of 
an evolved modern state progressively have to be couched in emergent national 
institutions and structures in order to ensure their sustainability. The development 
of such state institutions and structures coupled with the disarming of centrifugal 
societal forces produces a matured state. This state coheres peacefully with soci-
ety. The history of ideas treat the emergence of a state as fundamentally resting on 
the process of pacification where the state of nature was transformed. 
Classical social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, and John Lock were very much puzzled by the process of transforma-
tion from the state of nature to the state of culture, pre-society, or simply state. To 
these scholars of social contract, the state of nature represented an absence of gov-
ernment and regulating laws (Laskar, 2013). For Hobbes the state of nature repre-
sented a dark age of human history where “war of all against all” predominated. 
To escape the chaos state of nature humanity had to invent a political organisation 
called a state (Hobbes, 1962). To gain certain common benefits people had to 
voluntarily surrender some of their sovereignty. Based on the covenant the state 
assumed the legitimate right to exercise violence within the territory it controls on 
behalf of society (Weber, 1948). 
For Lock, on the other hand, the state of nature represented the absolute free-
dom of the individual, a state of liberty, albeit with some critical deficiency. For 
Lock the state of nature was a golden age (Laskar, 2013, 3). It was pre-political. 
In order to remedy the deficiency, the state was invented. The state needs to pro-
tect life and property. To equilibrate the relation between society and state there 
has to be a social contract. The social contract regulates state–society relations. 
Social contract theorists argued that to overcome the state of nature, human soci-
ety entered two agreements: Pactum Unionis and Pactum Subjectionis. While the 
first pact sought to ensure protection of their life and property through the con-
struction of society, the latter was an agreement that enabled them to submit to an 
authority and surrender their freedom and rights to an authority (Ritchie, 1891; 
Mouritz, 2010). Accordingly, they agreed to form a society by collectively and 
reciprocally renouncing the rights they had in the state of nature. They had to 
agree to live together under common laws and create an enforcement mechanism 






nature was about happiness and equality. The invention of property, however, 
heralded humankind’s fall from grace. To correct the fall they needed to surrender 
their right to the “general will” embedded in the social contract. 
In short, “the authority or the government or the sovereign or the state came 
into being because of the two agreements” (Laskar, 2013, 1). This concerns the 
legitimacy of power. Power is construed as legitimate depending on its origin and 
the manner it is exercised (Zaum, 2012, 51; Wiafe-Amoako, 2016, 78). In this 
regard, it is driven by certain values, norms, belief systems, shared goals, expecta-
tions, institutions, and mechanisms over which broad consensus reigns. Sources 
of legitimacy are presumed to be both domestic and external (Coggins, 2014; 
Osiander, 2001; Jackson and Rosberg, 1984). In an ideal situation state legitimacy 
conflates domestic and external sources equally. Most of the time, however, one 
dominates over the other. 
The external dimension of pacification relates to ensuring territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, security, and international relations reminiscent of the Westphalian 
state (Osiander, 2001, 261; Evans and Newnham, 1990; Morgenthau, 1985; 
Coggins, 2014, 8). The contemporary post-Cold War period, which some des-
ignate post-Westphalian (Newman, Paris, and Richmond, 2009, 6–7; Kreuder-
Sonnen and Zangl, 2014), a neoliberal-ideology-driven campaign has disrupted 
the status quo in international relations leading to serious conflict and instabil-
ity all over the world. The neoliberal-induced mobilisation of non-state actors, 
including armed groups that compete with the state over the monopoly of vio-
lence, undermines societal pacification. Supporting and arming anti-Sadam forces 
in Iraq, anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya, and anti-Assad forces in Syria (Held and 
Urlichsen, 2011), or arming warlords against the Union of Islamic Courts in 
Somalia (Samatar, 2013; Muller, 2013), are good illustrations. The push to limit 
the state and in turn replace its roles with civil society, non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs), and other non-state actors is an indication of the hostile position 
of neoliberal ideology towards the African state (Tom, 2017, 32–34). The post-
Cold War and post-Westphalian push of non-state actors with the aim of chal-
lenging the state for the purpose of democratisation encourages centrifugal forces. 
This, in turn, instead of pacification may lead to militarism in society thereby 
countering peace and peacebuilding. The upshot of this, particularly in Africa, 
is the disruption of the pacification process with dire consequences. A pacified 
society is presumed to be one that has surrendered to the state. Otherwise, “The 
state may be viewed as a ruling organization that competes for power with other 
political economic, and social organizations and groups” (Callaghy, 1984, 90). 
The competition eventually must be resolved in favour of the state for centrifugal 
forces be pacified and tamed. The state is an abstract concept as an institution 
that is empirically concretised in its expression through its component entities – 
executive, legislative, judiciary, and administrative – which receive societal legit-
imacy. This development enhances peace and peacebuilding. 
In this regard, the state gains the autonomy it deserves, an autonomy that would 
enable it to exercise power above class, ethnic, religious, and regional societal 





Peacebuilding in Africa 47 
groups. According to this conception state emancipation and societal pacifica-
tion gradually consolidate the autonomy of the state. Societal pacification also 
emancipates the state in order to fulfil its external functional tasks, defending the 
integrity and security of society from external forces. The lack of state emancipa-
tion means that sectarian social groups dominate power, which gives rise to a real 
or imagined sense of marginalisation of groups. This sense of marginalisation fur-
ther leads to ethnic and clan-based conflict resulting in chronic civil wars. On the 
other hand, lack of emancipation and pacification would also imply the absence of 
a consensual and contractual relationship between state and society, a prerequisite 
for peace and peacebuilding. 
State-building and peacebuilding: harmony and discordance 
The common understanding among donors, think-tanks, IFIs, and analysts is that 
there exists harmony between state-building and peacebuilding (Zaum, 2012, 47). 
Indeed, the perception is that they complement each other. The one is a presup-
position for the other. This is expressed by the book, edited by Charles T. Call 
and Vanessa Wyeth (2008), titled Building a State to Build Peace. It is this per-
ception of complementarity that lies behind neoliberal peacebuilding in the form 
of international intervention in state-building (Tom, 2017). Peacebuilding, in a 
neoliberal regime, often follows peace deals between the fighting parties and aims 
at institutionalisation and consolidation of the deal (Paris, 2002; Heathershaw, 
2013). Drawing on this neoliberal perception of the harmony between state-build-
ing and peacebuilding its proponents, in recent years, have demonstrated extreme 
interventionist tendencies to mid-wife state-building and peacebuilding in con-
flict-affected societies. This conviction is predicated on the assumption that state-
building and peacebuilding are necessary conditions for democratic peace (Tom, 
2017, 59–60). The democratic peace thesis is out there to reconfigure Africa (Call, 
2008; Curtis, 2012). By extension, the democratic peace thesis therefore serves 
the globalisation scheme that ensures Western domination through inclusive but 
unequal global integration. 
The contention of this chapter is that there exists some discordance between 
state-building and peacebuilding, at least initially. This contention is supported 
by scholars such Call (2008, 3), Curtis (2012), and Robert (2012). The underpin-
ning view of this contention of the discordance involves the different premises 
that govern state-building and peacebuilding. State-building by its very nature is 
political. Politics deals with power, with how power is allocated, and with who 
takes what, how, and when (Hyden, 2013; Harrison, 2012, 167; Schaar, 2000, 
206). Moreover, politics generates winners and losers. Losers then seek alterna-
tive mechanisms to address their grievances which leads to conflict and in some 
situations to war (Zaum, 2012, 48). In this manner state-building and peacebuild-
ing go their separate ways. 
State-building, perceived as institution-building, is a long-term process that 
may take several generations (Poggi, 1978; Kamrava, 2000; Mamdani, 1996; 















also need to be transformed into a political culture if they are to be recognised, 
accepted, and appreciated by citizens. The gestation of institutions as routinised, 
entrenched political practices requires a lapse of a considerable period. Political 
institutions as political culture are established as a result of protracted strug-
gles that include negotiations, bargains, compromises, etc. that are ultimately, 
reflectively, and discursively expressed in transparency, predictability, openness, 
accountability in the rule of the game, and expectations recognised and hopefully 
accepted by citizens. 
State-building is also by its very nature domestic. As domestic process, state-
building is contingent on continuous negotiations, interpretations, bargains,
trade-offs, compromises, dealings, and expectations between multiple stakehold-
ers. These stakeholders, in poly-ethnic, polyglottic, and poly-religious socie-
ties are numerous. This numerosity in turn presupposes complex and intriguing
arrangements and treatments. In this context, state-building concerns society’s
construction and ownership by, and legitimacy in the eyes of, citizens (Zaum,
2012; Tom, 2017). 
The so-called state fragility, weakness, and collapse that presumably makes 
state–society relations amenable to radicalism and terrorism, and subjects the 
West to security risks, “reinforced the association between state-building and 
peacebuilding” (Zaum, 2012, 47). The state-building and peacebuilding interven-
tion driven by the neoliberal ideology aims at ameliorating the risk involved in 
state fragility. Facts on the ground, however, do not corroborate the assumed ame-
lioration. If recent developments could be an indication, neoliberal intervention 
has rather thrown the world into an extremely precarious situation. Neoliberal 
state-building seeks to build Western-style states in non-Western post-conflict 
societies, in which “strong institutions” define strong states that are able to ensure 
internal security and stability, in ways that also eliminate threats to global security 
and prosperity (Barnet, 2006). 
It should be noted that this is a narrow conceptualisation of peacebuilding advo-
cated by donors, INGOs, the WB, and the UN (Barnet, 2006, 88). In this context, 
neoliberal peacebuilding is, relatively speaking, short-term. As discussed above, 
neoliberal peacebuilding is concerned chiefly with the technical and administra-
tive managerial nature of conflicts such as DDR, security sector reform, and trans-
forming security institutions, armed forces, police and intelligence apparatuses, 
the judiciary, etc. (Mac Ginty, 2008; Robert, 2012; Call, 2008). Moreover, as 
Harrison (2012, 167) notes, “building states is concrete, building peace is abstract, 
peacebuilding does not signify a specific agency to build.” As alluded to earlier 
in this chapter, the kind of peacebuilding that is in harmony with state-building 
is one that is based on popular progressive, rather than neoliberal, peacebuilding. 
Since state-building as a political project is concerned with power and gen-
erates winners and losers that may lead to conflict and war, at least initially,
then it will antagonise peacebuilding. In the long run, however, state-building
is a necessary requisite for peace and peacebuilding. The state being an agent
of war and peace, a matured state would create the necessary conditions for
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imperative for the harmony between state-building and peacebuilding. Until that
time comes a discursive segregation of the two processes is a well-deserved
action.
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to examine two theoretical approaches to peacebuilding in 
Africa. These are neoliberal peacebuilding and popular progressive peacebuild-
ing. Following the collapse of the Cold War, neoliberalism emerged as the domi-
nant ideology. Soon, however, neoliberal peacebuilding drew immense criticism. 
The criticism pivots around the main concern that neoliberal peacebuilding is pri-
marily externally imposed, technical, managerial, and short-term. It also concerns 
the post-war external reconstruction of societies. Informed by this criticism this 
chapter sought to advance an alternative to neoliberal peacebuilding. 
Popular progressive peacebuilding is superior to neoliberal peacebuilding for 
several reasons. First, it is by its very nature domestic and goes beyond post-con-
flict reconstruction. Second, it utilises domestic resources and infrastructures such 
as cultural, social, historical, structural, institutional, indigenous, etc. authorities. 
Third, society-building, in modern terminology nation-building, is an outcome of 
several generations’ work and social processes. The conflation of state-building 
and nation-building exemplifies a simultaneous dual process of integration and 
separation. The integration and cohesion of state and nation imply that the state 
should fit a particular nation or a nation should be represented by its own state. 
Separation, on the other hand, denotes delimitation between two dialectically 
interwoven entities. The notions of pacification and emancipation appropriately 
describe the process of integration and separation in the evolution of nation state 
formation. The organic process of integration and separation as the evolution of 
nation- and state-building in Africa, in history, was continuously disrupted by 
external intervention. This disruption also affected the organic domestic process 
of peacebuilding as conceptualised by popular progressive peacebuilding. 
It is argued the popular progressive peacebuilding will bring sustainable peace 
in Africa. The protracted evolutionary processes, dynamics, and mechanisms of 
nation and state formation that are founded on the idiosyncratic specificities of a 
particular society will ensure a sustainable, functional, permanent, comprehensive 
peace. This is so because the process is an outcome of protracted negotiations, 
bargains, compromises, and representation among societal groups that foster 
agency and ownership, and is sealed by the growth of the will to live together. 
This in turn rests on the construction of domestic institutions and structures; eco-
nomic, social, and political transformations; and ethnolinguistic harmony, cohe-
sion, social equitability, etc. 
In multi-ethnic societies, fostering the will to live together among members is 
of great significance for sustainable and functional peace. The will to live together 
results from the harmonisation of the processes and mechanisms of state and 
nation formation. Moreover, it is the outcome of historical, cultural, political, and 







social contract between society and state, and the legitimacy of the state, which is 
a mainstay for peace and peacebuilding. 
To summarise, the imposing of neoliberal peacebuilding and state-building 
programmes on Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) regions from the outside 
would adversely affects the peace process in these regions rather than leading to 
enduring peace. Conversely, the popular progressive peacebuilding model would 
result in peace and development. This is because the popular progressive model is 
by its very nature evolutionary; as a peacebuilding approach it not only addresses 
the root causes of conflicts but also considers the historical, cultural, and socio-
economic contexts of the conflict environments including the structure, agents, 
and actors in the ECOWAS and IGAD regions. 
Notes 
1 What I have called here “popular progressive peacebuilding” is referred to in the gen-
eral literature, invariably, as local (Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty, 2011; Chandler, 2013), 
indigenous, or bottom-up (Richmond, 2011; Reno, 2008). Michael Barnet (2006) dis-
tinguishes between liberal peacebuilding and republican peacebuilding which is close 
to what I have called in this chapter popular progressive versus neoliberal. According 
to Barnett, while liberalism refers to the creation of a post-conflict state defined by 
rule of law, markets, and democracy, republicanism refers to principles of delibera-
tion, constitutionalism, and representation that help a state recovering from war foster 
stability and legitimacy. A legitimate state must be organised around liberal democratic 
principles (Barnet, 2006, 88–89). 
2 A plethora of definitions abound in the literature of peacebuilding. This chapter is, 
however, not concerned with definitions of peacebuilding, but is rather concerned with 
the distinction of the two theoretical strands identified here. 
3 “It’s the Revolution that Matters: Remembering Che.” Published on Pambazuka News
(http://www.pambazuka.org), June 2016. 
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4 Towards a human security-centred 
approach to peacebuilding 
ECOWAS’s experiences and lessons 
Aderemi Ajibewa and Jubril Agbolade Shittu 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the Economic Community of West African
States’s (ECOWAS’s) peacebuilding experiences, focusing on the human secu-
rity-centred peacebuilding objectives enumerated in its Vision 2020 Strategy
and the practical approach which emphasises the increased participation of civil
society in early-warning, conflict prevention, and resolution. Debates about
long-term initiatives which recognise institutional and structural approaches to
peacebuilding have evolved to include actions aimed at building social relation-
ships and the participation of the people in the governance process. ECOWAS,
in furtherance of its human security and strategic objectives, has adopted a bot-
tom-up approach which seeks to transform the region from “an ECOWAS of
states” to “an ECOWAS of peoples.” This chapter commences by briefly docu-
menting the shift from state-centric to community-based approaches to peace-
building in West Africa. It then discusses ECOWAS’s experience in pursuing
its Vision 2020 human security-centred objectives. This is followed by a discus-
sion of ECOWAS’s approach to peacebuilding, including lessons learned from
its partnership with CSOs to achieve human security-centred regional peace-
building, and how these can be shared with other African Regional Economic
Communities (RECs). 
From state-centric to community-based approaches 
The current strategic vision of ECOWAS is to create a peaceful, prosperous, and 
cohesive West Africa based on a people-centred vision. Barely a decade after 
the creation of ECOWAS in 1975, conflicts emerged starting from 1989 within 
and across the borders of ECOWAS member states.1 These conflicts assumed 
dimensions that the existing ECOWAS framework, which had its primary focus 
on economic integration, could not manage.2 The need to respond to the conflicts, 
as well as a global push for preventive diplomacy, precipitated a gradual evolu-
tion of the ECOWAS peace and security framework towards the introduction of 
institutional, structural, and human security approaches to regional peacebuilding 
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ECOWAS needed a functional peacebuilding and security mandate in rec-
ognition of the nexus between peace and security and economic development
in West Africa. The ECOWAS Treaty articles of establishment were revised
in 1992 to reflect the demand for peace and security in the integration process.
However, the peacebuilding interventions during that period were state-centric
in approach. These include the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) inter-
ventions between 1990 and 2003,3 and numerous high-level mediation mis-
sions by heads of state. These approaches were generally criticised for their
short-term focus, militarised approaches, neglect of human rights, and lack of
inclusiveness. 
Global events, including the end of the Cold War and the global push for
preventive diplomacy outlined in the 1992 UN “Agenda for Peace” and a
wave of democratisation, signalled gradual ECOWAS departure from state-
centric approaches towards broader approaches involving a wider range of
actors. Conflict management transitioned to preventive diplomacy, peace-
making, and peacebuilding.4 The revised ECOWAS Treaty was complemented
by several frameworks which promoted these broader approaches, includ-
ing the 1999 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping, and Security;5 the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy
and Good Governance;6 and the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
(ECPF).7 These frameworks supported the broader participation of actors at vari-
ous levels in peacebuilding, notably civil society organisations (CSOs).8 Civil
society since then has increasingly been recognised as key to the transforma-
tive participatory processes of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. As high-
lighted by Ekiyor (2008, 27), “Over 3,000 CSOs work at different levels within
West Africa. Organisations work on various conflict prevention issues including
human rights, education, promoting dialogue, security sector reform, conflict-
sensitive development, election monitoring, gender equality and post-conflict
reconstruction.” 
Conceptualising a human security approach 
The concept of community peacebuilding is relevant to the subject of human 
security within the context of ECOWAS. While it is important to note that what 
peacebuilding entails and its practical application, vis-à-vis the role of the rele-
vant actors, remain an ongoing debate, Lederach, Culbertson, and Neufeld (2007, 
9) define peacebuilding as 
the development of constructive personal, group, and political relationships 
across ethnic, religious, class, national, and racial boundaries. It aims to 
resolve injustice in nonviolent ways and to transform the structural condi-
tions that generate deadly conflict. Conflict prevention, conflict management, 
conflict resolution and transformation, and post-conflict reconciliation are all 
part of peacebuilding. 
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Lederach’s “peacebuilding pyramid,” complemented by Pearce’s (2005, 45–49) 
identification of several phases9 at which peacebuilding has manifested globally, 
provides an overview of the levels in which peacebuilding has developed and the 
range of actors involved. Both Lederach (1997) and Pearce (2005) acknowledge 
the role and expansion of the “community” or grassroots where the conditions 
of a peaceful society are best generated. Community participation supports local 
ownership of the peacebuilding process, promotion of sustainable outcomes in 
the long term, improvement in social cohesion towards addressing common chal-
lenges, and strengthening of the global public sphere. Community participation is 
also important because of the integration of development and peace approaches. 
Local ownership is hinged on the community as the object of peace inter-
ventions and preventive engagement. Lederach (1997, 4) proposed a grassroots 
approach where local leaders, NGOs, and international players take part in creat-
ing peace. The limitations on the duration of the international community’s effort 
at sustaining peacekeeping implies that peacebuilding efforts should be viewed 
as an investment in sustainability in which the communities are direct beneficiar-
ies and should have a stake. Community participation in peacebuilding is also a 
socialisation process that should consider the indigenous knowledge and prac-
tices of the concerned communities, promoting social cohesion and cross-learning 
and peer review. In just the same way as peacebuilding intervention models are 
applicable though not entirely wholesale, communities should be able to learn 
from other experiences and consider other models. This resocialisation of peace-
building is consistent with arguments on structural transformation promoted by 
Galtung (1996).10 
The notion of a public sphere has gained momentum among various groups 
and its relevance continues to increase, especially where the human rights and 
lives of people are concerned. 11 Globalisation, the spread of information, and 
the growth of technology have ensured that events do not remain boxed within 
the traditional boundaries of the state. Communities and civil society organisa-
tions (CSOs) have networks whose influence cuts across sovereign state borders. 
Indeed, one may argue that there is a supranational voice through which citizens 
in one state rely on networks of global public opinion to highlight issues affect-
ing them, as well as evoke a response. Lessons from the Arab Spring, and global 
reaction and support for several causes including the “#MeToo movement” and 
“Justice for George Floyd” campaigns reveal a trend where events in one part of 
the globe spark reactions in other places.12 
ECOWAS peacebuilding is aimed at promoting sustainable peace, which is 
complemented by preventive diplomacy and peace-making. While ECOWAS 
peacekeeping efforts over the years has expanded to include election-monitoring 
and humanitarian assistance, it has been confronted with some limitations includ-
ing funding and resource constraints, a lack of consensus among member states 
on priorities, a lack of decisive action, and a state-centric approach. Relevant 
ECOWAS frameworks, especially the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 
(ECPF) and the Vision 2020 strategy, therefore had to be introduced to address 
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approach to conflict prevention13 and peacebuilding,14 and these emphasise the 
role of a wide range of actors. 
The arguments for a change in approach have been noted by Sen (2013, 26–27) 
who frames the human security-centred approach thus: 
A human security-centred approach recognises the limitations of a state-
centric notion of security, arguing for a holistic approach that involves coor-
dination of different capacities and actors in the peace process. The state
remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfil
its security obligations – and at times has even become a source of threat
to its own people. That is why attention must now shift from the security
of the state to the security of the people – to human security […] Human
security thus brings together the human elements of security, of rights, of
development. 
(Sen, 2013, 26–27) 
ECOWAS has also been involved in initiatives focused on building the capac-
ity of community actors in peacebuilding. It has designated various research 
institutions as training centres, which have been certified as centres of excel-
lence: the National Defence College Nigeria, KAIPTC in Ghana, and the “Ecole 
de Maintien de la Paix” Alioune Blondin Beye (EMP) in Mali. ECOWAS has 
developed technical collaboration with these institutions (ECOWAS-KAIPTC, 
ECOWAS-WACSI, ECOWAS-WANEP) to work on thematic areas and inves-
tigate areas of synergy and cooperation. ECOWAS also developed agreements 
with King’s College London and the latter has deployed some of its researchers to 
serve in the ECOWAS Political Affairs Directorate.15 
ECOWAS’s and community-based peacebuilding 
The strategic vision of ECOWAS focuses on development processes that are 
people-oriented and people-driven. The objectives of ECOWAS Vision 2020, as 
adopted in Abuja on 15 June 2007, aim to address four main challenges: 
·· Peace-building and security, promotion of the principle of good governance 
and democracy; 
·· Deepening of the integration process via the establishment of the ECOWAS 
common market and the interconnectivity of the markets through appropriate 
infrastructure; 
·· Integration into the global economy through improved regional competitive-
ness and the definition of common response strategies in particular as a way 
of addressing the different crises relating to the international economic situ-
ation; and 
·· Pursuit of the institutional reform of our organisation by providing it with 
resources to perform effectively and to carry out its mandate. 
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In a bid to meet these different challenges, the ECOWAS Commission in
2009 elected to focus its action on six priority areas, one of which is the pro-
motion of peace and security, dialogue, and preventive diplomacy and the
establishment of peacekeeping support structures through greater involvement
of member states.16 It was predicted that if these short-term objectives were
achieved, they would certainly strengthen the regional integration process and
political stability in the region. In achieving the strategic goals, civil society
remains an important partner and must be heavily involved in the promotion of
good governance and regional integration. In this regard, the ECOWAS Vision
2020 strategy17 seeks to transform the region from an ECOWAS of states into
an ECOWAS of peoples. 
The participation of civil society is a key input in achieving the strategic vision 
of ECOWAS.18 ECOWAS’s relationship with CSOs, stipulated in the ECPF and 
supported by ECOWAS Vision 2020, is defined in terms of creating awareness 
and strengthening capacity within member states and civil society to enhance their 
role as principal constituencies and actors in conflict prevention and peacebuild-
ing. For example, the West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP)’s partnership 
with ECOWAS,19 which was formalised through a memorandum of understand-
ing (MOU) in 2003, reviewed on several occasions and renewed in 201420 for a 
further five years, is derived from this mandate. Under this MOU, WANEP works 
in close collaboration with ECOWAS in conceptualising and implementing activ-
ities leading to the promotion of peace and security in the region, and is currently 
the civil society partner of ECOWAS in the operationalisation of the ECOWAS 
Early Warning Network (ECOWARN). Other examples of community participa-
tion include the engagement, dialogue forums, research, and capacity-building 
undertaken by ECOWAS-recognised CSOs who have formalised relationships 
with the various directorates in ECOWAS.21 
CSOs can mobilise wide support for a common cause,22 influence the imple-
mentation of policies, participate in transitions and electoral processes, and serve 
as a vehicle for the dissemination of credible information and ideas. ECOWAS 
has recognised the importance of establishing comprehensive dialogue and part-
nership for agenda-shaping in collaboration with CSOs within West Africa. It has 
built and formalised partnerships with civil society through agreements, which 
makes collaboration easier and more effective. Furthermore, ECOWAS policies 
are not adopted without inputs from civil society platforms. In pursuance of the 
goals of increased engagement with civil society, ECOWAS supported the forma-
tion of the West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF).23 In December 2014, 
over 50 civil society delegates representing the 15 ECOWAS countries attended 
the First Annual West Africa Civil Society Conference in Accra, Ghana. Part of 
the deliberations included engaging ECOWAS in achieving Vision 2020 in areas 
including promoting education and health; democratic governance, including 
transparency and accountability; women’s political participation and representa-
tion; natural resource management; youth development; and free movement of 
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The ECOWAS Mediation Facilitation Division under the Directorate of 
Political Affairs was established in 2015 to support the work of ECOWAS’s 
mediators; generate, document, and disseminate knowledge; and ensure active 
civil society collaboration in the area of peace mediation in West Africa. The 
coming into being of this division was in fulfilment of the preventive diplomacy 
component of the ECPF and one of the key recommendations that emanated from 
the 2010 ECOWAS International Conference in Monrovia, Liberia, known as 
the Monrovia Declaration. Subsequently, the Mali After-Action Review, which 
was held in Accra in 2013 to review and draw lessons from ECOWAS’s inter-
vention in Mali,25 in the aftermath of the conflict in that country, also echoed 
what had been recommended at the Monrovia conference. The challenge now 
is for ECOWAS to actively engage West African civil society in consolidating 
peace mediation interventions to fulfil the objective of the Mediation Facilitation 
Division. To do that, WACSOF needs to be strengthened. 
CSO participation in the election-monitoring process has also proved to be 
valuable. In addition to sensitising the general public and educating the electorate 
on convergence principles (e.g. human rights, term limits, and governance issues), 
CSOs provide independent observation of the electoral process26 and can also 
alert authorities of the potential for outbreaks of violence. Recent trends show the 
involvement of coalitions of CSOs in monitoring electoral transition processes 
in West African countries. The Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition 
made up of over 500 CSOs, was for instance involved in monitoring Nigeria’s 
2015 general election. The TMG has observers in every local government of the 
Nigerian federation and transmits election-related information using informa-
tion technologies to a command centre, known as the “situation room.” Thus, the 
TMG provides independent verification of elections in Nigeria. 
Apart from capacity-building activities by ECOWAS institutions, the organ-
isation also engages in inclusion strategies aimed at building the networks
and capacity of civil society through experience-sharing. Activities include
involving community experts in the areas of peace, security, and elections,
as well as gender experts from the training centres of excellence on technical
teams and in election observation missions. For instance, ECOWAS allocates
a quota for experts from training centres of excellence to participate in elec-
tion observation and monitoring. During missions, civil society experts from
WANEP, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) West Africa,
WACSOF, and other similar organisations are able to share knowledge with
their counterparts in the country where they have been deployed on mission,
while also learning about best practices. For instance, in elections in Niger
(2016), Cape Verde (2017), and Ghana (2016), experts independently learned
about the workings of the media and how the respective countries’ regulatory
authorities were able to maintain the transparency and independence of the
media. The experts were also able to individually share some of their experi-




   
 
A human security-centred approach 61 
Challenges of community participation 
peacebuilding in ECOWAS 
Despite the instrumentality of civil society in achieving the ECOWAS peacebuild-
ing agenda as outlined in Vision 2020, it still faces challenges. These challenges 
include funding, documentation of successes, institutional and technical capacity, 
information flow, and coordination between vital CSO groups and ECOWAS. 
In addressing these issues, ECOWAS has devised innovative approaches within 
its existing capabilities and relationships to improve community participation in 
peacebuilding. This has been mainly through partnerships, networking, lessons 
learned, and the promotion of experience-sharing among community actors. 
The funding challenges faced by CSOs have impacted their ability to contrib-
ute to peacebuilding efforts. Competition for donor funding among organisations 
undermines cooperation and coordination leading to duplication of effort and 
initiatives. To resolve the funding challenges, ECOWAS devised two strategies: 
incorporating provisions into the ECOWAS line budget to fund CSOs, and chan-
nelling donor funds to West African CSOs for their capacity-building activities. 
In June 2016, ECOWAS and CSOs in Accra, Ghana, discussed the Community 
Strategic Framework (CSF) 2016–2020 and the dedication of a portion of the 
ECOWAS community levy to ensure sustainable financing of the CSF’s imple-
mentation activities by CSOs. This includes the provision of a budget line for 
CSOs within the ECOWAS annual budget which will complement donated funds 
from emerging African foundations, indigenous philanthropists, and the diaspora. 
ECOWAS also channelled external donor funding to CSO programs. An example 
is the 2014–2017 Kingdom of Denmark’s Africa Programme for Peace (APP),27 
through which WANEP and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training 
Centre (KAIPTC) received direct financial support for their activities. 
Funding and the prioritisation of resources play a huge role in achieving 
ECOWAS’s community objectives. Although ECOWAS in 2003 created the 
Peace Fund, to ensure a timely response to urgent peace and security challenges, 
very little of its resources are used for non-emergency peace and security activi-
ties, such as policy development work and engagement with the broader policy 
community. Peacebuilding activities are to be emphasised rather than mitigation 
efforts, which requires much effort and attention as the stakes are higher. 
Documentation of ECOWAS successes in peacebuilding has not been fol-
lowed up over the years. ECOWAS convened conferences in 2005,28 2010,29 and 
201430 to discuss progress made by the broader peace and security policy com-
munity in the sphere of peace and security in the region and to review ECOWAS’s 
peace and security activities. These conferences have only been held periodically. 
They do not follow the same themes and it is unclear if conference proceedings 
are kept for future reference. On the civil society side, its contribution to conflict 
prevention needs to be further strengthened by the development of a documenta-
tion culture among CSOs. The West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI)31 is 
positioning itself to become a civil society knowledge-sharing hub and a credible 
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There is also a need for improved cohesiveness with CSOs playing a more 
active role in ECOWAS early-warning to early-response efforts. CSOs consti-
tute the lower level of the early-warning architecture, feeding into the informa-
tion shared with the ECOWAS leadership through Zonal Bureaus. CSOs also 
issue regular declarations on the political situation in West Africa.32 For instance, 
in 2011 CSOs voiced their concern over the fragility of the transition process, 
prompting action on the part of ECOWAS to intervene following Laurent 
Gbagbo’s refusal to leave power despite losing the November 2010 presidential 
elections of Cote d’Ivoire. While there has been a decentralisation of the early-
warning system, CSOs only feed information and recommend action-oriented 
interventions into the ECPF, not necessarily reflecting ECOWAS decisions which 
are still centred on the ECOWAS Commission and authority. 
ECOWAS is taking steps to create courses and training modules on the major 
challenges in institutional and capacity-building. According to Ismail (2013, 28): 
On the supply side, the [training centre of excellence], mainstream academic 
and research institutions, and civil society coalitions in West Africa could 
explore and create specialised modules and training courses focused on 
ECOWAS as an institution and broaden and improve existing courses on 
peace and security issues (for example, electoral management, disarmament, 
and demobilisation and reintegration). 
The ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs is slowly taking steps in this direc-
tion, an example being the workshop on the Review and Validation of Training 
Modules for Political Parties in ECOWAS Member States.33 The workshop, 
which had inputs from CSOs and experts across the region, aimed to produce 
training modules to address challenges in financial management, administrative 
structures, and democracy at the level of political parties in the region. Some of 
the course modules developed during the same workshop were used at a train-
ing workshop in July 2016. The training, held in Ghana, was organised with the 
objective of enhancing the capacity of political parties in Ghana in the areas of 
media relations and effective campaign strategies, internal party democracy and 
administrative processes, political party financing, and mainstreaming youth and 
women in political party activities. Youth across West Africa have not been left 
out of the process of capacity-building. ECOWAS in 2016 collaborated with the 
Friedrich-Ebert Foundation to organise a working session with journalists from 
member states.34 The training provided an opportunity for participants to gain 
insights into the role of the media in nation-building and development in West 
Africa. 
Conclusion and policy recommendations 
The increased role of regional organisations and communities in peacebuilding 
are important features of the emerging post-Cold War system. However, more 













A human security-centred approach 63 
their peacebuilding efforts and outcomes. The initiatives by CSOs like CDD, 
WANEP, and WACSOF in promoting people-centred approaches to peacebuild-
ing are commendable but need to be supported and built upon by ECOWAS and 
the wider community. Increased efforts towards ensuring capacity-building and 
documentation should pay equal attention to improvements in early-warning and 
response, funding and peer-learning, and the potential for the exchange of ideas 
with other African regional economic communities (RECs). 
CSOs should be better integrated into the early-warning and response action. 
Their contributions should go beyond feeding into the early warning mechanisms 
to joint analysis and planning of response efforts. Mainstreaming gender, youth, 
and the inputs of marginalised groups and analysing the impact of interventions 
on group dynamics will help improve outcomes. Response efforts should also 
include provisions for after-action reviews involving civil society so that lessons 
learned from the process can help inform future actions. 
Funding challenges could be addressed with the active contributions of
ECOWAS member states to the ECOWAS levy. Also, the people should rec-
ognise they need to play a greater role towards building the future ECOWAS
of their dreams. The need for localised sources of funding including from local
businesses, the private sector, and willing volunteers should be encouraged.
Funding limitations should also be mitigated with increased investments in the
use of technology to promote communication, cross-learning, and coordination
of efforts. 
The lessons of ECOWAS’s efforts towards a human security and people-
centred approach to regional peacebuilding are relevant to other African RECs, 
particularly against the background of efforts to facilitate inter-REC collabora-
tion over the past decade. In 2008, the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue facilitated a working exchange between ECOWAS and IGAD, with a 
focus on peace and security matters. Both organisations held fruitful exchanges 
and agreed to seek areas of future collaboration. The AU in 2012 held a retreat of 
the Panel of the Wise which brought together intergovernmental organisations, 
regional economic communities (RECs), civil society organisations (CSOs), gov-
ernments, and experts to discuss the peace and security landscape in Africa. The 
meeting also highlighted the nexus between security and development. Similarly, 
during the July 2016 AU Summit held in Kigali, Rwanda, ECOWAS pledged to 
host an inaugural inter-REC Retreat towards the end of 2017 to advance a culture 
of experience-sharing and cooperation among African RECs though this is yet to 
take place. 
Notes 
1 Liberia and Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso. 
2 Notwithstanding the fact that ECOWAS had by 1978 adopted the Protocol on Non-
Aggression, followed in 1981 by the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence, it was 
also evident by the end of the 1980s that there was a missing link in the equation for 
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3 In August 1990, ECOMOG deployed for its first intervention in Liberia, and as of 
2003 ECOMOG had been deployed on five missions in Liberia, Guinea Bissau, and 
Sierra Leone. 
4 The agenda recommended the continual dispatch of fact-finding missions and use of 
eminent and qualified experts in fact-finding and other missions, selected on as wide a 
geographical basis as possible, taking into account candidates with the highest stand-
ards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. 
5 A/SP1/12/01. 
6 The 2001 Protocol is supplementary to the 1999 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security. 
7 These Protocols have given ECOWAS a mandate to intervene in issues of elections and 
accession to power, decentralisation of power and participatory democracy, poverty 
alleviation, human rights, and education. In this vein, ECOWAS has successfully con-
tributed to violence-free and fair elections in the region. 
8 The ECPF, with its 14 components and the 15th being enabling mechanisms. The sec-
ond definition of civil society fits the West African context. This school of thought 
defines civil society as the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market, where 
people associate to advance common interests. In West Africa, these actors may include 
women’s organisations, traditional rulers, queen mother associations, youth organisa-
tions, faith-based organisations, trade unions, the media, and academia. 
9 First phase is the Agenda for Peace, which saw the role of multilateral institutions in 
peacekeeping and maintaining world order, second phase is the post-war reconstruction 
focus on development as a way of maintaining peace. This phase focused on institution-
building and democratic enhancement, despite the attendant criticisms of this approach 
as fostering a Cold War pro-democracy agenda. The third phase is peacebuilding from 
below expounded by Lederach’s multi-track and multi-dimensional approaches which 
emphasise the grassroots approach to peacebuilding. 
10 See also Conteh-Morgan (2005). 
11 The public sphere is 
crucial to identifying the public good and to shaping both public and private 
strategies for pursuing it. The public sphere is also important where civil society 
is seen mainly in terms of the direct action of citizens – organized informally in 
communities or more formally in voluntary associations. Public communication 
shapes what civil society organizations […] address, from poverty to the environ-
ment. Not only do issues go in or out of fashion, the very forms and strategies 
of civil society organizations are matters of public knowledge, circulating in the 
media and first-hand reports, and offering a repertoire of models to each new 
organizing effort. Public discussion is also vital to evaluating the extent to which 
different civil society organizations – or social movements – do in fact serve the 
public good. The public sphere takes on its most specifically political import 
when civil society is seen as centrally related to the state. Calhoun. 
(2011, 311–323) 
12 See Drury et al. (2005). 
13 ECPF has operational and structural preventive approaches. Operational prevention 
focuses on methods such as early warning/response, mediation, conciliation, disarma-
ment, and peacekeeping through the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). Structural pre-
vention, on the other hand, focuses on peacebuilding through political and institutional 
reforms, capacity building, justice and the rule of law, reconciliation and reintegration, 
and peace education. 
14 These frameworks include provisions for early-warning; preventive diplomacy; 
democracy and political governance; human rights and rule of law; media; natural 
resource governance; cross-border initiatives; youth empowerment; the ESF; humani-
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a focus on resource mobilisation and cooperation between member states and civil 
society organisations [CSOs]). 
15 The relationship covers the provision of technical advice and support, support for 
capacity building, and incorporating findings from peace and security research and 
analysis into ECOWAS activities. For instance, researchers at the Conflict, Security, 
and Development Group (CSDG) contributed to the development of the ECPF and its 
activity plans, especially thematic strands on security sector reform, natural resource 
management, and women, peace, and security. Also, since 2008, the CSDG has consist-
ently deployed young West African professionals in peace and security to ECOWAS 
to support its operational efficiency; ECOWAS has absorbed some of them into its ser-
vice. Similarly, in 2013, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue supported ECOWAS’s 
creation of a Mediation Facilitation Division in the Political Affairs Directorate by 
deploying consultants to undertake background research and develop operational man-
dates, procedures, and staff profiles. 
16 Others include: the establishment of the customs union; facilitation of the signing of 
an equitable, balanced, and development-oriented Economic Partnership Agreement; 
pursuit of the agricultural and environment policy; implementation of adopted action 
plans; regional infrastructure; making the free trade area function effectively by estab-
lishing the common external tariff; and encouraging member states to honour their 




18 This is captured by Aryeetey (2001). In narrating the experience of CSOs: “The revised 
1993 ECOWAS Treaty called on the regional community to co-operate with regional 
CSOs and encourage the broad participation of citizens in the integration process.” 
19 WANEP builds the capacity of peacebuilding, development, and human rights practi-
tioners in Africa and worldwide on peace and security issues to promote and protect 
human security through context-specific tools and indigenous techniques. 
20 https://wanep.org/wanep/attachments/article/658/pr_sept_2014_WANEP-ECOWAS
_mou.pdf. 
21 Other initiatives have been formed, which are discussed in brief by Ekiyor (2008). They 
include the West African CSO Forum (WACSOF) Forum of Associations Recognized 
by ECOWAS (FARE), the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), the West 
Africa Network for Peace (WANEP), the Foundation for Security and Development in 
Africa, and the West Africa Women’s Association, working with ECOWAS on issues 
of governance, early-warning, small arms proliferation, and gender, respectively. 
22 Civil society can put pressure on states to implement policies through close moni-
toring of the ratification and implementation of agreements that have been signed by 
the states. One way CSOs influence policy is through the mobilisation of the public 
in providing a common voice concerning issues affecting the welfare of citizens in a 
particular state and in the region. The role of civil society in early-warning cannot be 
overemphasised. 
23 Created in 2003, WACSOF is the umbrella body of civil society organisations created 
as the institutionalised channel of dialogue between ECOWAS and civil society organi-
sations. http://wacsof.net/index.php/en/who-we-are/about-wacsof. 
24 Communique adopted here: http://commonwealthfoundation.com/wp-content/uploa
ds/2014/12/Communique%20%20%201st%20West%20Africa%20Civil%20Society
%20Conference%20Accra%20-%20December%208-9%202014.pdf. 
25 https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/70571/1192305, also see https://realnewsmagazine.net/ 
africa/ecowas-interventions-in-mali-reviewed/. 
26 Elections are among the most important barometers of democracy. However, they 
are also a potential source of conflict and threat to peace and security. In line with 
the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and in 
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accordance with the Decision of Heads of State and Government at the 26th session 
held in Dakar, Senegal, on 31 January 2003, the ECOWAS Commission dispatched 
fact-finding missions to relevant countries in advance of elections, in order to ascertain 
the status of preparations. 
27 http://www.netpublikationer.dk/UM/evaluation_africa_programme_for_peace_2004
-2017/Html/kap05.html. 
28 A workshop on “Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: 1990–2004,” 
held in February in Accra, Ghana, included ECOWAS staff and regional and internal 
experts. 
29 In March 2010, a conference on “Two Decades of Peace Processes in West Africa:
Achievement, Failures, and Lessons” in Monrovia, Liberia, included over 150 participants,
including former heads of state, ministers, government officials, researchers, media mem-
bers, civil society activists, and policy actors from within and outside the region. 
30 The February 2014 “Experts’ After-Action Review of ECOWAS’s Intervention in 
Mali,” held in Akosombo, Ghana, was organised to assess and draw lessons and rec-
ommendations from ECOWAS’s role in Mali’s multidimensional crises. Participants 
included researchers and experts in political, military, and security issues, civil society 
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5 Civil society organisations and the 
ECOWAS peace and security agenda 
A case study of the West Africa Network for 
Peacebuilding (WANEP) 
Chukwuemeka B. Eze 
Introduction 
West African civil society organisations (CSOs) have played important roles in 
the promotion and implementation of the ECOWAS’ peace and security agenda. 
There is increasing recognition that CSOs often have unfettered access to conflict 
zones and are in direct contact with perpetrators as well as victims, allowing them 
to provide unique types of information needed in conflict prevention, manage-
ment, and transformation. Conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone marked a water-
shed for the specialisation and professionalisation of West African CSOs in the 
field of peace and security (Beck, 2001). Community leaders, women’s groups, 
media actors and the private sector, including businessmen and -women, have 
demonstrated their influence in waging conflict and seeking peace and stability as 
pre-conditions for sustainable development. These actions include addressing the 
structural and immediate causes of conflict, building the capacity of actors to pre-
vent and mitigate violence, and support the rebuilding of societies after conflict. 
They also engage in peacebuilding activities before, during and after violence. 
These have been achieved largely through, among other things, advocacy, capac-
ity building, policy and programmatic interventions, and research. Despite these 
achievements, the emergence of new threats such as terrorism, pandemics, cyber-
crime, transnational organised crime and climate change continue to threaten 
the region. Addressing them requires enhanced collaborative approaches by all 
stakeholders including CSOs. In this regard, the collaboration between CSOs and 
ECOWAS is germane. 
ECOWAS Vision 2020, which seeks to deliver meaningful development and 
promote an ‘ECOWAS of the Peoples’, provides an even greater impetus to 
engage CSOs on issues of peace and human security in the region. This chapter 
assesses the contributions of CSOs towards the consolidation of the ECOWAS 
Peace and Security Agenda, based on a case study of the West Africa Network 
for Peacebuilding (WANEP). It argues that the significance of CSOs in peace 
and security goes beyond traditional activities of monitoring and policing gov-
ernments, although influencing policy is a key factor in realising the ECOWAS 
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West Africa’s peace and security context 
West Africa has been one of the most politically dynamic and challenging regions 
of Africa. Since the 1960s, the region has registered one of the highest rates of 
coup d’états in the world. Violent conflicts occasioned by civil wars, ethno-reli-
gious conflicts, political crises, etc., have led to instability and reversals in the 
developmental gains made by several countries. In recent decades, the region 
has experienced some of the most horrendous fratricidal conflicts. Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau witnessed civil wars that have brought 
untold hardships to millions of people, destroyed property and infrastructure, 
resulting in the near-collapse of the state, while threatening the stability of neigh-
bouring countries (Obi 2009). Huge amounts of scarce resources meant for human 
and economic development have been diverted to peacekeeping efforts through 
the combined efforts of ECOWAS, the United Nations (UN) and the international 
community. 
Most recently, West Africa has become synonymous with rising levels of
radicalisation and violent extremism. Across the Sahel–Sahara zone, countries
such as Nigeria, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are burdened with high levels
of insecurity emanating from the activities of extremist groups such as Boko
Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness
and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), etc. Continued attacks on local and trans-
border communities in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon by Boko Haram and
the attacks in Mali, the Grand Bassam area of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso,
indicate the expanding nature of the threat and its destabilizing consequences.
AQIM and Boko Haram are two of the deadliest groups currently operating in
the region.
Despite efforts to prevent violent extremism and counter-terrorist activities 
across the region, new groups such as the Ansar ul Islam in Burkina Faso are 
operating with a level of sophistication that increases in ferocity with each attack. 
This has been further exacerbated by declarations of affiliation by these groups 
to Islamic State (ISIS). Terrorist groups in West Africa have access to weapons 
such as plastic explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, surface-to- air missiles and 
light anti-aircraft artillery believed to have been sourced from Libya following the 
toppling of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi regime (Aning, Okyere & Abdallah, 
2012). 
The presence of large caches of weapons has contributed to the high level of 
violence in West Africa. Out of an estimated 500 million arms in circulation in 
the global market, about 7 million have reportedly made their way into Africa 
(GIABA, 2013) in addition to locally manufactured arms in West Africa. This 
can be attributed to the aftermath of the Cold War, civil wars, armed conflicts, 
and the proliferation of weapons from the Arab spring. Mali was instrumental to a 
negotiation process within the institutional framework of ECOWAS for a regional 
freeze on the import, export and manufacture of small arms and light weapons 
in West Africa. However, the country has since regressed significantly since the 
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Additionally, transnational organised crimes such as fraud, drug and human 
trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, piracy, hostage taking and kidnapping 
are also common. These crimes are facilitated by porous borders, corruption, weak 
or fragile states and lack of institutional capacity. West Africa is a key transit hub 
for narcotics (cocaine and heroin) from South America and destined for European 
and North American markets, and as a re-distribution and consumption point. In 
some countries, such as Guinea-Bissau, narco-enterprises have succeeded in cor-
rupting state officials, leading to the disintegration of state institutions and their 
authority. Another area of concern relates to the spate of cybercrime. According 
to Adeniran (2011), the modernisation of criminality among Nigerian cybercrimi-
nal groups, for example, has been enabled by the internet and youth unemploy-
ment, lack of social support and a general deterioration of conditions of living in 
the country. The most prevalent forms of cybercrime include fraud, Automated 
Teller Machine (ATM) spoofing, hacking, impersonation, identity theft and so-
called ‘419’ scams, also known as advance-fee fraud. 
Challenges to peace and security emerge during democratic transitions and 
in West Africa. Elections are characterised by deep tensions fueled by factors 
such as ethnicity, which candidates often exploit; winner-takes-all political con-
tests, which makes parties and candidates want to win at all cost; relative lack 
of confidence in the neutrality of election management bodies and allegations of 
electoral malpractice. Election disputes across the region are often marked by out-
breaks of violence – as witnessed in Burkina Faso, 2014, and 2015, Benin 2019, 
Côte d’Ivoire 2011, Guinea 2012-2013 and 2018, and Nigeria 2015, and 2019 – 
with elections often causing great anxiety among the populace. Regrettably, a 
few leaders still nurse ambitions of long-term rule, even if that means manipulat-
ing and influencing constitutional changes to extend their stay in power beyond 
constitutional term limits. Such practices are exacerbating the crisis of political 
stability and undermining good governance in a few countries across the region. 
On the human security front, conflict arising out of struggles between compet-
ing groups for access to, and control over natural resources continue to pose new 
threats. Droughts, linked to climate change have led to increasing migration of 
individuals and communities from drier zones, in search of farming and grazing 
land and water resources. Consequently, farmer-herder conflicts have become a 
common feature, threatening the peace and security landscape. Also, meningitis, 
cholera, and Lassa fever are endemic in the region, and epidemics and pandemics 
such as Ebola and most recently Covid-19 have exhibited the region’s vulnerabil-
ity in the face of widespread disease outbreaks. Given the fragile state of health 
infrastructures and shortages of vaccines and medications, the outbreak of epi-
demics and diseases pose formidable threats to the lives of West Africans. 
Despite the provisions of ECOWAS’s Conflict Prevention Mechanism and 
emphasis on detecting conflicts early, before they lead to incalculable conse-
quences, organised violence, and the looming threats of a breakdown of law 
and order are evident. Realising that issues of governance have been one of the 
roots of conflicts in West Africa, ECOWAS leaders signed a Supplementary 
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matters relating to democratisation and governance. However, these remain a 
major challenge in most member states because of wide gaps between signing 
protocols, ratifying and implementing them. Events in the Gambia in 2017 when 
ECOWAS insisted that Yahya Jammeh hand over to the winner of the December 
2016 elections, Adama Barrow, despite the former’s initial refusal to do so, dem-
onstrated ECOWAS’s continued zero-tolerance for unconstitutional changes of 
government in the region. 
The Principle of an ‘ECOWAS of the peoples’ 
Since its inauguration on 28 May 1975, ECOWAS has been promoting economic 
cooperation and regional integration among its 15 member states. Also, from the 
early 1990, it progressively created Africa’s most sophisticated mechanisms of 
regional peace and security (Obi 2009). Member states recognised that peace and 
security were necessary ingredients for economic development and that economic 
strategies had to be complemented by initiatives that addressed human devel-
opment, social infrastructure, health, the environment, and ethnic and political 
conflicts. The Liberian war of 1989-1996 was largely responsible for bringing 
regional security to the core of ECOWAS’s integration agenda. By August 1990, 
there were 225,000 Liberian refugees in Guinea, 150,000 in Côte d’Ivoire, and 
69,000 in Sierra Leone. Furthermore, 5,000 people had been killed and about 
3,000 Nigerian, Ghanaian and Sierra Leonean citizens were held hostage by the 
rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia led by Charles Taylor (Aboagye, 1999). 
In June 2007, the Authority of Heads of State and Government adopted a land-
mark resolution through its Vision 2020, which aimed to transform the organisa-
tion from an ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of the Peoples (see chapter 4 in 
this volume). The resolution resonates with the spirit behind the formation of the 
organisation, seeking to create a borderless region where populations have access 
to its abundant resources and can exploit them through the creation of opportuni-
ties under a stable environment. The peace and security pillar of Vision 2020 is 
aptly captured in the ECOWAS Strategic Plan. It envisions a secure and socially 
cohesive West Africa devoid of conflicts, whose leaders and people place a high 
premium on peace and collective regional security; and the effective operation of 
an ECOWAS regional defence and security system that will combat the prolifera-
tion of SALWs and illicit drugs. There will be conscious and sustained collective 
effort to eliminate social discrimination or exclusion; and a demonstrably strong 
drive to inculcate acceptance of the socio-cultural diversity as a positive factor 
that enriches life in the region. 
ECOWAS has advanced a paradigm shift from a unilateral and state-centric 
approach to peace, security, and development, to multi-stakeholder participa-
tion working in partnership with civil society (See chapters 4 and 7 in this vol-
ume). The revised 1993 ECOWAS treaty called on the regional community to 
co-operate with regional CSOs and encourage the broad participation of citizens 
in the integration process. This marked an important change in both the structure 
and character of West African cooperation marked by a shift towards a more 
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people-centred agenda as opposed to the “overly state-centric approach of the 
past” (WACSI, 2009). To ensure its collaboration with CSOs and bring to fruition 
the spirit behind an ECOWAS of the Peoples, the organisation created a platform 
for interaction with CSOs, the Forum of Associations Recognized by ECOWAS 
(FARE). The association has a membership base of about 30 CSOs, represent-
ing different expertise and constituents of civil society in the region, and tries to 
bridge the gap between ECOWAS and the citizens of the community. 
Similarly, in 2003 ECOWAS spearheaded the creation of the West African 
Civil Society Forum (WACSOF). WACSOF is a network of CSOs and operates at 
the national level, with a regional coordinating secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria. The 
logic for creating a regional civil society forum was based on the need to ensure 
the input of community citizens in ECOWAS policy formulation processes and 
increase dialogue between CSOs and ECOWAS. CSOs from within the region 
have been working with ECOWAS in implementing various instruments includ-
ing, the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management. 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, signed in Lomé on the 10 December 1999 
(1999 Mechanism); and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) of 
January 2008. The framework seeks to address operational and structural conflict 
prevention and provides entry points for civil society participation. This resonates 
with the global shift in the focus of peace and security from a state-centric to a 
human security agenda, and consistent with operationalising the principle of an 
ECOWAS of the Peoples. 
This principle undergirds WANEP’s partnership with ECOWAS and shows the 
possibilities and prospects for improved civil society engagements with Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs). In line with this partnership, WANEP maintains 
a liaison office in the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja to facilitate the interface 
between ECOWAS and civil society on matters relating to conflict prevention and 
mitigation. This is an opportunity that has enabled CSOs to contribute to the peace 
and security agenda of the region. WANEP has influenced policymaking to end 
violence and deadly conflicts in the region through its numerous analytical policy 
briefs, which provide incisive ideas on what the threats and vulnerabilities are; 
who the actors are and what their agenda and undeclared intentions are; and what 
needs to be done by whom, how and why. 
WANEP-ECOWAS Partnership 
In West Africa, community-based organisations, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and CSOs at large working for peace and development have demon-
strated their passion and perhaps their capacity to complement government efforts. 
Unfortunately, these organisations in the past were side-lined in peace processes, 
especially at the peace negotiation table. However, due to significant contributions 
by CSOs in the areas of the environment and sustainable development, human 
rights and women’s issues, conflict prevention and peace building, governments 
and international actors are increasingly recognising the role of civil society in 
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are many CSOs with experience in grassroots development, engaging in political 
processes, policy formulation, influence and effecting change, which also requires 
political leverage (WANEP, 2012). However, WANEP became an obvious choice 
for ECOWAS, considering its expertise in peace and security, its structure and 
wide coverage of the region. 
WANEP was formally launched in 1998, with a vision of a West Africa at 
the pinnacle of justice and peaceful coexistence. The mission of WANEP is to 
enable and facilitate the development of mechanisms for cooperation among civil 
society-based peacebuilding practitioners and organisations in West Africa by 
promoting cooperative responses to violent conflicts. It also provides the struc-
ture through which these practitioners and institutions regularly exchange experi-
ences and information on issues of peacebuilding, conflict transformation, social, 
religious, and political reconciliation; and promoting West Africa’s values as 
resources for peacebuilding (WANEP, 2016a). 
With a network of community-based, national, and regional networks in vari-
ous peace and security thematic issues, WANEP has continued to build strong 
synergies with stakeholders and partners to ensure a transformation and para-
digm shift from reaction to prevention of violent conflicts. In 2002, it entered 
into a formal agreement with ECOWAS through the Capacity Building Program 
in Conflict Prevention and Good Governance. The aim of the partnership was to 
mobilise civil society in West Africa in salient thematic areas that affect regional 
peace and stability. ECOWAS and WANEP share the conviction that CSOs can 
make governments and state structures more responsive through participation in 
political processes, policy dialogue, monitoring, and advocacy campaigns. CSOs 
can also help share and collate information/data on early warning of emerging 
crises via monitoring, analysis, and communication strategies. This will help raise 
awareness, as well as develop options and strategies for early response. In this 
regard, political will for response through lobbying and campaigns is mobilised 
and domestic audiences sensitised. 
The challenges, failures and shortcomings in resolving West Africa’s multi-
faceted crises, and the quest to right the wrongs and errors of the past were the 
driving force behind the elaboration of the framework document that provides the 
opportunity for collaboration between ECOWAS and WANEP. The partnership 
between WANEP and ECOWAS was sealed by a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) in 2004. The MOU had three broad objectives: a) to enhance the conflict 
prevention capacity of CSOs in West Africa; b) to enhance the conflict preven-
tion capacity of ECOWAS, and c) to build and enhance collaboration between 
CSOs in West Africa and ECOWAS in matters of conflict prevention. WANEP’s 
primary focus was the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Warning and Response 
Network (ECOWARN). The MOU has been consistently renewed1, with the most 
recent targeting the decentralization of early warning, being for five years, ending 
in 2019. This experience of collaboration between WANEP and ECOWAS has 
been highlighted as the best practice for building alliances with CSOs in conflict 
prevention; and is a point of reference currently being examined by other RECs 
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ECOWARN is an important component of the Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and 
Security, especially on preventive measures. It is made up of an observation and 
monitoring system located at the ECOWAS Commission, with four zonal infor-
mation and reporting bureaus in Cotonou (covering Benin, Nigeria and Togo); 
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger); Monrovia (Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ghana); and Banjul (the Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea-
Bissau, Senegal). 
To further strengthen and complement ECOWARN, WANEP launched its 
West Africa Early Warning and Response Network (WARN) in 2010 as an inte-
gral part of its peacebuilding strategy. Subsequently WANEP developed the 
National Early Warning System (NEWS) in all the 15 ECOWAS member states. 
NEWS strives to respond to critical demands for pertinent information relating 
to human security and violent conflicts, especially at community level. Through 
NEWS, CSOs are involved in filtering, monitoring and analysing information on 
possible threats to human security at the community and national levels. Early 
warning information is shared with ECOWAS and other stakeholders on a regular 
basis; for example, as daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly reports, as well as 
conflict censuses and assessments. WARN and NEWS have been of immense 
value in the promotion of peace and security in the region. 
In support of ECOWAS’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone 
during the war, a comprehensive impact assessment of the conflict was conducted 
shortly after Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels attacked Freetown in 
January 1999. The assessment provided an opportunity to hold discussions with 
civil society groups and key stakeholders in Sierra Leone to build a common 
strategy for the peacebuilding process. Arguably, these activities influenced key 
leaders and other key actors in the Sierra Leone conflicts to disband their forces 
in preference for negotiated peace through dialogue. For example, the leader of 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/Sierra Leone Army (AFRC/SLA), Johnny 
Paul Koroma, disbanded the AFRC/SLA. Similarly the Civil Defence Forces 
(CDF) proposed a joint conflict resolution committee, where politicians were 
engaged in a deep reflection about what type of Sierra Leone should result from 
post-war rebuilding efforts, and what type of vision and leadership were needed to 
bring this forth. The collaborative approach to peacebuilding encouraged NGOs 
to come together and to form the Network for Collaborative Peacebuilding, which 
allows for efficient coordination. WANEP-Sierra Leone continues to facilitate the 
activities of the Network for Collaborative Peace Building representing CSOs at 
the level of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. 
The West Africa Peacebuilding Institute (WAPI) was established in 2002 as the 
official training platform of WANEP to provide additional training for ECOWAS 
Commission staff, ECOWAS citizens, relevant agencies, peacebuilding prac-
titioners, organisations and businesses in the area of conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding. It strives to overcome the gap in practice, knowledge, and skills 
in peacebuilding in the region and increase the number of competent, active 
peacebuilding practitioners. Since 2002, WAPI has trained over 500 practitioners 
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from ECOWAS, the AU, UN, state institutions, CSOs and corporate bodies in 
peacebuilding paradigms; natural resource governance and conflict management; 
human security and development; dialogue and mediation; youth and peace edu-
cation; gender and peacebuilding; and early warning and early response. WAPI 
currently holds a training program annually at the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana, with which WANEP 
has signed an MOU. The MOU affirms the commitment of the two institutions 
to work together with ECOWAS in pursuit of peace and stability in West Africa 
through research, training, education, and mentoring. 
In support of ECOWAS’s dialogue and mediation efforts in West Africa, 
WANEP undertakes special interventions in dialogue and mediation with the aim 
of promoting inter- and intra-communal dialogue and peaceful coexistence, as 
well as to enhance the mediating capacities of communities and other relevant 
state and inter-governmental bodies. In addition, WANEP is a strong advocate 
for national peace architectures as a national and decentralised mechanism for 
responding to conflicts and mitigating their effects. In this regard, WANEP played 
a crucial role in the establishment of the National Peace Council of Ghana and 
is currently supporting the establishment of peace architectures in Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea, Nigeria, and Niger (WANEP, 2007). 
WANEP has contributed to the mediation of disputes at the communal and 
national levels in several countries, notably Ghana, Benin, Guinea, Nigeria, and 
Niger. An example of this was during the 2012 general elections in Ghana, where 
through the Joint Platform for Election Result Monitoring (J-PERM), results com-
ing in from polling centres were jointly accessed in a coordinated situation room 
by the major political parties and representatives of the Electoral Commission, 
National Peace Council and other strategic stakeholders. Rising tensions were 
immediately defused where it became evident that the situation was going to dete-
riorate. With WANEP’s support, the National Peace Council of Ghana convened 
a meeting with the two major parties (NDC and NPP), and Electoral Commission 
to brainstorm a way forward in order to allow the Electoral Commission to pro-
ceed to declare the results. 
WANEP also supports the ECOWAS electoral unit and its commitment 
to peaceful transitions in West Africa, via its Civil Society Coordination and 
Democratic Governance programme. The programme provides an integrated plat-
form for WANEP’s engagement with diverse stakeholders to promote peaceful 
democratic transition and conflict-resolving processes/programs. It specifically 
collaborates with other CSOs to monitor and mitigate election-related conflicts 
with a view to promoting dialogue and peaceful elections. WANEP has devel-
oped a practice guide and training manual on managing election disputes in West 
Africa, which is in use in throughout the region. 
In Côte d’Ivoire, WANEP was able to mobilise CSOs, including religious 
and traditional leaders, in campaigning against the ethnically divisive politics 
deployed by some politicians, which literally divided the country into the gov-
ernment-controlled south and rebel-held north. WANEP-Côte d’Ivoire played a 
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symbolised the cessation of fighting and respect for the Ouagadougou Agreement 
between President Laurent Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro of FN, on March 4, 
2007.2 A monitoring committee was set up with other CSOs to provide quarterly 
reports on the implementation of the agreement. 
Through its Women in Peacebuilding Program (WIPNET), which was 
launched in 2001, WANEP builds the capacity of women to enhance their roles 
in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction in West Africa. It also and sup-
ports the ECOWAS Gender Directorate in the implementation of the Women, 
Peace and Security component of the ECPF, and promotes gender mainstreaming 
into peacebuilding and conflict prevention frameworks at the community, national 
and regional levels. WIPNET seeks to promote the involvement and participa-
tion of women in peace processes, following their enormous suffering in wars; 
and the under-valued and under-utilised conflict prevention skills of women and 
their leadership prowess, which is key in reversing their marginalization in the 
rebuilding of war-torn societies. The programme mobilised Liberian women as a 
pressure group to force the warring parties into signing the Accra Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement or Accra Peace Agreement for the resolution of the Liberian 
crises in August 2003 during the ECOWAS-led mediation process. The out-
come of the Liberian peace process and the role of WIPNET have been widely 
acknowledged (WANEP, 2017). It led to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the former president of Liberia and former chair of the 
ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, and Leymah Gbowee, 
the former WANEP-Liberia coordinator for the WIPNET programme. 
The WIPNET initiative preceded UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1325, demonstrating the flexibility and foresight of CSOs in promoting women’s 
participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in West Africa. In collabora-
tion with the ECOWAS Gender Directorate and the Women Peace and Security 
Institute of the KAIPTC, WANEP launched guidelines for the development and 
implementation of national action plans on UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions 
in October 2012. Since then, over 90 percent – 13- out of the 15 ECOWAS mem-
ber states have developed and continued to implement their national plans on 
UNSCR 1325. 
Children and youth in West Africa constitute a significant percentage of actors 
or victims directly affected by various conflicts that have bedevilled the region 
in the past three decades, as witnessed in Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and more recently the violent extremism and religious fundamentalism 
ravaging northern regions of Mali, Niger and Nigeria. This has had physical and 
psychological impacts on children and young people, who have suffered massive 
abuse at the hands of armed militia groups and insurgents, as child soldiers or 
orphans, or as victims of sexual slavery, displacement, and torture. In this regard, 
WANEP launched the Nonviolence and Peace Education Program (NAPE) in 
May 2000 to address rising levels of children and youths’ involvement in violent 
conflicts. 
This is based on the conviction that the youth hold the key to future stability and 
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and peace within West African communities, with a focus on children and youth 
in schools and the informal sector. The programme works in harmony with the 
vision of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers of Education of institutionalising 
peace education in the region’s schools. It promotes peer mediation and peace 
clubs, as well as peace education curriculums either as integrated or independent 
subjects at various levels such as schools, colleges, teacher training colleges and 
universities, and at the policy level. 
WANEP sees peacebuilding not as an event but rather a process; when prop-
erly inculcated in the minds and comportment of children, youths, and adults, 
they will become agents of change. The acceptability and impact of the project 
motivated WANEP to capture its experiences through a practice guide that is now 
a referral document to institutionalise peace education policy and practice in West 
Africa (WANEP, 2001). 
Challenges and prospects of CSOs contribution to the 
ECOWAS Peace and Security agenda in West Africa 
In analysing the activities of CSO globally, Frerks (2006) noted eight sets of chal-
lenges that tend to undermine the activities of CSOs, especially in the field of 
peacebuilding, namely: 1) the problem of staying impartial during or after con-
flict; 2) representation or the problem of the democratic deficit; 3) the issue of 
quality and the question of institutional strengthening and partnering; 4) the com-
plex nature of peacebuilding; 5) transparency and accountability; 6) measurability 
of impact, macro issues and power elites; 7) sustainability; and 8) “securitisation” 
of development. In looking at the West African context of civil society’s role in 
conflict prevention, Ekiyor (2008) highlighted the many valuable contributions 
of West African CSOs, but focused on six areas of concern: 1) state-civil soci-
ety relations; 2) narrow focus on NGOs; 3) weak and underfunded coordination 
mechanisms; 4) limited conflict prevention skills; 5) lack of policy influence; and 
6) lack of documentation. Be that as it may, there are major challenges hindering 
the effective contribution of CSOs to the actualisation of the ECOWAS Peace and 
Security Agenda. 
Insufficient funding 
This has greatly inhibited the contributions of CSOs to the promotion of peace 
and security in the region. Moreover, a large portion of funding for conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding comes from external partners such as the Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA), USAID, the Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA), and Austrian Development Cooperation, etc 
(see chapter 7 in this volume). Funds are usually short-term in duration and lim-
ited in scope, considering that some foreign partners are wary of CSOs in West 
Africa. With limited funds, external partners demand results within noticeably 
short and unrealistic timeframes, especially given the complex nature of conflicts 
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and business sectors in West Africa. Their contributions in the peace process have 
not been significant towards the consolidation of peace and security in the region 
(Eze and Suifon, 2012). 
Unskilled workforce 
While the number of peacebuilding practitioners in the region has grown, there is 
still a shortage of skilled personnel. In some instances, the situation can be exacer-
bated, especially when personnel intervene in conflict situations without requisite 
knowledge of the context and required skills to engage in the circumstance. 
State-CSOs’ relationship 
In comparison with other RECs in Africa, ECOWAS has demonstrated leadership 
through its well-thought-out normative frameworks and involvement of CSOs in 
its peace and security agenda. However, some member states still perceive issues 
of peace and security as the sole responsibility of the state. To this end, many gov-
ernments are suspicious of the motives of CSOs and see their activities as being 
tantamount to political opposition. 
Weak coordination
There is weak collaboration among some CSOs, which often leads to duplication 
of efforts and lack of synergy necessary for advancing partnerships. This could 
be due to adversarial relationships between organisations over funding opportuni-
ties, rather than disagreements over collaboration for the collective promotion of 
human security. 
Specifically, the challenge for WANEP in the promotion of peace and security 
stems from the fact that many state institutions and security apparatuses in the 
region are unable or slow in confronting emerging threats to peace, due to lack of 
resources or political will. In addition, corrupt and ineffective governance mecha-
nisms in some ECOWAS member states undermine the gains of WANEP and 
ECOWAS in ensuring human security and development. This weak link between 
early warning and early response continues to threaten the sustained effectiveness 
of WANEP, as collecting, analysing, and reporting conflict early warning infor-
mation is meaningless unless it is properly connected to early response. 
Conclusion and recommendations 
Civil society has emerged as an indispensable partner in peacebuilding in West 
Africa. It remains a critical factor in regional stability, peace, and economic devel-
opment. In several countries, state legitimacy is either being undermined or con-
tested, and citizens’ trust in government has been eroded due to poor governance 
expressed mostly in the failure to provide social services. Also, the states in some 
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Civil society has been at the forefront of rebuilding broken relations, especially
in the crucial phase of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation (Suifon,
2014). There have been significant improvements in the role of CSOs in the areas of
conflict resolution and regional peacebuilding. Responses to conflict by ECOWAS
and CSOs are improving in terms of speed and effectiveness. The ECOWAS-
WANEP partnership is an emerging success story in relation to the capacity to
detect and predict security threats in the region. While far-reaching steps have been
taken towards implementing the “ECOWAS of the Peoples,” the prevalence of
new and ongoing conflicts suggests that more work needs to be done. The involve-
ment of civil society in the operationalisation of ECOWARN is an innovation that
reflects global recognition of civil society in building peace and security. So far, the
partnership has led to the establishment of an early warning system that draws its
strength from information gathering. However, the challenge remains ECOWAS’s
inability to effectively link early warning to early response (Opoku, 2007). 
In charting a path for civil society collaboration with the state and intergov-
ernmental organisations, and promoting its contribution to the ECOWAS Peace 
and Security Agenda, member states need to further interrogate the notion that 
peace and security should remain the sole responsibility of the state. This would 
entail an expansion of the notion beyond its current state-centric focus to embrace 
a people-centered ‘endogenous’ insistence on good governance and a renewed 
international commitment to greater egalitarianism in global decision-making. In 
this regard, emphasis on multi-disciplinary approaches involving a range of gov-
ernmental and non-governmental actors in understanding their respective roles, 
and reliance on a broad partnership – including local communities, civil society, 
media, the private sector, humanitarian organisations and others – is key. Here are 
some recommendations: 
·· Expansion of partnerships with relevant CSOs to include directorates of the 
ECOWAS Commission other than Political Affairs Peace and Security. 
·· Annual contributions from the ECOWAS Peace Fund and other sources to 
regional CSOs in formal partnerships with the Commission. 
·· Organisation of an annual meeting between the Commission and CSOs on 
thematic issues to promote synergy and accountability. 
·· A review of ECOWARN indicators to ensure they capture current dynamics 
including violent extremism, piracy, and cybercrimes. 
·· ECOWAS member states should domesticate the ECPF as well as other 
ECOWAS strategic documents and ensure national ownership. 
·· The ECOWAS Commission should serve as an entry point for engaging 
national governments on key regional peace and security initiatives. 
·· CSOs should increase capacity building in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. 
·· CSOs should collaborate with relevant national and community stakeholders 
to ensure synergy and optimise results. 
·· CSOs involved in conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding should 
intensify their advocacy and insistence on preventive mechanisms, since they 
are cheaper (than mediating full-blown conflict) and less complex. 
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·· CSOs should be engaged in the decentralisation of ECOWARN through the 
development and operationalisation of the ECOWAS National Early Warning 
Mechanisms and the establishment of peace architectures as aptly articulated 
in the policy document adopted by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State 
and Government in Accra in 2014. 
Notes 
1 Both ECOWAS and WANEP renewed MOU for the sustenance of Regional Early 
Warning and Response Mechanism Available online: https://wanep.org/wanep/attach
ments/article/658/pr_sept_2014_WANEP-ECOWAS_mou.pdf 
2 The Ouagadougou Political Agreement 4 March 2007 Available: https://peaceaccords
.nd.edu/accord/ouagadougou-political-agreement-opa
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6 ECOWAS and the limits of 
peacemaking in West Africa 
Amadu Sesay 
Introduction 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is arguably the 
single most important achievement of West Africa’s post-independence leaders. 
The project was aimed at bridging the tangible and intangible legacies of the colo-
nial powers, often referred to as the “Anglophone and Francophone divide in West 
Africa.” A retrospective glimpse at the region before the creation of ECOWAS 
reveals a geographical space that was replete with “sit-tight leaders,” “presidents 
for life,” one-party dictatorships, and tyrannical, retrogressive, plundering civil-
ian and military regimes; it was a severely asphyxiated political space that had 
little or no respect for basic human rights, human dignity, or security of life. There 
was absence of region-wide opprobrium and sanctions for those who obtained 
power through the barrel of a gun or by other unconstitutional means. 
The establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 changed the governance, peace, and 
security landscape in West Africa significantly. ECOWAS was able to noticeably 
mitigate the debilitating effects of the East–West Cold War rivalry in the region 
through the deliberate use of “good offices” and “presidential mediation,” which 
resulted in significant fence-mending between and among some of its members, 
including those that were not on talking terms with one another.1 To its credit, 
ECOWAS has, in the past four decades and a half, facilitated political recon-
ciliation and prevented an outbreak out of hostilities between its members.2 The 
huge success of the European Union (EU), often seen as ECOWAS’s “mentor,” 
undoubtedly played an important role in encouraging the leaders in the region to 
move ahead with the integration project despite the enormous challenges. There 
was also encouragement from the relative economic success of the BRICS – 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – in that regard (Cheru and Obi, 
2010; Southall and Melber, 2009; Vines, Wong, Weimer, and Campos, 2009). 
An accidental peace enforcer? 
In assessing the now widely acknowledged success of ECOWAS in restoring
relative /peace and stability in West Africa, it is often forgotten that the organi-
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between its feuding leaders. It was, however, the cataclysmic post-Cold War
conflicts in some member states – most especially Liberia and Sierra Leone –
that led to their interconnected “uncivil” wars and the deepening of ECOWAS’s
involvement in peace support operations in the region. The new preoccupation
was codified in the 1999 Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (“the Mechanism”),
which aimed to change responses to domestic peace and security challenges.
Another significant development was the involvement in, and support of, key
external state and non-state actors to ECOWAS’s peacemaking efforts in West
Africa in diverse ways: funding meetings and conferences; providing technical
expertise through the secondment of senior military personnel at the ECOWAS
Commission’s headquarters in Abuja; and providing logistics support using
development partners, especially during military deployments. Such partner-
ships with donor countries have been an indispensable catalyst in the implemen-
tation of ECOWAS’s “expanded mandate” and institution-building, which have
also underlined the interconnectedness of economic and politico-security issues
in the region. 
ECOWAS capitalised on the commitment of regional leaders to stealthily 
challenge and tone down the emphasis hitherto placed on national sovereignty. 
Slowly and incrementally, ECOWAS has made important inroads into the tradi-
tional preserves of member states and the almost exclusive right to make laws for 
peace and security, all of which underscored its evolution into a regional security 
community. This concentration on security is arguably at the expense of grow-
ing the economies of member states, wealth creation, and even economic inte-
gration, with negative consequences for the organisation’s ability to undertake, 
and sustainably, what I call “hard or lethal peacemaking” activities. ECOWAS 
presents a salient theoretical and practical innovation and change in integration 
schemes, most especially in Africa, an unorthodox route to integration in which 
peace, security, and stability are the most notable catalysts for political and eco-
nomic integration. 
Of particular interest were the extremely inhumane civil wars in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone in the early 1990s, which inspired unparalleled improvisation by 
ECOWAS, most notably the deployment of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG), a precipitate military operation that was believed to have been 
authorised by the still little-known Community Standing Mediation Committee. 
ECOMOG troop deployments in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau, and 
then in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and the Gambia, symbolised at a level of analysis a 
bold attempt to operationalise contemporary pan-Africanism or what has been 
described as “try Africa first” (Sesay and Omotosho, 2011), which emphasises 
collective problem-solving at continental and regional levels as an approach to 
multilateral cooperation and integration. At another level, the deployment of 
ECOMOG, now institutionalised as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), was a 
practical expression of the popular phrase “African solutions to African prob-
lems” (AfSOL) (Sesay and Omotosho, 2011; Sesay, 2016) in peace and security 













The ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture is in tandem with the AU’s 
mechanism, an institutional reflection of the continental body’s own expanded 
mandate. The ESF’s capacity is being strengthened for effective deployment 
within and outside the region at the request of the AU, the United Nations (UN), 
or any other international organisation.3 This is why the ESF has been acknowl-
edged as a model for other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) on the con-
tinent. It is arguable that ECOWAS has mastered, consciously and instinctively, 
what international relations scholars describe as “disjointed incrementalism” in 
its approach to peacemaking in West Africa, by turning the huge challenges and 
threats in the region that resulted from the collapse of some member states and the 
hostile immediate post-Cold War global environment into enormous opportuni-
ties for putting in place institutions, mechanisms, and processes for peacemaking 
and peace enforcement operations that were never anticipated, even in the revised 
1993 Treaty. In the process, it engendered irreversible behavioural change among 
West Africa’s leaders and citizens, through institution-building. Some of the more 
notable landmarks are worthy of a brief mention. 
First is the 1978 Protocol on Non-aggression, which aimed to build confidence
and discourage interstate conflict in the region. In 1981, the Protocol on Mutual
Assistance in Defence (PMAD) was unanimously adopted to compel the organisa-
tion to defend any member state that was the victim of external military aggression.
President Samuel Doe of Liberia invoked Article 16 of the Protocol in July 1990 in
the wake of relentless attempts by Charles Taylor to take over the country by force
of arms. A lot has been written on the legality of Doe’s letter. Much of the contro-
versy centred on whether, at the time he sent the letter to the ECOWAS Executive
Secretary, he was still the country’s de jure leader (Aboagye, 1999). Unfortunately,
ECOWAS never commented on Doe’s letter, which would have given us a fuller
background to the decision-making processes that culminated in the deployment of
the ECOMOG force in Liberia. The Standing Mediation Committee, however, jus-
tified ECOMOG’s deployment on the ground as a needed response to the challeng-
ing and complex humanitarian emergency in the country, especially in Monrovia.4 
Other relevant landmarks in mapping ECOWAS’s foray into regional peace-
making and peace enforcement include the Mechanism, which placed overwhelm-
ing emphasis on multi-track approaches in tackling conflicts in the West Africa 
region. The Mechanism provided the template for creating other key conflict pre-
vention and peacemaking instruments, such as the Early Warning System, the 
Council of Elders, the wide-ranging ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, 
Election Observation, the ECOWAS Court and Parliament, and the ESF. In January 
2016, ECOWAS set up the Mediation Facilitation Directorate (MFD) as part of 
its efforts to consolidate and institutionalise its peacemaking efforts in the region. 
The broad mandate of the MFD is to “support the Political Affairs Directorate in 
the coordination and monitoring of mediation efforts by ECOWAS institutions 
and organs, Member States and non-state actors” (ECOWAS Commission, n.d., 
7), and to organise bi-annual exchange programmes to enhance learning, sharing 
of experiences, and research in dialogue and mediation (ECOWAS Commission, 










ECOWAS and the limits of peacemaking 85 
The ECOMOG military operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and the Gambia are eloquent testimonies to the strong politi-
cal will and commitment of West African leaders to engage conflicts in the region 
head-on. It is irrelevant if deployments and interventions were carried with or 
without external support.5 What is more important is that ECOWAS’s huge 
investment in peacemaking mechanisms and initiatives in West Africa reflects a 
consciousness by the region’s leaders of the unquantifiable costs of violent con-
flicts on the one hand, and, on the other, the reality that “conflict prevention and 
peacemaking efforts are not only necessary but imperative if the integration pro-
ject is to succeed”.6 
The Liberian intervention is particularly significant in tracking the evolution 
and consolidation of the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture. It was the 
first attempt by a sub-regional organisation in Africa to deploy a peace enforce-
ment force without the explicit approval of the UN Security Council. Second, 
the subsequent deployment of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) 
several years later presaged the formal involvement of the world body in such a 
joint venture as a “junior” partner. Third, the intense political and diplomatic shut-
tles, tensions, negotiations, disagreements, and compromises that characterised 
the formation and deployment of ECOMOG significantly enhanced political com-
munication between member states as well as their commitment to the expanded 
ECOWAS project. 
These developments become much more meaningful and potent in the con-
text of the perceived Anglophone–Francophone divide; and associated fears
of Nigeria’s hegemonic intentions in West Africa – what Adebajo has called
“pax Nigeriana” (2002; 2004b).7 ECOWAS’s commitment to promoting peace
and security in West Africa underscored the paradoxes between the region’s
appalling levels of poverty and underdevelopment, and its strong commitment
to put together and deploy complex peacekeeping and peace enforcement
missions.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the political capital generated by the success 
of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone translated into unprecedented changes 
in the mandate, objectives, institutional structure, and ideological foundations of 
not only ECOWAS in West Africa but also of other regional bodies in Africa, 
especially the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This signifi-
cant emotional, ideological, and political shift – and even activism – led to the 
transformation of the essentially redundant OAU into the more pro-active African 
Union (AU) in July 2002. 
Not surprisingly, SADC and similar RECs have made conflict management, 
including peacekeeping and peace enforcement, a cardinal concern. The mandates 
of regional and continental bodies in Africa are now more intrusive, while mem-
ber states are unwittingly surrendering increasing aspects of their sovereignty to 
continental and regional bodies to enhance the achievement of common goals, 
especially in the area of peace and security. The restoration of peace and stability 
in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and the Gambia has 
enabled those countries to face the more daunting challenges of nation-building 
  86 Amadu Sesay
and post-conflict reconstruction with some measure of success. Liberia and 
Sierra Leone have consolidated post-civil war governance gains, and success-
fully organised a series of presidential and general elections certified as peaceful, 
free, and fair by ECOWAS, the AU, the EU, the UN, and other international 
bodies. Notwithstanding the daunting operational limitations and inevitable intra-
organisational geopolitical competition, ECOWAS has since the 1990s emerged 
as the leading and most-experienced actor in peacemaking in Africa. ECOWAS 
has become an invaluable and indispensable partner of the AU and the UN in 
promoting peace and security in West Africa. Under the subsidiarity principle, it 
is ECOWAS, not the AU or the UN, that has primary responsibility for peace and 
security in the West Africa region. 
Irony of success and limits of peacemaking 
A lot has been written on ECOWAS’s peacemaking activities (see Adeshina, 
2002; Adisa, 1993; Aning, 1994, 1999; Asante, 2004; and Bach, 2004). However, 
there is a scarcity of literature on the link between ECOWAS’s relative success 
in conflict prevention, management, peacemaking, and security on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, its poor record in creating wealth and prosperity among its 
members through effective economic integration. According to Article 2(1) of the 
Treaty of Lagos, ECOWAS was set up “to promote cooperation and development 
in all fields […] for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its people, 
fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress 
and development of the African continent.” Through cooperation on socio-eco-
nomic policies and processes, ECOWAS was to facilitate timely standardisation 
of tariffs and trade procedures among member states to eventually create a com-
mon market, common commercial policy, and external tariffs (Article 58 of the 
1975 Treaty). 
Another central objective of the organisation was to facilitate the progressive 
liberalisation of trade within the community, through the elimination of customs 
duties and administrative and infrastructural barriers to trade among members. 
The abolition of restrictions on the free movement of people, services, and capi-
tal within the sub-region became a critical component of ECOWAS’s mandate, 
which is encapsulated in the 1979 Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and 
Services. ECOWAS was also to harmonise member states’ agricultural and indus-
trial policies; promote joint projects in marketing, research, and agro-industrial 
enterprises; harmonise planning and implementation of schemes in transportation, 
communication, and energy sectors; and promote even development among mem-
ber states through the establishment of a Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, 
and Development (Article 2[2] 1975 Treaty). 
To underline this rather ambitious programme, the founding treaty of 
ECOWAS implicitly provided for the establishment of a customs union within 
ten years. As a regional integration scheme, it aimed to enhance the region’s 
development potential by expanding intra-community trade and improving essen-
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and promoting monetary and financial cooperation to achieve a single currency. 
However, Article 58 of the revised 1993 Treaty did not hide the new emphasis on 
security matters and ECOWAS’s unwitting transmutation into a complex security 
community. 
Neglect of the economic integration components of ECOWAS, evidenced 
by its failure to meet vital community targets and, in particular, its inability to 
execute community-wide industrial projects, left West Africa far behind other 
regions in the UN’s Human Development Index, with negative consequences for 
its peacemaking agenda. The failure of the 1987 Economic Recovery Plan, which 
was already apparent in 1990, pointed to the stagnation as well as the decreasing 
political commitment of the organisation to its economic targets. 
This failure became more pronounced after the 1990s, a period that also
coincided with the expansion of its agenda in the non-economic sphere. During
this period, most of the development indicators were negative for West Africa
(Adedeji, 2004). The unimpressive performance of ECOWAS as an economic
integration scheme drew attention from critical stakeholders and official plat-
forms, notably the 21st ECOWAS Council of Ministers. In 2000, ECOWAS’s
Executive Secretary lamented that, after 25 years, “ECOWAS has shown a poor
record with regard to the community programmes” (ECOWAS, 2000). 
This is reflected in its inability to fulfil its six cardinal goals, most notably
trade liberalisation, well after the 1990 target date; its inability to evolve a com-
mon external tariff scheme as a prerequisite for a customs union; limited pro-
gress in harmonising economic and fiscal policies among member states; and the
continued absence of a single monetary zone across the region. More than four
decades after its creation, intra-regional trade was still less than 15 percent of
the regional total (Sesay and Akinrinade, 1996; Shuaibu, 2015).8 In April 2017,
no significant progress had been made either in promoting integration in trade
and production or in creating practicable region-wide structures for economic
transformation and wealth creation. The modest gains made in the organisa-
tion’s visa-free policy for community citizens have been bogged down by veiled
politico-security restrictions, which are further compounded by terrorism and
insurgency in some key member states including Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Burkina
Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire. Continued terrorist threats from Boko Haram in Nigeria
have increasingly directed the attention of ECOWAS’s most powerful member
inwards (Runsewe, 2016). 
It is apposite therefore to start with a brief look at Nigeria, the most populous 
member and its biggest economy, which now accounts for 75 percent of West 
Africa’s total GDP and is the biggest economy in Africa ahead of South Africa 
(UNECA, 2015). Retrospectively, and to its credit, Nigeria led and provided more 
than 75 per cent of the human and financial resources needed for the Liberia and 
Sierra Leone operations in the 1990s. Nigeria is presently among those member 
countries that have been hardest hit by the global economic downturn caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Crude oil production was already at its lowest level in 
30 years between 2016 and the first quarter of 2017 due to the activities of militant 








Nigeria’s shaky economy had far-reaching implications for the country as well 
as the entire ECOWAS region,10 notably the resultant financial challenges for the 
regional body. The instability in the price of oil and the effect of insecurity in the 
Niger Delta on oil production were risk factors for national wealth.11 The signifi-
cance of this for Nigeria and ECOWAS lies in the fact oil sales receipts constitute 
the biggest chunk of the country’s revenue and account for more than 80 percent 
of total earnings. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) confirmed in July 2016 that 
crude oil earnings had dropped by as much as NGN 41 billion in one month, and 
by as much as 18.01 percent in April 2016.12 Not surprisingly, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) warned that Nigeria’s economy would contract by 1.8 per-
cent in 2016 due to unprecedentedly low oil prices (Vanguard, 2016a). 
The significance of this brief politico-economic profile of Nigeria is that, as 
the region’s biggest economy and the most important contributor to ECOWAS’s 
annual budget, the gloomy statistics are directly and indirectly tied to the organi-
sation’s financial fortunes and its capacity to undertake autonomous force deploy-
ments in the region. 
The success of the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone was 
mainly due to the total commitment of Nigeria to the project and its relatively 
buoyant economy at the time. The present poor health of the Nigerian economy, 
coupled with constitutional checks and balances, makes it difficult for the presi-
dent to engage in “foreign ventures” like those in Liberia. Another new dimen-
sion is the increasingly isolationist tendencies of the Nigerian elite, who openly 
complain that previous costly foreign adventures in Liberia and Sierra Leone did 
not yield commensurate dividends in terms of improved welfare for the citizens, 
or even political support for Nigeria’s foreign policy goals in the region, the AU, 
and the wider international community (Sesay, 2016).13 The ongoing insurgency 
in the northeast of the country, coupled with the disruptive militancy in the Niger 
Delta, presented security and socio-economic challenges that will make it hard 
for Nigeria to engage decisively in any future ECOWAS-led military missions 
in West Africa.14 The former President of the ECOWAS Commission, Marcel de 
Souza, admitted that the organisation was facing challenges including a “finan-
cial situation that has become quite precarious and the precarious situation is tied 
to the economic situation in the Member States and the fact that the price of oil 
has dropped” (Financial Watch, n.d.; Blank News Online, n.d.). Mr de Souza 
regretted that the Community Levy, which accounts for 90 percent of ECOWAS’s 
funding, is no longer regularly paid by most member states. The Commission 
was particularly concerned with the economic fortunes of Nigeria, its “richest” 
member, stressing that the poor financial state of ECOWAS was undermining its 
credibility in the region. He appealed to Nigeria to pay up its outstanding bills 
(Financial Watch, n.d.; Blank News Online, n.d.). The ECOWAS Commission’s 
new political head revealed, openly for the first time, that “the bills of peacebuild-
ing troops sent to Mali and Guinea Bissau were yet to be paid […] peace comes 
with a cost that must be paid” (Financial Watch, n.d.; Blank News Online, n.d.).15 
The Commission’s success and failure are intricately tied to the political and eco-
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Unfortunately for ECOWAS and its peacemaking efforts in West Africa, the 
prospects for the rest of the members are no better. According to the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2015, xiii), “in terms of human development, 
with an average development index of 0.450 for West Africa, most of the coun-
tries in the region fall within the category of countries ‘with low human develop-
ment,’ besides Cape Verde and Ghana” (UNECA, xiii). Consequently, the chances 
of attracting significant investment into the region are slim because of its low 
ranking in the Doing Business Report for 2018. Except for Ghana, which ranked 
120th out of 190 countries listed, most West African countries were in the bottom 
half of the rankings. The low rating of countries in the region in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index for 2018 shows most countries in 
West Africa as grappling with major corruption-related challenges. The Ibrahim 
Index of African Governance also drew attention to the key indicators of poor 
governance in most of these countries. 
Unconstitutional changes of government and coups d’état have significantly 
receded in the region. Nonetheless, religious extremism and terrorism in some 
key countries as pointed out earlier remain potent threats to state stability and 
prosperity in West Africa. Another very compelling threat ECOWAS has yet to 
find an answer to is the youth bulge, and massive youth unemployment and under-
employment in all member states. More than four decades of regional integration 
have failed to promote inclusive development in the member states, a situation 
that does not augur well for sustainable peace and stability, given the direct link 
between youth unemployment, violence, political instability, insurgency, and 
civil wars.16 
The Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria is partially blamed on youth 
exclusion, massive youth unemployment, and illiteracy. Intricately linked to that 
is the conclusion by the Ibrahim Index of African Governance that West Africa’s 
democratic institutions and governance systems are weak and could unravel under 
the weight of youth mass unemployment. The quality of institutions and mecha-
nisms of the organisation are themselves a function of the quality of democratic 
governance in the member states. Although ECOWAS scores high on the proven 
political commitment of its members to peacemaking in the region, and has the 
“blood” – the military and allied personnel for peace enforcement operations – it 
is severely constrained by its weak “treasury” or fragile financial base. As the 
Mali After-Action Review (ECOWAS, 2014) eloquently testifies, “ECOWAS 
lacks the requisite strategic, military, logistical and financial base for autonomous 
action during violent conflicts in a non-permissive environment” (ECOWAS, 
2014, 25). The Africa-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), 
which was co-sponsored by the AU and ECOWAS, was eventually taken over by 
the UN, although the mission was undertaken in “ECOWAS’s backyard.” 
The Mali After-Action Review starkly revealed that the combined efforts 
of ECOWAS and the AU could not sustain the local funding and ownership of 
AFISMA, necessitating its re-hatting to create the United Nations Multidimensional 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). ECOWAS’s poor finances and lack 




and successfully see through military deployments in the region. The Mali After-
Action Review candidly admitted: “the conviction among the ECOWAS Member 
States that the Region could not intervene militarily in Mali on its own with-
out substantial international logistical and financial support compromised any 
autonomous military planning from the start” (ECOWAS, 2014, 23). In spite of 
spirited efforts to institutionalise the ESF, there is no guarantee that the mecha-
nism will be deployed efficiently in a member state. Few members can support 
their contingents in future military deployments for the statutory 90-day period 
and ECOWAS may not be able to take over funding such missions in line with 
global practices. As the Mali After-Action Review poignantly highlighted, “vol-
untarism and goodwill are not sufficient conditions for the success of a modern 
Peace Support Operation. Pledges must be backed by redemption” (ECOWAS, 
2014, 31). Another serious hurdle to effective future military deployments is the 
absence of “an effective multidisciplinary Peace Support Operations Division 
to plan and coordinate operations” at the ECOWAS Commission. In Mali, the 
functions of this strategic organ were performed by a “cross-departmental Mali 
Working Group, which was a poor substitute” (ECOWAS, 2014, 31). More than 
four decades after its formation, ECOWAS has failed to develop the region’s “real 
sectors” upon which national and regional economic development and prosperity 
hinge (Bach, 1993, 606). 
ECOWAS’s relative success in peacemaking ventures and initiatives in West 
Africa has inadvertently led it to adopt a static classical, rather than a robust, 
dynamic, and pragmatic approach to economic integration. Consequently, it has 
not been able to build and sustain its capacity to engage decisively in “lethal” 
peace support operations in West Africa. This shortcoming is compounded by its 
tendency to mirror similar experiments in Western Europe, notwithstanding the 
vast differences in their historical, socio-economic, geographical, and political 
dynamics; a situation that Sesay (2008b) described as “symbolism and imper-
sonation.” The structural changes in ECOWAS, including the switch from an 
ECOWAS Community to an ECOWAS Commission complete with an executive 
President and Commissioners, underlined the symbolism and impersonation phe-
nomenon on the part of West Africa’s flagship regional organisation. 
Conclusion 
The central argument in this chapter is that peacemaking and peace support opera-
tions are expensive, and presently beyond the means of ECOWAS, because of 
the appalling economic and security conditions in its members. Of concern is 
the weak economy in Nigeria, the region’s powerhouse and regional hub. Abuja, 
which had almost singlehandedly led and financed the ECOMOG operations in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, is no longer in a position to do so. There is a need for 
both member states and the organisation to rededicate themselves to the original 
principles of the organisation. 
Economic diversification and good governance must go hand in hand with sus-
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wealth and income, in favour of disadvantaged groups that constitute the majority, 
to give every citizen a voice in decision-making processes that affect their lives. 
At the institutional level, ECOWAS should encourage members to put in place 
transparent and effective strategies beyond their formal Youth Policy Documents. 
It should nudge members to undertake the following measures, among many oth-
ers: first, they should revamp outmoded curricula in all sectors of their educational 
systems, so that young school leavers and graduates will possess the requisite 
skills and be employable, and expose them to vocational life skills training for 
self-employment. Sadly, while the ICT revolution has catapulted states in the 
global North into the fourth industrial revolution, West Africa and sub-Saharan 
Africa are yet to embrace the first one successfully.17 
Second, ECOWAS should rededicate itself to the pursuit of a two-track
approach to regional integration, promoting economic development and wealth,
and consolidating the creation of a security community to attract desperately
needed foreign investment into the region. Third, ECOWAS should encourage
member states to implement “tax incentive measures and programmes for the
employability of young graduates by companies and the acquisition of first work
experience” (UNECA, 2015, xiv). ECOWAS should set an example in spear-
heading genuine reform of agriculture by increasing investment in this vital sec-
tor, providing transport infrastructure that will open up remote rural areas, to
choke off the urban–rural drift of young and largely illiterate youth. Effective
investment in the agricultural sector could lead to genuine income redistribu-
tion through enhanced earnings for farmers, in a way that would checkmate the
vicious cycle of what sociologists call “transmission of poverty” from one gen-
eration to another. It is remarkable in this regard that the Southeast Asian “eco-
nomic miracle” was driven by substantial investment in the agricultural sector,
which in some instances was as high as 25 percent of national budgets, among
other pro-people measures and policies (Eyinla, 2012, 1). 
Fourth, ECOWAS must establish a department at its headquarters in Abuja
that is exclusively responsible for coordinating regional integration issues. It
should encourage effective mechanisms at the national level to coordinate
regional programmes and policies. There is real need for the re-establishment
of vital links between member states and citizens to deepen economic integra-
tion in the region. ECOWAS should also encourage members to adhere to the
protocol on terrorism as well as the 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms
and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, and other Related Matters, especially
after the collapse of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011, and its
ramifications for peace and security in West Africa. ECOWAS must, therefore,
work closely with other stakeholders to fully operationalise the “Sahel Strategy
and strengthen crisis management mechanisms to contain the security and ter-
rorism risks” (UNECA, 2015, xiv). ECOWAS needs to be actively involved in
coordinating the actions and responses of critical non-member countries such
as Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mauritania, and Morocco and important development
partners, including the AU, the US, and the EU, to fast-track the operationalisa-






















Fifth, ECOWAS should work towards the full establishment and operationali-
sation of a logistics depot to enhance its response capacity and facilitate the stand-
ardisation of equipment for enhanced local ownership. Closely related is the need
for financial self-sufficiency, which is critical to sustainability and local owner-
ship of peace support operations. The Mali After-Action Review rightly noted: “to
ensure its rapidity and flexibility, safeguard secrecy and confidentiality to achieve
successful outcomes, a PSO [peace support operation] must be endowed with an
autonomous, consolidated and dedicated fund.” ECOWAS should seriously con-
sider holding annual fundraising activities within and outside the region every year
to celebrate “ECOWAS Day.” “ECOWAS Day” should be used to raise money
for the ECOWAS Peace Fund. ECOWAS should encourage successful local and
foreign corporate entities such as banks and oil companies, which are among the
major beneficiaries of peace and stability in the region, to donate to the Fund. The
West African Diaspora and friends of ECOWAS should be encouraged to donate
generously. A Board of Trustees comprising notable individuals in and outside of
the region should manage ECOWAS Day donations (ECOWAS, 2014, 31).
The need for effective communication during peace support operations cannot 
be overstated. Poor or even lack of efficient communication channels has been 
the bane of ECOWAS military missions dating back to Liberia in 1990. It was 
also a major challenge in the Mali mission. There is urgent need to put in place 
a “dedicated and secure communications, and simple administrative and pro-
curement procedures (for such purpose) outside the normal (ECOWAS) bureau-
cracy” (ECOWAS, 2014, 31). A good starting point is to sufficiently fund the 
Communications Directorate at the headquarters in Abuja, to build its capacity to 
drive the new orientation. Finally, ECOWAS must work towards the realisation 
of Vision 2020 in line with its determination to transform “an ECOWAS of States 
into an ECOWAS of People Democratic and Prosperous” (ECOWAS, 2011). The 
organisation should, therefore, continue to engage closely and continuously with 
civil society forces and organisations in the region to benefit from their invaluable 
support in marketing its programmes and policies.18 
Notes 
1 President Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea was noted for having very frosty relations 
with some of his Francophone and Anglophone neighbours 
2 The last border skirmish between ECOWAS members occurred in 1984 between Mali 
and Burkina Faso but was quickly brought under control through the timely interven-
tion of Nigeria’s former foreign minister Bolaji Akinyemi. 
3 In the 2015 revised 1999 Mechanism. 
4 Hundreds of civilians, including ECOWAS nationals who took refuge in holy places 
and in diplomatic missions, were being massacred indiscriminately by all sides in the 
uncivil war. Most of the more comprehensive literature on the intervention in Liberia 
discussed this aspect. 
5 The UN took over the Mali Mission from the AU and ECOWAS less than two years 
into the operation due to funding and logistical challenges. 
6 Interview with Mr Osei, former director, economic planning and research department, 
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7 Adekeye Adebajo has made this point forcefully, directly, and indirectly, in some of his 
works. See, for instance, Adebajo (2002, 2004a, 2004b). 
8 See, for example, Sesay and Akinrinade (1996) and Shuaibu (2015). 
9 Sabotage of oil production facilities so disruptive that the Nigerian government is 
alleged to have reached an agreement with them, which at one point involved the 
release of the Okah brothers, who were sentenced in connection with bombings in 
Abuja in October 2010. In April 2020 crude oil price was $16.46 less than the produc-
tion cost of $30. 
10 Various national newspapers ran stories on the recession; for example The Nation
(2016) and Vanguard (2016). 
11 For instance, the price of crude oil, the country’s major foreign exchange earner, was 
only USD $27 a barrel in January 2016, while the budget was pegged at USD $38, with 
a daily production rate of 2.2 million barrels. Production dropped steeply to 1.2 million 
in July 2016 due to the activities of the Niger Delta Avengers. 
12 See Vanguard, 20 July 2016. 
13 For more on this argument see, Sesay (2016). 
14 Nigeria pulled out of the Mali Mission unexpectedly blaming it on the need to concen-
trate on the war against Boko Haram in its northeast. 
15 The visit led to the release of Nigeria’s contributions to the ECOWAS budget for 
2015 and 2016, totaling USD $694,000. The minister also promised to provide the 
ECOWAS president with accommodation to save costs. It has been alleged that the 
money was deliberately withheld in protest at the Commission’s profligacy, especially 
during his predecessor’s tenure, which left it virtually bankrupt. 
16 The most notorious examples are perhaps Liberia and Sierra Leone, which imploded in 
the early 1990s. 
17 This is why African states and citizens are referred to as “ICT migrants” as opposed to 
“ICT citizens” as is the case in technologically developed countries. 
18 I am not sure of the percentage of ECOWAS citizens that presently know of its exist-
ence, even after four decades of its existence, having been founded in July 1975. 
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7 ECOWAS and triangular cooperation 
for peacebuilding in West Africa 
Challenges and prospects from the Liberian 
and Sierra Leonean experiences 
Kehinde Olusola Olayode 
Introduction 
The expansion of the role of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) from being an organisation primarily focused on economic integra-
tion to include conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities in the 1990s exem-
plified the changing security environment across Africa and the convergence of 
development and security issues in the post-Cold War era. The outbreak of civil 
wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and unconstitutional changes in power in other 
West African countries, and accompanying humanitarian crises necessitated a 
review of ECOWAS’s foundational statutes to accommodate peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding interventions. ECOWAS-led peacebuilding in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone involved responses to multiple complex emergencies arising from the col-
lapse of central administration and its attendant consequences. These included 
the collapse of various administrative organs of the state and institutions; refugee 
crises and internal displacement-related issues; resettlement and post-war rehabil-
itation and economic reconstruction. Others include rehabilitation of infrastruc-
ture, democratic transitions, and elections; reconciliation; disarmament and arms 
destruction; security sector reforms; and justice and restitution (truth and rec-
onciliation). Given resource limitations and capacity deficiencies, ECOWAS-led 
peace initiatives were supported by multilateral agencies, South–South partners, 
and Western powers in a triangular pattern of cooperation for peacebuilding in 
West Africa. 
South–South cooperation as a development framework has a long history. 
It is based on the building of shared histories and mutual economic, political, 
and cultural interests. The pivotal role of several emerging powers in the global 
South have created a compelling context for mainstreaming South–South coop-
eration framework peacebuilding efforts in developing countries. It seeks to shift 
the paradigm of development cooperation away from dominant asymmetrical 
donor–recipient, North–South, neo-colonial relationships, towards global “part-
nerships” with an emphasis on national and community ownership, equity, sus-
tainability, inclusiveness, regional solutions, cost-effectiveness, and affordability. 
These principles are relevant to peacebuilding and resonate with the core princi-
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recognition of the immense potential of South–South development cooperation in 
the context of shared interests in sustainable peacebuilding is a recent develop-
ment (United Nations, 2009). 
Triangular cooperation refers to a version of South–South cooperation involv-
ing collaboration between Southern aid providers and Northern donors for the 
benefit of a third Southern recipient country. It can find expression either in tri-
lateral, regional, or multilateral arrangements. Incorporating triangular coopera-
tion into peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction resonates with the United 
Nations (UN) agenda for peacebuilding, which emphasises the importance of 
cooperation between the UN and regional organisations for preventive diplomacy 
within their respective areas of competence. 
This chapter examines the prospects and challenges of triangular cooperation 
in peacebuilding projects, using post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone as case 
studies. It addresses the following questions: (1) What are the political and eco-
nomic constraints that have hampered ECOWAS initiatives in peacebuilding 
in West Africa? (2) What are the lessons that can be learned from the Liberian 
and Sierra Leonean cases in relation to ECOWAS’s experience with triangular 
cooperation for building sustainable peace in West Africa? and (3) Can triangular 
cooperation (multilateral and bilateral) be instituted as a permanent framework 
for peacebuilding in West Africa? 
Conceptual framework 
Triangular cooperation involves Southern-driven partnerships between two or 
more developing countries, supported by developed countries or multilateral 
organisations to implement development programmes and projects. It has been 
described by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) as “partnerships between Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
donors and Pivotal Countries (providers of South–South Cooperation) to imple-
ment development cooperation projects in beneficiary countries” (OECD, 2009).1 
Thus, “triangular cooperation is South–South cooperation with the added dimen-
sion of Northern support to the southern partner assisting other developing coun-
tries” (ECA, 2011, 1). It, however, can also be undertaken by Southern partners 
only as pivotal countries (ECOSOC, 2008; OECD, 2009). 
Pivotal countries are Southern countries that have capacity and experience in 
promoting South–South cooperation and are thus well-placed to promote technical 
cooperation among developing countries by “sharing their capacities and experi-
ences with other developing countries in their regions or in other regions” (ECA, 
2011, 2). In Liberia and Sierra Leone, various versions of triangular cooperation 
manifested in trilateral, regional, and multilateral arrangements. For example, the 
India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) funds could be seen as a trilateral arrange-
ment, in support of ECOWAS peacebuilding initiatives in the two countries. In 
addition, the participation of several UN agencies and other multilateral institu-
tions in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding is another example of a 
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Peacebuilding as conceived by the UN Secretary-General’s Report in the 
1992 Agenda for Peace involves “action to identify and support structures, which 
will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into con-
flict” (UN, 1992, 21). This definition was further elaborated upon by two sub-
sequent UN documents: the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations (known as the Brahimi Report), and the UN Secretary-General’s 
Policy Committee in the 2007 Report. 
According to Ismail (2008, 13), some essential features of post-conflict peace-
building include: 
Disarmament, guarding and destruction of weapons, repatriating and resettling 
refugees, advising and retraining security actors, monitoring elections and 
protection of human rights, reforming and strengthening government institu-
tions, police and judicial systems, [and] reforms and economic development. 
The concept of peacebuilding is also intrinsically related to state-building in the 
context of collapse of state institutions during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
civil wars. Peacebuilding in West Africa usually involves multiple complex 
emergencies associated with the collapse of central administration (failed 
state phenomenon) and its attendant consequences. As noted earlier, the cases 
of Liberia and Sierra Leone contributed to the ascendancy of politico-security 
issues in ECOWAS’s agenda of economic integration as a strategy of regional 
development. 
Wars and attendant complex emergencies 
The interconnectedness of conflicts in West Africa should be in the context of 
strong historical and cultural ties between the peoples of the sub-region. This is 
further reinforced by artificial boundary demarcations that have aided unrestricted 
movements across borders. The porosity of borders has enabled dissident ele-
ments from one country to cross over into neighbouring ones to wage insurgen-
cies. The ECOWAS peacekeeping intervention started as a regional response to 
the Liberian civil war in late 1989, which later spilled over into Sierra Leone in 
1991, triggering a brutal ten-year armed conflict (Obi, 2009). The first Liberian 
civil war commenced in December 1989 and lasted until 1997. The war started 
when Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) crossed the 
border from Côte d’Ivoire into Liberia with a small band of Libya-trained rebels, 
seeking to overthrow the repressive regime of Samuel Doe. The insurgency ini-
tially started in Nimba county and gradually gained ground due to the support 
that Taylor obtained from neighbouring countries and many dissident groups that 
opposed Doe’s brutal regime. The fighting later escalated into civil war, with dif-
ferent factions struggling for the control of central power. 
The civil war in Sierra Leone was arguably a direct fall-out of the Liberian
civil war. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was led by the aging Foday
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of NPFL in Liberia. Taylor found a willing ally in Sankoh in his desire to explore
the lucrative illegal diamond trade in Sierra Leone to fund his insurgency. Taylor
also claimed that by allowing its territory to be used as an operational base for the
ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Sierra Leone had indirectly
declared war against the NPFL and thus became a legitimate target for the NPFL.
The RUF commenced its attack from the eastern and southern Sierra Leone border
areas with Liberia in March 1991, claiming a desire to overthrow President Joseph
Saidu Momoh because of corruption and repressive leadership. The RUF cam-
paigns in Sierra Leone were characterised by wanton brutality against civilians,
destruction of property, and savage plunder of mineral resources. The collapse
of central state authorities was accompanied by massive dislocation, widespread
human rights abuses, bloodshed, outbreaks of epidemics, looting, and arms traf-
ficking. The Report of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee of 1990,
where a decision was taken to dispatch the ECOMOG peacekeeping force to
Liberia, highlighted the attendant security emergencies triggered by state collapse
in Liberia (ECOWAS 1990, 3–4). The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee
on 7 August 1990 established ECOMOG in Liberia “to halt the wanton destruction
of human life and property and massive damage being caused the armed conflict
to the stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation” (ECOWAS, 1990, 3). 
Referring to the connections between conflicts and regional security in West 
Africa, an analyst for an international humanitarian organisation noted: 
The arc of instability in West Africa is linked together. The violence is inter-
woven. War in Liberia begat war in Sierra Leone, which in turn begat attacks 
in Guinea and prolonged the civil war in Cote d’Ivoire. The recognised bor-
ders do not mean anything to many of the hardcore combatants. When a 
country finally achieves a peace treaty, the guys who make a living through 
the barrel of their guns seep across the border to the next country. 
(Drumtra, 2003, 1) 
The Liberian civil war, which roughly lasted for 14 years, can be typically divided 
into two phases, the first spanning 1989–1997 and the second 1999–2003 (Shilue 
and Fagen, 2014, 1). The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone provided vivid 
examples of state collapse and attendant humanitarian crises, which justified the 
creation of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Mechanism. ECOWAS peace-
keeping interventions began with the Liberian civil war in 1989 and continued 
in Sierra Leone in 1997; Guinea-Bissau in 1998; the second Liberian civil war in 
1999; Côte d’Ivoire in 2002; the second Côte d’Ivoire civil war in 2011; Mali in 
2012; and the second Guinea-Bissau crisis in 2012 (Ukeje and Olayode, 2015, 9). 
ECOWAS’s initiatives for peacebuilding 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
In the context of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis and global powers’ dis-
engagement from African conflicts after the Cold War, the Liberian crisis was 
  100 Kehinde Olusola Olayode
a turning point in ECOWAS’s agenda of promoting economic development and 
regional integration, to taking responsibility for collective security and conflict 
management in the sub-region. 
Following a protracted and unproductive dialogue with various faction leaders 
in Liberia, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee in August 1990, took 
the bold step of establishing and deploying ECOMOG amid bitter opposition from 
then rebel leader Taylor and some West African leaders. ECOMOG was charged 
with both mediating between the warring factions and neutralising them through 
forceful disarmament, if necessary. It also had peace enforcement and peacekeep-
ing objectives. The deployment of ECOMOG to Liberia faced many difficulties. 
The deployment was opposed by Taylor, who was the dominant rebel leader in 
Liberia. Personal interests and ideological differences between Francophone and 
Anglophone members of ECOWAS made the task of peace restoration difficult in 
Liberia. In addition, procedural and operational disagreement among ECOWAS 
members also frustrated the deployment of troops by ECOMOG to Liberia. 
ECOMOG’s military intervention in Sierra Leone was predominantly under-
taken by Nigeria-led troops to restore the democratically elected government of 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who was deposed in a military coup led by Major Johnny 
Paul Koroma on 25 May 1997. The coup was undertaken by a segment of the 
Sierra Leone Army that supported the RUF. Koroma established the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council and made Sankoh vice-chairman. After the restoration of 
Kabbah, under the Lomé Agreement, a power-sharing arrangement saw Sankoh 
emerge as the vice president and head of the Commission for the Management of 
Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconstruction, and Development (Ismail, 
2015). With the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from the ECOWAS peacekeeping 
force in Sierra Leone and relentless attacks by the RUF, the UN Security Council 
eventually established the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). 
ECOWAS multilateral peacekeeping initiatives have been repeatedly criti-
cised for being ineffective and for exacerbating the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone because of inadequate resources, lack of broad political support, and lim-
ited knowledge of the conflict terrains (Howe, 1997, 168–169; Obi, 2009, 8–9; 
Ismail, 2015, 4–5). However, Draman and Carmen (2003, 17) have argued that 
ECOMOG’s operations, though largely ineffective, “succeeded in containing the 
Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts in the short term and also prevented the 
situation from degenerating into genocide as witnessed in Rwanda in 1994.” 
Although initially conceived as a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG’s actual 
mission “bordered on peace-making and peace-enforcement, which was a clear 
departure from its original mandate” (Whiteman, 1990, 28). Resource constraints 
also limited the effectiveness of ECOMOG operations. While provision was made 
for the deployment of over 12,000 troops, inadequate funds and lack of military 
materials and equipment only permitted mobilisation of a limited number of sol-
diers, which was grossly inadequate for an effective peacekeeping operation. 
As stated earlier, ECOWAS’s multilateral peacekeeping operations, though 
imperfect, taking into consideration the Liberian and Sierra Leonean experi-
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The intervention also reflected an African attempt to resolve an African conflict 
through regional cooperation. Thus, without previous experience to draw from, 
the modest achievements recorded in Liberia were significant. While ECOWAS 
indeed faced enormous challenges in peace intervention, its military and diplo-
matic engagements paved the way for subsequent international efforts that finally 
ended devastating conflicts in the Mano River Basin region between 1990 and 
2003. Although critics may point to its limited effectiveness, the ECOMOG inter-
vention could be seen as “as a harbinger of potential African solutions to some of 
Africa’s pressing security problems” (Pitts, 1999, 1). 
On the humanitarian front, ECOMOG was successful in reducing casualties 
and wanton destruction and provided safe passage for trapped civilians to be evac-
uated out of troublesome war zones. In addition, by securing the port and airport 
essential relief supplies were obtained for thousands of displaced civilians in dire 
need. In the context of state collapse and absence of administrative functions, 
ECOMOG in effect functioned as a police and defence force within its occupa-
tional zone (Scott, 1998, 19). 
Triangular cooperation for peacebuilding 
Faced with resource and capacity limitations, ECOWAS’s multilateral peace ini-
tiatives paved the way for the subsequent intervention of UN and Western powers 
in a triangular cooperation framework for peacebuilding. In Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, ECOMOG co-deployed peacekeepers with UN observer missions, while 
ECOWAS missions in Liberia (ECOMIL) and Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) provided 
rapid deployment forces that were transformed into UN peacekeepers. Despite 
problems of coordination and logistics, and differences in mandate, the coopera-
tion between the UN and ECOWAS allowed each organisation to maximise its 
comparative advantage while working together to resolve the conflicts. Lessons 
learned from these missions provided a blueprint for how the UN and regional 
organisations could work together (Kabia, 2011, 2–4). 
While the notion of “African solutions to African problems” is a highly com-
mendable aspiration, the capacity for sustainability required in post-conflict
peacebuilding is currently weak within ECOWAS because of inadequate funding,
poor logistics, ideological differences, and weak capacity, among other things. A
consequence of some of these deficiencies was that Nigeria pulled out from direct
ECOMOG peacekeeping operations due to the heavy financial cost incurred in
the Liberian and Sierra Leonean operations. This paved the way for the United
Kingdom, the UN, France, and the African Union (AU) to become more sub-
stantially involved in post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone and Liberia
through triangular cooperation arrangement. A triangular South–South coopera-
tion was also adopted in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali, with France
playing a leading role, supported by the AU and ECOWAS. The challenges of
sustaining peacekeeping operations faced by ECOWAS also led to the “rehat-
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In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the checklist of tasks involved in peacebuilding 
and post-conflict reconstruction included 
deployment of peacekeepers; undertaking disarmament, demobilisation, and 
reintegration of ex-fighters; judicial and security sector reform; economic 
reconstruction reforms to facilitate development aid and assistance packages; 
and elections. 
(ICG, 2004, 1) 
In undertaking these various tasks, a combination of regional, trilateral, and mul-
tilateral arrangements involving various state and non-state actors were involved 
in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1509 in 2003 to assist the National Transitional 
Government of Liberia to establish the rule of law and undertake post-conflict 
reconstruction and peacebuilding. The international donor community pro-
vided considerable financial support to the Liberian peacebuilding process 
and post-conflict recovery efforts. A National Commission for Disarmament 
Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation was established to imple-
ment the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the various war-
ring factions in August 2003. Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, and 
Rehabilitation (DDRR) activities in Liberia were strictly donor-driven, with dis-
armament and demobilisation undertaken by UNMIL while reintegration and 
rehabilitation were coordinated by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
as mandated by international partners through a memorandum of understanding. 
The Japanese government provided financial support for the overall disarmament 
component of the DDRR programme. Security reforms of the Liberia National 
Police were undertaken with help from UN Police and support from the United 
States (US), Belgium, India, Ghana, Norway, the European Union (EU), Ghana, 
Egypt, and various UN agencies. For the armed forces, the United States (US) 
through the private security firm DynCorp led the process of restructuring of the 
Armed Forces of Liberia. Other countries that supported this process were Ghana, 
China, Nigeria, the United Kingdom (UK), and France. 
Another major international stakeholder involved in DDRR activities in 
Liberia was UNICEF, which focused on disarming, demobilising, and reintegrat-
ing former child-soldiers. A partnership was forged between UNDP and UNICEF 
for the national rehabilitation of children. The Carter Centre in the US was invited 
by President Charles Taylor of Liberia to undertake justice sector reform. The 
World Bank was also actively involved in post-war reconstruction and infrastruc-
ture development 
In Sierra Leone, post-conflict reconstruction has ranged from security sec-
tor reform to economic reform. Bilateral and multilateral support was received 
from donor governments and organisations. The World Bank supported the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy, while the British government through the Ministry 
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Other international organisations that supported the post-war reconstruction in 
Liberia were Oxfam, World Vision, and the Norwegian Refugee Council, which 
have set up country offices; the National Endowment for Democracy, based in the 
US; and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, based in the UK. The latter 
two have given financial support to local organisations for work on human rights 
and governance issues. 
In Sierra Leone, the UK assumed responsibility for security sector reform 
through the British Military Advisory and Training Team, while India, Brazil, 
and South Africa undertook a project on leadership development and institutional 
capacity building for human development and poverty reduction. The project was 
undertaken under the framework of triangular cooperation involving India, Brazil, 
and South Africa in partnership with UNDP. The World Bank has played a sig-
nificant role in post-war peacebuilding, notably through its focus on the plight 
of internally displaced peoples (IDPs), and the provision of basic infrastructural 
faculties and social amenities destroyed in the civil war. 
ECOWAS also benefited from triangular cooperation in peacebuilding through 
training activities for the military forces of its member states to improve opera-
tional capacities for peacekeeping. The US and France were actively involved in 
this capacity-building project on the protection of refugees, command and control, 
and negotiation techniques, among others (Ismail, 2015, 14). For example, the 
US established the African Crisis Response Initiative for the purpose of training 
and enhancing the capacity and efficiency of West African militaries in diverse 
humanitarian and peacekeeping activities (Howe, 2001, 19). 
Challenges of triangular cooperation for peacebuilding 
The challenges experienced in triangular cooperation in peacebuilding operations 
in West Africa are like those of other modalities of development cooperation. 
Some of these challenges include lack of proper coordination among different 
actors operating in the field, which sometimes results in duplication of efforts 
and conflicts. Other challenges identified were high implementation costs due to 
excess reliance on using experts from the global North; the existence of distinct 
procedures and institutions from different countries; lack of agreement on harmo-
nised common standards and procedures for measurement and evaluation; weak 
local content due to problems of adaptation; and unclear division of roles and 
responsibilities (OECD, 2009, 4–5). 
The logic behind triangulation in development cooperation involving develop-
ing countries is the belief that Southern developing partners are better placed, 
and possess relevant experience, to respond to the needs of beneficiary countries 
that are developing themselves. It is expected that these Southern development 
partners should take the lead in implementing development projects, with the 
necessary support from Northern donors, where required. However, the peace-
building operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone did not follow the “normal” 
structure of South–South triangular relations, but displayed characteristics of 
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implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding projects were 
from the North, while Southern partners were relegated to background and sup-
portive roles. 
The strategic structure and direction of the peacebuilding processes in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone were fundamentally flawed and hindered the effective operation 
of South–South partnerships. The trend displayed in the two cases was an infor-
mal arrangement whereby ECOWAS/ECOMOG provided the human resources 
for peacekeeping but were side-lined in critical components of the peacebuilding 
decision-making efforts. Critical issues relating to entry and exit strategies, coor-
dination, finance, and timing were decided by Western institutions and actors. 
However, during conflicts, regional and sub-regional entities bring long-standing 
relationships, depth of understanding and determination, and often a willingness 
to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies. 
The bitter rivalries between ECOMOG and the UN over leadership positions 
in UNAMSIL, which resulted in a verbal war between Nigeria and UNAMSIL, 
exemplified the disagreement over ownership. India contributed the largest contin-
gent to UNAMSIL and thus assumed the overall command. However, ECOWAS 
asserted that the Indian commander, being unfamiliar with West African con-
ditions, should be replaced by a commander from West Africa. The ECOWAS 
resolution even suggested that the multinational peacekeeping force should be 
replaced by a regional West African peacekeeping force. The tension generated 
by this appointment forced India to announce its withdrawal from peacekeeping 
responsibilities in UNAMSIL. 
Another contentious issue was the ownership, control, and implementation of 
peacebuilding processes. National governments are best positioned to respond 
effectively to the non-military elements of peacebuilding (Haze, 2007). In a post-
conflict context, long-term interventions linked to capacity-building initiatives 
require national ownership. Also, an inclusive reintegration and rehabilitation 
process may be difficult to achieve in the absence of national ownership. The 
likelihood of exclusion may lead critical actors in the war to withdraw from the 
peacebuilding processes to take up arms against the government. 
However, in most cases post-conflict states are characterised by a weakened 
institutional base, thus making it difficult for them to undertake peacebuilding 
activities without external support. Again, regional arrangements sometimes 
suffer from crises of trust and legitimacy, especially when pivotal actors in the 
arrangements are parties to the conflicts. They also bring their own interests, some 
of which carry potential risks to managing conflict impartially. This was the situa-
tion in Liberia and Sierra Leone that hindered ECOWAS in the peacebuilding and 
conflict resolution processes. External support is also needed to forge inclusive 
peacebuilding arrangements in a war-torn environment to prevent the isolation of 
critical opponents by incumbent governments that may want to use peacebuilding 
processes to shore up their political positions. 
Funding is a critical constraint in the operation of regional cooperation for
peacebuilding in West Africa. The modest successes recorded by ECOWAS
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financial, logistical, and diplomatic support of Nigeria. As one of the founders
of ECOWAS, Nigeria provided politico-economic leadership to the organisa-
tion in an effort to develop a collective regional peace and security mechanism
in West Africa (Francis, 2006, 147). Nigeria has provided about 60 percent of
the ECOWAS budget; there is no doubt that multilateral peacebuilding under
the auspices of ECOWAS is intimately linked to Nigeria’s active coopera-
tion and contributions. This was evidently demonstrated in Liberia and Sierra
Leone, where Nigeria was the major provider of military and other resources
for peacekeeping operations. At the peak of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean
crises in the 1990s, Nigeria provided over 70 percent of ECOMOG’s military
and civilian personnel, as well as logistical support (Hamman and Omojuwa,
2013, 4–5). Many ECOWAS member states cannot make significant financial
contributions to peace missions due to domestic economic and development
challenges. Funding is a major challenge for the AU, ECOWAS, and other
African sub-regional organisations. Given the enormous resources committed
to peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone through ECOMOG,
domestic pressures and internal security challenges compelled Nigeria from
1999 to shift focus from leading military peacekeeping operations to conflict
prevention initiatives. 
Prospects for triangular cooperation for 
peacebuilding in West Africa 
The prospects for triangular cooperation for peacebuilding are very promising in 
West Africa, given the institutional reforms undertaken by ECOWAS. Dictatorial 
governments are now the exception rather than the rule in the sub-region due to 
ECOWAS’s zero-tolerance for unconstitutional changes in government. There is 
also increasing involvement and engagement with civil society organisations in 
the areas of conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction, and peacebuilding 
(see Chapter 5). ECOWAS has evolved – in capacity and sophistication in the 
areas of regional security and peacebuilding. Several legal and institutional frame-
works have been established to address the challenges of human security, govern-
ance, and sustainable development (see Chapter 4). However, to consolidate these 
achievements, West African leaders must continue to deepen democratisation. 
Civil society actors must also remain vigilant and act as watchdogs to expose cor-
ruption, dictatorial leaders, and political excesses. Sustainable economic growth 
and institutional reforms are also needed to diversify national economies, catalyse 
economic growth, and improve quality of life, which will prevent relapses into 
resource-starved and poverty-induced conflicts. 
Furthermore, the valuable experience of the different UN agencies, especially 
the UNDP, in integrating South–South cooperation into their different activities 
could be an important asset for the UN Secretariat, especially the agencies respon-
sible for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations – the Department of Political 
Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Peacebuilding Support 
Office. They can utilise existing institutional structures to also incorporate 
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triangular and South–South cooperation into conflict prevention and peace opera-
tions in Africa. 
The new development environment as conceptualised in the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) agenda prioritised the nexus between security and 
development; for example, SDG 10, which focuses on reduction of inequality, and 
SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions resonate well with ECOWAS’s 
agenda of West African development. The new SDGs and the broader sustain-
ability agenda go much further than the Millennium Development Goals in 
“addressing the root causes of poverty and conflicts, and the universal need for 
development that works for all people” (Olayode, 2015, 8). The SDG frame-
work has underscored the need for wider application of developmentally focused 
South–South cooperation across the peace and security pillar of the UN’s work. 
In contemporary global peacebuilding strategies, regional and sub-regional 
arrangements have become prominent elements. The UN Agenda for Peace, the 
AU’s Africa Peace and Security Architecture, and ECOWAS’s peace and security 
mechanisms have all highlighted the significance of regional initiatives in pre-
venting conflict and in peacebuilding. The UN’s regional partnerships in Africa 
must be strengthened by creating effective mechanisms for effective partnership. 
Conclusion and recommendations 
South–South cooperation, with its emphasis on demand-driven, context-specific, 
long-term partnerships among equals, and involving the sharing of relevant exper-
tise and experiences between developing countries, has shown its potential to 
become a catalyst for successful peacebuilding efforts. 
While regional and sub-regional organisations like ECOWAS may not have 
the required resources to undertake post-conflict reconstruction singlehandedly, 
Western multilateral agencies also lack adequate knowledge and the necessary 
expertise to undertake peacebuilding alone. Triangular cooperation involving 
partnerships between ECOWAS and multilateral organisations is thus required to 
achieve the desired results in peacebuilding. For the partnership to be effective, a 
clear definition of roles and capacity-building should be agreed on to enhance the 
ability of the partnering countries both at regional and sub-regional levels. The 
multilateral agencies involved in triangular cooperation should therefore focus 
more on building local capacities rather than simply acting as “delivering agen-
cies” (Ajayi, 2008, 5). This would enhance local ownership and promote sustain-
able human security. 
Contemporary security threats and challenges, especially those relating 
to Islamist terrorism across the Sahel–Sahara belt and in the Gulf of Guinea, 
require collaborative efforts from member states in those regions, ECOWAS, the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the AU. Apart from regional 
initiatives, international assistance is needed for logistics, surveillance, training, 
funding, and technical support. 
To conclude, for South–South and triangular cooperation to become a potent 
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should take ownership of, and raise their own, resources, and actively participate 
in the process. They should also translate and adapt programmes to suit local 
realities. Similarly, South–South cooperation partners and DAC donor countries 
must also harmonise and coordinate their activities and strategies with beneficiary 
countries by dividing and allocating responsibilities based on their areas of exper-
tise (OECD, 2009). 
Note 
1 Examples of Pivotal countries are China, India, South Africa, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Brazil, Nigeria, and Egypt. 
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8 Nigeria’s role in the 
ECOWAS Peace and Security 
Agenda for West Africa 
Oshita O. Oshita and Warisu Oyesina Alli 
Introduction 
The West Africa sub-region has faced a lot of security challenges, particularly in 
the past three decades. The first major security challenge was the Liberian crisis 
which rapidly deteriorated into a civil war that threatened the entire sub-region. 
While the Liberian civil war was going on, the political crisis in neighbouring 
Sierra Leone quickly grew into a civil war, influenced no doubt by the events in 
Liberia. Guinea also experienced grave political upheaval. Not far away, Côte 
d’Ivoire also had its national political conflict, which developed out of a protracted 
political succession crisis. Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, 
one after the other, were consumed by political conflicts that, in most cases, ended 
in major internal disturbances and in some cases civil wars. Indeed, the Mano 
River Union region, in particular, was in the form of a political conflagration. The 
occurrence of so many violent conflicts in the sub-region, particularly in the last 
decade, would suggest that the conflict prevention mechanisms and preventive 
diplomacy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have 
mostly been ineffective. 
In all cases, ECOWAS’s peace and conflict resolution mechanisms were acti-
vated in response to such developments. However, ECOWAS’s interventions, 
which would necessarily begin with mediation and were mostly diplomatic, were 
found to be inadequate and in need of military support in terms of peace support 
operations (PSOs), provision of humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution, and 
peacebuilding efforts. These are tasks the sub-regional organisation has not been 
well equipped to carry out successfully, mainly because of its weak resource base. 
It is therefore almost inevitable that Nigeria, which has a gross domestic product 
(GDP) that is much more than the GDP of all the other ECOWAS members com-
bined, has had to shoulder a lot of responsibilities in providing the leadership, as 
well as the human and material resources, needed for ECOWAS interventions in 
the many conflicts in the sub-region. Nigeria’s regional leadership is also defined 
and determined by its demography and possession of many critical elements of 
power, including a strong military, moral imperatives, and the political will to 
take on the challenge. There are also the security concerns of the country for sub-
regional peace. 
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Conflicts and development of peace support operations 
ECOWAS was established in 1975 as a regional organisation for the promotion 
of economic cooperation and integration. The organisation comprised at incep-
tion 16 countries, which have now been reduced to 15 since the withdrawal 
of Mauritania in 2000. The sub-region has a diverse colonial history, with the 
countries being either former British, French, or Portuguese colonies. Also, the 
sub-region has had the highest incidence of military coups and interventions in 
civilian politics in Africa. 
As West Africa experiences rapid transformation, democratisation, and popu-
lation growth, security challenges have continued to threaten its progress. Even 
though the original mandate of ECOWAS focused on regional economic integra-
tion as a way to enhance economic stability and development, it was, however, 
immediately apparent to ECOWAS members that the organisation’s lofty goals 
could only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace and stability. Accordingly, two 
protocols on defence were signed shortly after the creation of the community. 
These were the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the Protocol on Mutual 
Assistance on Defence (1978). The two documents were designed to address 
the understanding at the time that threats to security could only emanate from 
the external environment. The documents empowered ECOWAS to intervene in 
armed conflict in any of its member states if the conflict was likely to endanger 
peace and security in the entire community. 
The collapse of the economies of many West African countries in the wake 
of the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in the 1980s, 
the end of the Cold War, and negative effects of globalisation, coupled with the 
nature of authoritarian domestic politics, led to political crises in many West 
African states, leading to state collapse and civil wars and conflicts in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso. 
The Liberian crisis, which started in 1989, provided an opportunity for 
ECOWAS members to demonstrate their commitment to the ideals of the mutual 
assistance protocol, especially on the request of Liberian President Samuel Doe 
for intervention. ECOWAS could not accede to this request because of the dif-
ferent positions of Francophone and Anglophone states. While the Francophone 
countries supported the rebel leader, Charles Taylor, the Anglophone countries 
supported Doe. To overcome this stalemate, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation 
Committee, which was dominated by the Anglophone countries, with Nigeria in 
the lead, met in Banjul, the Gambia, and agreed to send an intervention force, the 
ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to Liberia. 
In the absence of any response from the international community to the con-
flict and massive violations of human rights in the country, ECOMOG came to 
save the day. The idea of deploying ECOWAS troops in Liberia was mooted by 
Nigeria, against the wishes of many other members, particularly Francophone 
countries. 
In August 1997, ECOMOG’s mandate was extended to Sierra Leone to rein-
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which was overthrown by the military, and to restore peace, security, and democ-
racy in that country. 
In 1998, ECOMOG foreign ministers recommended that ECOMOG formally 
become responsible for peacekeeping operations in the region. ECOWAS subse-
quently enhanced its capacity and slowly transformed ECOMOG from a series of 
ad hoc initiatives to a more permanent structure for sustained military cooperation 
and operation. 
The lessons learned from intervention in Liberia (1990–1997), Sierra Leone 
(1997–2000), and Guinea-Bissau (1999) were later to shape the creation of 
the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping, and Security in 1999, also referred to as “the Mechanism,” which 
went beyond the earlier protocols of 1978 and 1981 in that it allowed a situa-
tion whereby ECOWAS could intervene in internal conflicts that posed security 
threats to the region, including the overthrow of, or threats to, democratically 
elected governments. ECOWAS has had to intervene in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and 
several other crisis situations across the sub-region. ECOWAS has been desig-
nated as one of the five regional pillars of the African Economic Community 
(AEC), together with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). 
In 2001, ECOWAS member countries signed the Supplementary Protocol 
on Democracy and Good Government, which complements the Mechanism 
in addressing the root causes of conflict, instability, and insecurity. Earlier, in 
July 1993, a revised ECOWAS treaty, designed to accelerate cooperation, was 
signed, while in January 2007 the ECOWAS Secretariat was transformed into the 
ECOWAS Commission as part of a wider institutional reform of the community. 
Notwithstanding the challenges of ECOWAS’s economic integration, the 
1990s saw the development and institutionalisation of a formal peace and security 
architecture to facilitate regional peacekeeping, PSOs, and conflict management 
interventions. The Mechanism was the realisation of this objective and was also 
aimed at shifting emphasis from conflict management, which is a reactive inter-
vention, to a proactive conflict prevention framework. 
Role of Nigeria 
The role of Nigeria in PSOs in West Africa has largely been determined by its size 
and resources, as well as its security concerns. Thus, it has played a prominent 
leadership role in ECOWAS and a significant role in ECOMOG, contributing 
significant numbers of troops for peacekeeping deployments to Liberia (1990– 
1997), Sierra Leone (1997–2003), Guinea-Bissau (1998), Côte d’Ivoire (2003), 
and Mali (2014). Nigeria also led a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with 
Niger and Chad (2015) to tackle the insurgency by the Islamic group Jama’atu 
Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad [People Committed to the Propagation of the 
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One of the realities of the political landscape of West Africa is the clear, unques-
tionable, and transparent preponderance of Nigeria as the leading and hegemonic 
local actor in the sub-region (Akindele, 2003). This has informed the development 
of its military capability. The consequence has been aggressive investment and 
modernisation to improve the nation’s military power, including its composition, 
equipment, leadership, and doctrine (Bassey, 1993). This capability of Nigeria 
in the military and economic spheres defines the role it plays in regional security 
policy and operations. 
Adebajo (2002) has described Nigeria’s role in West Africa as hegemonic. 
Even ECOWAS member states which have benefitted from its generosity only 
grudgingly accept its leadership (Adebajo, 2008, 3). There is a dilemma for 
Nigeria in that West African states are not prepared to replace a colonial yoke 
with a Nigerian one. As pointed out by Fawole (2008), even though President 
Ibrahim Babangida declared that Nigeria was one country that every other country 
in West Africa and Africa in general looked up to, to provide the desired lead-
ership, the Francophone states, in particular, and other states in the sub-region, 
in general, view Nigeria with suspicion. They therefore enter into other forms 
of security arrangements – for their self-pride and protection (Danjuma, 2012). 
Hence, the view expressed by Adebajo (2002) that Nigeria’s leadership position 
has become a kind of affliction. And the fear and suspicion that Nigeria has impe-
rialist designs on its neighbours seem to be another challenge to Nigeria’s West 
Africa policy (Akindele, 2003, 287). 
Considering all the problems facing West African states, there is a need to 
establish a security regime in the area and a hegemon is required to propel the 
security regime and Nigeria fits that description. But there are still other problems, 
because Nigeria is yet to develop the capacity and legitimacy to influence the 
sub-region and fail sometimes to convince other states to follow its lead on vital 
political and security and economic issues. Of course, it is not as simple as that 
because there are other forces at work; for example, other regional powerhouses, 
such as Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and others, and even extra-
sub-regional interests competing for influence in West Africa. 
Generally, however, by whatever yardstick sub-regional leadership is meas-
ured, Nigeria is a core state, defined as a state whose economic size is sufficiently 
large to be capable of successfully going it alone in industrialisation and eco-
nomic development. Its population, natural resource endowments, and market 
size and intensity make economy of scale realisable; and Nigeria is recognised by 
its neighbours as the economic, financial, and diplomatic centre of the sub-region 
(Akindele, 2003, 282). 
Nonetheless, Nigeria’s role is also determined by its interests, which are stra-
tegic in nature. These interests are also linked to the fact that a sizable number of 
its citizens reside in other African states and it has undertaken to protect the lives 
of its nationals anywhere as part of its defence policy objectives, since regional 
crises impact directly on Nigeria and Nigerians. There are also social and eco-
nomic interests, which include the resources it has invested in maintaining peace 
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Nigeria’s security, according to former minister of foreign affairs Ojo 
Maduekwe (2008, 6), is therefore inexorably linked to a more secure Africa; 
a continent that is peaceful and prosperous, a continent that is respected and 
courted, not just for its previous contributions to world civilisation, but for the 
advancement of humankind into the twenty-first century and beyond. Hence, 
Nigeria could find justification to not only contribute but to also provide leader-
ship, including the use of its military, to control any instability in the sub-region, 
as a way of protecting its own interests. 
It thus became imperative for Nigeria to organise and develop an effective 
diplomatic and military backbone with which to support its national objectives, 
taking account of the risks (FGN, 2006, 3). As part of this commitment to sub-
regional security, Nigeria created the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in 
Africa (MCIA) in 1999 with a Department of Collective Defence and Security 
and Department of Regional Economic Integration. The MCIA, under which the 
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution also functioned, was also made the 
focal point for ECOWAS, thus showing the high level of the nation’s commit-
ment to West African integration. This arrangement allowed more attention to be 
given ECOWAS peace and security matters than used to be the case. However, in 
2007 as part of the civil service reforms, President Olusegun Obasanjo merged the 
MCIA with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Nigeria’s geostrategic location also plays a role in defining the nation’s secu-
rity focus. Situated in a region of comparatively much smaller and weaker states, 
in terms of size, human, and material resources, Nigeria’s security focus could be 
said to have been pre-determined (Alli, 2012). As a result, all Nigerian leaders 
have come to accept that responsibility for sub-regional security rests on their 
shoulders. 
In common with most members of the United Nations (UN), Nigeria subscribes 
to the ideals of “collective security” at global, continental, and sub-regional lev-
els. Accordingly, West African security, Nigeria believes, can only be guaran-
teed by policies of cooperation, economic integration, and adoption of consensus 
(Ajibewa, 2007, 18). 
Justifying Nigeria’s involvement in PSOs and in regional security policy, 
Gambari (2010) observed that 
in Africa, lack of sustainable development has been linked directly to the
proliferation and intensity of conflict situations and war which in turn have
hampered development efforts […] threats to peace in a neighbouring coun-
try, if not carefully managed and resolved could lead to massive exodus of
refugees, weapons proliferation and trans-border crimes and general inse-
curity that could threaten other stable polities and compromise national
economies. 
Thus, Nigeria could be appropriately considered a driver of security policy in 
West Africa. This is because, as argued by Adedeji (2007, 198), in this loosely 
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resources to serve as the core of an ECOWAS rapid deployment force with broad 
objectives. 
The personal diplomatic efforts of Nigerian leaders, from Generals Yakubu 
Gowon, Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha, and Abdusalam Abubakar to 
Presidents Obasanjo, Umar Yar’Adua, Goodluck Jonathan, and Muhammadu 
Buhari, have been quite significant. Obasanjo, as civilian president (1999–2007), 
was active in these conflict resolution efforts. President Umar Yar’Adua followed 
Nigeria’s traditional role and at the same time furthered what Ojo Maduekwe, his 
foreign minister, called citizen diplomacy, but with a more audacious rendition 
of the perspective, guided by diplomacy of consequence, which means reciproc-
ity (Akinterinwa, 2010). Jonathan also continued to shoulder this self-imposed 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in West Africa, getting 
very involved in the Mali crisis. 
The general direction of Nigerian involvement is informed by a broadly defined 
foreign policy objective built on a national role perception, articulated and docu-
mented in the National Defence Policy (2006). It is informed by a conventional 
perspective on security threats, and the capacity for rapid response and deploy-
ment (Bamali, 2007, 96). 
The main features of Nigeria’s West Africa policy derive from the paradigms 
of Nigerian foreign policy, including African centrepiece perspective, the con-
centric circle model, and the beneficial concentricism. The 1999 Constitution of 
Nigeria, as amended in Section 19, projects a dynamic foreign policy for Nigeria 
through the promotion of economic development, integration and unity, and 
peace and security in Africa and the world. Accordingly, Nigeria’s involvement 
in West African security affairs and any role it might have played in the past few 
decades have been the result of strongly held opinions by its successive leader-
ships. Generally, it has been a role that acknowledges the nation’s responsibility 
for Africa, which the public has come to accept, though with reservations. This 
was the basis for Babangida’s famous declaration in 1985, as quoted by Ajulo 
(1998, 18), that “Africa’s problems and their solution, should constitute the prem-
ise of Nigeria’s foreign policy.” This idea was echoed by Jonathan (2011), who, 
at the opening of a National Conference on the Review of Nigerian Foreign Policy 
organised by the Presidential Advisory Council (PAC) in August 2011, noted that 
In the era of globalisation, at a time of grave challenges to national and inter-
national security such as we face from terrorism and transnational criminal 
networks, our commitment to regional and international peace and security 
must remain as strong as ever. 
In line with this, the Federal government Vision:2020 prescribes an 
elaborate mandate for the Nigerian Foreign Service including ensuring that 
Nigeria’s leading role in Africa and in the West African sub-region is sus-
tained and safeguarded. 
Ironically, the establishment of ECOWAS remains one of the greatest achieve-
ments of Nigerian diplomacy up to 1990 and has remained the embodiment of 
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In furtherance of its security management capabilities, Nigeria has finally 
developed what is considered a comprehensive National Defence Policy. The 
high-powered committee on national defence policy, headed by the late Gen. Joe 
Garba, director-general of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies 
(NIPSS), was empanelled in 2000 by Gen. T. Y. Danjuma, then defence minister. 
Though work on the Nigeria National Defence Policy (NNDP) started immedi-
ately, it was only finally adopted in 2006. 
The NNDP enunciates general guidelines for the employment of the armed 
forces, in particular, and national resources, generally, to maintain the country’s 
territorial integrity and protect it from external aggression. It is aimed at providing 
compact, flexible, and above all battle-winning armed forces. It provides direction 
for the development of defence organisations, together with other elements of 
power for the security of Nigeria (FGN, 2006, 2), and is well integrated and man-
aged in order to serve national security objectives in response to perceived threats. 
Notwithstanding what Nigeria may have put in place, there are institutional 
weaknesses within ECOWAS including inadequate resources, lack of adminis-
trative and military capability, and poor political will and commitment by mem-
bers, all of which militate against and indeed undermine Nigeria’s leadership role. 
While it appears the military components are being progressively addressed, the 
non-military components have not been properly articulated in a manner that is 
responsive to the emerging security challenges at home and in the sub-region. In 
addition, the use of militarism instead of socio-economic and political engineer-
ing to address security matters is no longer appropriate for the kind of security 
challenges being faced domestically and in the sub-region as a whole. 
Peacekeeping and peace support operations 
About half of the West Africa population is Nigerian; the GDP of Nigeria
amounts to about 60 per cent of the sub-region’s regional GDP. According to
Deng (2009, 26), 
Leadership of the regional organisation and lead nations, in particular the 
dominant state, Nigeria, is key to the effectiveness of ECOWAS in peace and 
security. General Yakubu’s leadership of Nigeria in the 1970s was crucial 
to the establishment of ECOWAS. In the 1990s, the then Nigeria military 
leader, General Babangida, made it possible for ECOWAS to intervene in 
regional peace, conflict and security. 
Nigeria is globally recognised as a major troop-contributing nation to UN peace-
keeping operations around the world because of its readiness and commitment, 
which started even before the nation had gained independence, participating in 
UN peacekeeping operations in Congo in 1960. Since then, Nigeria has deployed 
troops for PSOs at bilateral, African Union (AU), ECOWAS, and UN lev-
els, participating in Lebanon, Chad, Angola, Namibia, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, 
Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan (Darfur), and of course Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, and 
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others – and also in observer missions. According to Gambari (2010), peacekeep-
ing operations or PSOs have become for Nigeria a veritable instrument of foreign 
policy, an accent of the imperative to deter abroad acts that threaten its security, 
peace, and development. 
Babangida, whose regime was confronted with the Liberia conflict, argued 
then that 
The ECOWAS region completes what has been termed the three concentric 
circles governing Nigerian foreign and defence policies – There is therefore 
no gain saying [sic] the fact that when certain events occur in this region 
depending upon their intensity and magnitude, which are bound to affect 
Nigeria’s politico-military and socio-economic environment, we should not 
stand-by as hapless and helpless spectators. 
Nigeria in collaboration with others, in this sub-region, is duty bound to react 
or respond in an appropriate manner, necessary to either avert the disaster or 
to take adequate measures to ensure peace, tranquillity and harmony. 
(Bassey, 2011, 7) 
With ECOMOG’s efforts under Nigeria’s leadership, the Liberia conflict was 
eventually resolved and in August 1997 Charles Taylor was sworn in as president. 
In many respects, the Sierra Leone conflict was a spill-over of the civil war in 
Liberia. On 25 May 1997, the Sierra Leonian military overthrew the government 
of President Tejan Kabbah. The UN, the AU, and ECOWAS were united in their 
demand for the Junta to return power back to the overthrown government. Rather 
than heed this call, the Junta went ahead and announced its cabinet. At ECOWAS 
meetings in Abidjan in June–July 1997, sanctions were imposed and some embar-
goes were also applied. ECOWAS was to formally approve the extension of the 
ECOMOG mandate to include Sierra Leone. Subsequently, the Nigerian govern-
ment, which later became impatient with the pace of compliance with the various 
resolutions, ordered its troops to overturn the coup (Adeshina, 2002, 14). Nigerian 
troops were deployed, and they removed the Major Koromah Junta and Kabbah 
was reinstated in office in 1998. It was therefore Nigeria’s immense contribution 
in troops, money, and material that made it possible for ECOWAS to achieve 
its objectives in the two countries. After ECOMOG’s success in Sierra Leone, 
the UN established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 
October 1999 as a peace-enforcement operation. 
By 1999, it was estimated that Nigeria had committed over USD $13 billion 
to peacekeeping operations in West Africa (Bamali, 2007, 100), since the begin-
ning of the Liberian conflict in 1989. Over the years, there has been public out-
cry over the way and manner the Nigerian leadership waded into trouble spots 
in the sub-region without any tangible benefit to the country. Because of this, 
in 1998 Nigeria decided not to contribute troops to the ECOMOG mission in 
Guinea-Bissau (Galadima, 2011, 322). However, without Nigeria’s participation, 
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After his inauguration as president in 1999, Obasanjo wanted to scale back 
Nigeria’s commitment to sub-regional military engagements. In a speech to the 
54th UN General Assembly in 1999, Obasanjo (2007, 40), noted that 
For too long, the burden of preserving international peace and security in 
West Africa has been left almost entirely to a few states in the sub-region. 
Nigeria’s continued burden in Sierra Leone is unacceptably draining Nigeria 
financially. For our economy to take off, this bleeding has to stop. 
In the ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone, Nigeria provided virtually everything 
ranging from aircraft hiring to the supply of food items. 
A contingency operational allowance of $150 per person was paid on a 
monthly basis to more than 10,000 soldiers throughout the period the opera-
tion lasted (i.e. from May 1997 to April 2000 when the UN took over the 
operation from Nigeria). 
(Adeshina, 2002, 182) 
Subsequently, Nigeria had to scale down rather than withdraw its troops in Sierra 
Leone, because of the strong pressure on the country to remain. General Abubakar, 
former military head of state, noted that Nigeria can claim a fair share of the glory 
for winning the peace that Sierra Leone went on to enjoy (Abubakar, 2009, 95). 
Nigeria participated in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2003 until its 
completion in 2018. In this operation, according to Gen. Nuhu Bamali, Nigeria 
was left to transport its own troops and those of Gambia and Guinea for the 
ECOMOG operation in the capital Monrovia (Bamali, 2007). 
The Côte d’Ivoire crisis presented a different kind of security challenge to
ECOWAS. The keenly contested elections of October 2000 led to an intense
power struggle between Laurent Gbagbo and his allies, on the one hand,
and Gen. Robert Guéï on the other. After several years of prevarications, in
2010 another presidential election was conducted between Laurent Gbagbo and
Alassane Ouattara and his supporters. This was against the background of an
intense debate over ivoirité or “Ivorianness.” The identity crisis turned violent
following gun battles in the economic capital of Abidjan and elsewhere in the
country in 2002. President Obasanjo despatched Nigerian Alfa fighter planes to
foil a military coup d’état against Gbagbo, only to withdraw them soon there-
after. A rebellion led by disgruntled soldiers, under the name of the Patriotic
Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), soon made the situation worse, splitting
the country into two. Nigeria was to provide buffer troops to separate the two
warring groups, now identified as the Northern and Southern forces. This early
intervention helped to dictate the direction of ECOWAS policy on the very com-
plicated crisis. 
At the request of President Gbagbo, ECOWAS deployed a peacekeeping force 
to monitor a ceasefire agreement between the warring forces. Nigeria was to con-













118 Oshita O. Oshita and Warisu Oyesina Alli
2002. Throughout 2003, Obasanjo undertook several missions across West Africa 
to ensure a unified approach to the Ivorian crisis. 
In early February 2004, the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution
1527 approved the efforts of ECOWAS and France to “promote a peaceful set-
tlement of the conflict” and also empowered the ECOWAS mission in Côte
d’Ivoire to stabilise the nation. Later in the same month, UNSC Resolution
1528 established the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) into which
ECOWAS troops were later integrated. Meanwhile, Nigeria also contributed
military observers to the Côte d’Ivoire operations just as Ambassador Ralph
Uwechue of Nigeria was appointed the Special Representative of the ECOWAS
Executive Secretary in Côte d’Ivoire to monitor and coordinate ECOWAS
efforts in the country. 
The complexity of the Ivorian crisis, according to Sanda (2003), “taught the 
Nigerian government to learn to take the backstage, and adopt a multilateral dip-
lomatic approach instead.” Hitherto, Nigeria used to wade into sub-regional inter-
nal political crises with a lot of enthusiasm, as demonstrated by Nigeria’s role in 
Sierra Leone, which as Adeshina (2002, 154) points out was essentially a unilat-
eral mission that was costly in terms of operation, finance, and human resources, 
and lost the country goodwill within the sub-region. 
Nigeria has been able to provide logistics and funding at crucial moments in 
the organisation’s history of conflict management, resolution, peace-keeping, and 
peacebuilding (Akindele, 2003). Over 70 per cent of ECOMOG troops and 80 per 
cent of the mission’s funds were provided by Nigeria (Abubakar, 2009, 195). 
Agwai (2010, 132) observes that the major accolades the Nigerian army won in 
the cause of participating in some of the PSOs helped to project Nigeria’s image 
as an emerging power in Africa and were an important factor in international 
politics, while Malu (2009, 174) asserts that without Nigeria’s involvement and 
leadership, it is doubtful that peace could have been achieved. 
However, Adeshina (2002, 154) cautions that 
The decision by Nigeria to embark on the Sierra Leonean operation all alone 
was unnecessarily altruistic and unwise. Ghana and other countries that took 
active part during the various peace negotiations between the Junta Forces 
and government of Sierra Leone backed out when it came to the issue of 
using their Forces to remove the rebels from Freetown and the entire country. 
In March 2012, junior officers of the Malian army under Capt. Ahmadou Sanogo 
executed a coup to overthrow the democratically elected government of President 
Amadou Toumani Touré. The rebel officers accused the government of failing to 
equip the military adequately for the fight against a Tuareg insurgency in the north 
of the country. Following this coup, the Tuareg rebels in the National Movement 
for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and their allies in militant Islamist group 
Ansar Dine, backed by Al-Qaeda in the Magreb (AQIM), declared the establish-
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ECOWAS immediately imposed a comprehensive embargo on the new Malian 
military regime, which, according to ECOWAS Chair and President of Côte 
d’Ivoire Alassane Ouattara, would only be lifted when constitutional order was 
restored in the country. When ECOWAS military chiefs met on 5 April at Abidjan 
to discuss the Malian crisis, it was agreed to activate the process for deployment 
of ECOWAS troops to “protect the unity and territorial integrity of Mali.” The 
AU supported this decision of ECOWAS. 
After overcoming several setbacks, the African-led International Support
Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was launched in January 2013 with 3,300 troops.
Nigeria provided 1,200 of them, while others came from Benin, Burkina Faso,
Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Maj.-Gen. Shehu Abdulkadir of Nigeria
was appointed force commander. It is important to note that without the significant
Nigerian contingent, the ECOWAS stabilisation force in Mali would have suffered
from a lack of personnel (Pryce, 2013, 29). AFISMA faced many logistical chal-
lenges from the beginning, including securing food, fuel, and water (Oluwadare,
2013, 116). In fact, France, which had been reluctant to intervene in the Malian
crisis, had to move in when AFISMA troops were overrun by the rebels. 
In May 2013, just a few months after AFISMA was deployed, UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon announced the reconstitution of AFISMA into the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) 
with Maj.-Gen. Jean-Bosco Kazura of Rwanda as the new force commander. 
No Nigerian officer was appointed to the MINUSMA posts of deputy force 
commander, head of mission, or deputy head of mission. Also interestingly, 
MINUSMA received enormous logistical support from Belgium, Canada, France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. According to Oluwadare (2013, 118), 
AFISMA was a phantom force that was dead on arrival because of poor funding 
and inadequate troops, and was only resuscitated by MINUSMA. 
Shortly thereafter, Nigeria announced the withdrawal of its troops from Mali. 
It was argued in some quarters that Nigeria withdrew its troops from Mali because 
the UN did not appoint a Nigerian as the force commander or in any of the lead-
ing positions in MINUSMA. However, the ECOWAS chair said he received a 
letter from President Jonathan that the withdrawal was in response to the need 
for the infantry to cope with a domestic situation in Nigeria (McGregor, 2013, 4). 
Truly, Nigeria was at that period in 2013 facing very serious challenges from the 
asymmetric Boko Haram insurgency. It should be noted, however, that although 
Nigeria pulled out its infantry from Mali, it left behind engineers and other spe-
cialist officers. Nigeria also withdrew two battalions from the African Union-
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The country, however, 
retained its troops in Guinea-Bissau as part of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia 
(ECOMIL), a 620-strong contingent drawn from Nigeria, Senegal, and Burkina 
Faso (McGregor, 2013, 4). 
The ECOMOG experience in regional peacekeeping and conflict manage-
ment – and the enduring role of Nigeria in it – demonstrates the relevance of the 




120 Oshita O. Oshita and Warisu Oyesina Alli
peace and security. Despite reservations about Nigeria’s preponderance, its pres-
ence in enforcement operations has contributed to the management of conflicts 
and restoration of stability. In general, the majority of West African states tend to 
accept Nigeria’s leadership in regional peacekeeping, even though they are suspi-
cious of it, and equally resent its unilateral military interventions. This illustrates 
that a sub-regional hegemon has to be sensitive to reservations among smaller 
member states in a collective security mechanism. 
In fact, some ECOWAS members, particularly the Francophone states, per-
ceiving ECOMOG as an instrument of Nigerian foreign and security policy, 
provided opportunities for extra-regional actors with strategic interests in West 
Africa to discourage some ECOWAS states from participating in the Nigeria-led 
regional peacekeeping force, hence undermining the effectiveness of ECOWAS 
in peace and security. 
Initially, ECOMOG was a peacekeeping force. However, as conflicts became 
more intractable, its mission was re-designated, at the insistence of Nigeria, as a 
peace enforcement force. This was a historical development in the sense that it 
was clearly the first time such an initiative had been undertaken on the African 
continent. Nevertheless, it was an ad hoc mechanism. However, because of its 
success and usefulness, the framework was institutionalised in the Mechanism. 
ECOMOG became an intervention force under Article 17. It also provided for the 
composition of ECOMOG as a structure of “several stand-by multi-purpose mod-
ules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and ready for immediate 
deployment.” This is what is referred to as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). 
The ESF has continued to undergo modifications to enhance its capability, mobil-
ity, and effectiveness when the need arises for deployment. 
Conclusion 
Nigeria has played an important role in the maintenance of peace and secu-
rity in West Africa and particularly in the development and institutionalisation 
of a regional peace and security architecture and the commitment to collective 
security. However, Nigeria has its own domestic challenges due to unresolved 
socio-economic, political, and security issues. These domestic challenges consti-
tute serious limitations to Nigeria’s ability to continuously exert its influence in 
regional peace and security issues. A certain sense of clumsiness is also observed 
in the nation’s intervention in security matters in West Africa because officials are 
sometimes lackadaisical and casual about issues. 
With Nigeria’s dependence on an economy based solely on crude oil exports 
and given the global crisis in oil prices, the need has arisen for new and creative 
strategies for more inclusive, proactive, multilateral, and sustainable peace and 
security planning and operations in West Africa. This will ensure that the burden 
of PSOs is equitably shared in order to strengthen collective ownership among the 
member states of ECOWAS. However, Nigeria’s critical role in the establishment 
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the good examples from which other sub-regional organisations, such as IGAD, 
could learn. 
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9 The IGAD–Eritrea impasse 
Future prospects in light of recent 
developments 
Senai W. Andemariam 
Introduction 
Eritrea, for some years, suspended its participation in the African Union (AU) and 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In 2011, the country 
decided to go back to these two organisations only to receive opposite responses: 
while the AU immediately welcomed Eritrea back, IGAD was not ready to open 
its doors to the country. This chapter aims at proving that Eritrea’s re-entry into 
the regional organisation (IGAD) was contingent on the settlement of Eritrea– 
Ethiopia animosity. The evidence of the truth of this assumption materialised 
when Eritrea was fully welcomed, following the signing of the Eritrea–Ethiopia 
rapprochement in July 2018, where IGAD showed great willingness to receive 
back Eritrea. Eritrea is, however, still reluctant to reactivate its membership 
in IGAD. Eritrea resents the way IGAD treated it and thus abhors the regional 
organisation. 
Eritrea’s relations with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), IGAD, 
and its neighbours in the 29 years since its independence (1991–2020) have not 
been free from tension and conflicts (Reid, 2009; Clapham, 2007). Regarding its 
relationship with the OAU, Eritreans have a bitter memory. This memory was 
expressed by the president of the newly independent Eritrea in a scathing cri-
tique he delivered at the OAU Summit of 1993, where he virtually accused the 
continental organisation of being worthless (Wrong, 2005, 358). This criticism 
pertains to how the OAU treated the Eritrean liberation struggle. The sense of bit-
terness was further reinforced because of the role of the OAU during the second 
Eritrea–Ethiopia war (1998–2000) and the subsequent no-war no-peace situation 
and UN Security Council-imposed sanctions (Bogale, 2014). IGAD and the AU 
were behind the 2009 UNSC-imposed sanction on Eritrea, both organisations, 
according to Eritrea, acting on behalf of Ethiopia. 
Eritrea’s relation with neighbouring countries was also characterised by 
tensions and conflicts. In Sudan, influenced by the ideologue Dr Hassan Abd-
Allah al-Turabi, the government of Omar al-Bashir aggressively supported the 
consolidation of radical Islam and its expansion into neighbouring countries. 
Sudan helped in the establishment and support of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, 
which pestered the western Eritrean lowlands. Soon, Eritrea and Sudan became 
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engaged in a series of battles and broke off diplomatic relations; and Eritrea 
aligned itself with Ethiopia and Uganda in supporting the rebel Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) (Bogale, 2014; Healy, 2009). While Eritrea sup-
ported the Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) fighting the regime in 
Khartoum, Sudan supported Eritrean opposition groups. Therefore, throughout 
the post-liberation period, Sudan–Eritrea relations showed serious difficulties that 
had implications on IGAD as the two are members. 
A treaty between two colonial powers, France and Italy, created the bound-
ary between Eritrea and Djibouti. Following Eritrea’s de jure independence in 
1993, some tensions pivoting around the boundary began to simmer. Until 2008, 
no notable border dispute occurred between the two countries except for a skir-
mish and a two-month standoff in 1996. In February 2008, regional Djiboutian 
officials observed Eritrea was constructing earthworks close to the border on the 
Ras Doumeira ridge. Djibouti alleged – and Eritrea denied – that on 7 April 2008, 
Eritrean armed forces penetrated Djiboutian territory, dug trenches on both sides 
of the border, and occupied Ras Doumeira. Several rounds of negotiations were 
held, but were halted when Djibouti sent troops, on 22 April, to the border area. 
It is highly possible that this tension was connected to the Ethiopia–Eritrea con-
flict, which at the time was experiencing additional tension around the common 
border of the three countries. On 5 May, Djibouti took the case to the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), the AU, and the Arab League, all of which 
urged Djibouti and Eritrea to exercise restraint. Consequently, until August 2018, 
all diplomatic relations between Eritrea and Djibouti were severed. 
The Somalia–Eritrea relation has a historical dimension. The former was one 
of the few countries in Africa that consistently supported Eritrea’s independence. 
Eritreans, therefore, are grateful for the various forms of support – particularly 
the provision of passports and offices – they received from Somalia during their 
liberation struggle, and feel indebted to, and obliged to contribute to peace and 
stability in, Somalia. Ostensibly, they see their role in Somalia from that vantage 
point. Through IGAD, Eritrea continued to participate in the Somali peace pro-
cess that finally led to the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) in Somalia. With the subsequent outbreak of clashes between the TFG and 
Islamist groups in Mogadishu and beyond, and Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 
2006, things changed. While Ethiopia stood on the side of the TFG, Eritrea found 
itself supporting factions opposing the TFG. This led scholars to maintain that 
Somalia fall victim to a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Lyon, 2009; 
Abbink, 2003). The Eritrean government took the position that only Somalis, 
without external intervention, could resolve their problem. This Eritrean posi-
tion antagonised powerful actors, particularly the US and Ethiopia, who accused 
Eritrea of supporting terrorist groups. 
In December 2009, through IGAD’s request and AU’s endorsement, the 
UNSC imposed arms and travel sanctions against Eritrea for its alleged involve-
ment in Somalia and its conflict with Djibouti (Sabala in Sharamo and Mesfin, 
2011; Bogale, 2014). The fact that the imposition of sanctions was initiated by 
IGAD created a bitter resentment in Eritrea towards the regional organisation, 
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such that Eritrea, even after sanctions were lifted, found it difficult to reactivate 
its membership in IGAD. 
The Eritrean and Ethiopian relation is long and complex. Following 30 years 
of liberation struggle, Eritrea got its independence from Ethiopia in 1991. The 
relationship between the post-liberation Eritrean government and the post-Der-
gue Ethiopian government was highly praised, until the second war (1998–2000) 
broke out in May 1998, seemingly sparked by border dispute. The end of the 
war was replaced by a no-war no-peace situation that lasted until July 2018. The 
unconditional acceptance and readiness to implement the Algiers Agreement by 
the new Ethiopian leader paved the way for the signing of the Ethiopian–Eritrean 
rapprochement on 9 July 2018, ending the 20-year state of war between the two 
countries. Following the rapprochement, also as part of the package they signed, 
the countries renewed their diplomatic relations; opened embassies in their respec-
tive capitals; reinstated sea, air, land, and telecommunication links; began trading; 
etc. Yet, the village of Badme, the flashpoint of the war, remains under Ethiopian 
control, which casts a dark cloud on the relationship. 
Briefly, Eritrea’s relationship with IGAD, the OAU/AU, neighbouring coun-
tries, and the larger world is defined by the history and experiences of the last 
70-plus years. Understanding these relationships requires unpacking and having 
an adequate grasp of the difficult experiences of the last several decades. 
The sections below will show that IGAD and Eritrea have been at odds with 
each other – mainly due to the Ethiopian factor. 
The 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia border conflict 
Intensive peace efforts in 1998 and 1999 showed to intermediaries – the US, the 
UN, the OAU, and Algeria – that neither country was ready to fully commit to 
the peace process. Fighting resumed in May 2000 around the village of Badme, 
the flashpoint of the war. The war, sparked apparently by a border dispute, raged 
for two years. With Bouteflika’s personal input and under the auspices of the 
OAU, both countries agreed to a cessation of hostilities (18 June 2000), with the 
UN and the AU as its guarantors, followed by a comprehensive peace agreement 
(12 December 2000) signed in Algiers with the Algerian government, the US, the 
European Union (EU), the OAU, and the UN as witnesses. 
Despite the claim by Demeke (2014) that IGAD attempted to mediate between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea during the 1998–2000 war, IGAD played no discernible role 
in the peace process that stopped the border war. Nor did IGAD or the guarantors 
and witnesses of the Algiers Agreement make any notable and persistent attempt 
to normalise the relationship between the two countries following the stalemate 
that arose after Ethiopia refused to be bound by the April 2002 decision of the 
Eritrea–Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC), which awarded Badme to Eritrea. 
Ethiopia continues to occupy Badme, even after the signing of the Eritrea– 
Ethiopia rapprochement in July 2018. After referring to the Eritrea–Ethiopia and 
Eritrea–Djibouti conflicts, Frank (2015, 115) notes: “Regarding conflict media-
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action calls into question the ability of these regional security brokers to accom-
plish one of their fundamental tasks.” As many observers allude to, IGAD, under 
the spell of Ethiopia, was unable to play any role in the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict 
(Mengisteab, 2014). 
The Eritrea–Djibouti border conflict 
In a similar manner to how it failed to be involved in the Ethiopia–Eritrea con-
flict, IGAD did not develop a notable peace initiative to resolve the Eritrea– 
Djibouti conflict. During the 12th Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government (AHSG) on 14 June 2008, IGAD expressed serious concern 
over “Eritrea’s military attack” and reprimanded Eritrea for attacking Djibouti.1 It 
should be noted that the communiqué of this summit was passed in Addis Ababa 
during Eritrea’s self-imposed absence from IGAD. A series of IGAD commu-
niqués2 on the Eritrea–Djibouti dispute called on Eritrea to release Djiboutian 
prisoners of war and to be bound by the UN Security Council Resolution 
1862 of 14 January 2009 to withdraw from Djibouti’s territory. The author has 
seen no IGAD communiqué to date taking note of the fact that in March 2016, the 
Government of Eritrea released four Djiboutian prisoners of war. Hence, IGAD’s 
statements castigating only Eritrea could be easily interpreted as taking sides. It 
is hard – or not hard – to understand why IGAD, which had for years insisted on 
the release of the prisoners, failed to take note of, or appreciate, Eritrea’s action.3 
The UN Security Council took relatively quick initiatives. From 28 July 
to 6 August 2008, a fact-finding mission visited the region and presented its 
report to the Council on 17 September. On 14 January 2009, UNSC Resolution 
1862 demanded that within five weeks of the resolution’s adoption Eritrea with-
draw its forces to the status quo ante (i.e. to positions they occupied before their 
deployment to the ridge in April 2008). Eritrea rejected the resolution the next 
day. It alleged that Ethiopia’s setting up of long-range artillery on Eritrean ter-
ritory at the tri-border on Musa Ali was proof that the Eritrea–Djibouti conflict 
was a continuation of the Eritrea–Ethiopia dispute and the UN’s failure to enforce 
the EEBC decision (Frank, 2015). The Council continued to receive reports on a 
mediation process initiated by Qatar. On 20 July 2010, the Council held a meet-
ing to discuss Eritrea’s compliance with Resolution 1907 regarding the border 
dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea. The Council’s uneven-handed treatment 
of the Eritrea–Djibouti and Ethiopia–Eritrea disputes is disturbing, and seriously 
undermines its credibility, not to mention further exacerbating its relation with 
Eritrea. 
The most important and fruitful intervention in ameliorating the dispute has 
been Qatar’s efforts. Frank (2015) refers to Qatar’s “reputation as a fair and honest 
mediator over a number of [previous] conflicts” such as those in Sudan, Yemen, 
and Lebanon, a reputation which it brought to the Eritrea–Djibouti conflict with-
out “agendas and ulterior motives.” Djibouti had requested the intervention of 
Qatar’s “good offices” prior to the Ras Doumeira incident; and Eritrea’s previ-
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and Sudan and Eritrean–Qatari efforts to resolve the conflict in Darfur and East 
Sudan – made it easier for Eritrea to also accept Qatari mediation. 
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa AI-Thani, the emir of Qatar, took personal charge 
of the mediation process and Presidents Isaias Afwerki and Ismail Omar Guelleh, 
of Eritrea and Djibouti, respectively, by an agreement they signed in Doha on 
6 June 2010, entrusted him “with full powers to issue a document containing legal 
and technical actions as well as mechanisms as he deems fit for a final and mutu-
ally binding resolution of this border dispute.”4 A six-article executive document 
was signed and a committee of three established to resolve the boundary dispute. 
The committee was authorised to receive necessary documents and information 
and ensure the demarcation of the frontiers between the two countries by a world-
renowned company. Moreover, it was agreed that each party would provide Qatar 
with a list containing the number and names of prisoners of war they had detained, 
if any, and also a list containing the number and names of missing persons. In a 
letter sent to the UN Security Council on the same day, Qatari Prime Minister 
Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr AI-Thani, who chaired the committee, con-
firmed that Eritrea had withdrawn its forces from the disputed border areas. Qatari 
soldiers would continue to monitor the border area until the final demarcation 
(Awate Team). 
Eritrea’s pull-out and return to IGAD and the AU 
On 13 April 2005, IGAD’s CoM resolved to support Ethiopia’s military interven-
tion in Somalia. Eritrea’s objection to the resolution for the next two years had 
two sides to it: Eritrea objected to the use of the military of one member state in 
the territory of another; as an undercurrent running the other way, however, was 
the constant competition between Eritrea and Ethiopia to assert influence in the 
region. Somalia was allegedly a territory for a proxy war between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. Finally, the Eritrean minister of foreign affairs sent a letter to the then 
AHSG chair notifying him that Eritrea had “temporarily suspended its member-
ship in [IGAD] effective 21st April 2007 […] in reaction to a number of reso-
lutions passed pertaining to the worsening situation in Somalia” (Andemariam, 
2015, 364). 
Eritrea has not been pleased with the AU either. Since Ethiopia’s failure to 
abide by the decision of the EEBC, Eritrea had been developing grudges against 
the guarantors and witnesses of the Algiers Agreement and had continuously aired 
its grievance against the US-led collusion with Ethiopia to discredit Eritrea’s inde-
pendence and stability. Following numerous reminders to the AU to implement 
the EEBC’s ruling, Eritrea recalled its ambassador from the AU in November 
2003. 
However, both IGAD and the AU continued to encourage Eritrea to come back 
to them. In meetings held on 12 and 14 June 2008 (although more than a year after 
Eritrea’s self-suspension) IGAD’s CoM and AHSG respectively made known 
their intent to welcome Eritrea back. To unite IGAD and AU efforts, the commu-
niqué of the 14 June IGAD AHSG Summit endorsed the CoM recommendation 
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for the establishment of a task force that would engage Eritrea in the succeeding 
the 11th African Union summit, “with a view to convincing Eritrea to reconsider 
her decision to suspend her membership in IGAD” (Andemariam, 2015, 366). 
At the invitation of Eritrea’s president, a delegation led by Kenyan Foreign 
Minister Moses Wetangula, Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor, and IGAD 
Executive Secretary Mahboub Maalim made an official visit to Eritrea on 14–15 
August 2008, where the delegation invited Eritrea back to the organisation. 
During the meeting, Afwerki noted his government’s displeasure at IGAD for 
not living up to its expectation in resolving the Somalis, Sudan, Eritrea–Ethiopia, 
and Eritrea–Djibouti disputes, but nevertheless welcomed IGAD’s request for his 
country to resume its participation in IGAD and appointed his minister of agricul-
ture as Eritrea’s IGAD focal person. 
In January 2011, Eritrea reopened its Permanent Mission to the AU and its 
representative, Girma Asmerom, was well received by Jean Ping, chair of the 
AU Commission, who said that he was delighted and that Eritrea’s return to the 
AU had been a priority since he took office three years previously (Andemariam, 
2015). Following the welcome ceremony, Eritrea continued to participate fully in 
all activities of the AU in Addis Ababa through its representatives. In fact, during 
a national conference in Asmara on 11 June 2016, to launch the end of a campaign 
of child marriage in Eritrea, the conference was attended by an AU delegation 
led by Dr Mustapha Sidiki, the AU commissioner for social affairs, who also 
exchanged ideas during the conference. 
However, a different state of affairs was unfolding in Djibouti at IGAD’s head-
quarters. In a letter to Mahboub Maalim, dated 25 July 2009, Eritrea’s foreign 
minister notified IGAD of his government’s intention to reactivate its member-
ship in the organisation. A subsequent letter sent to Jean Ping described the reason 
for Eritrea’s decision to rejoin IGAD: 
In recognition and appreciation of the consistent and frequent requests 
and appeals made by IGAD Ministerial Delegation, AU and International 
Development Partners such as EU; and in the spirit of reconciliation, peace 
and security and regional integration; as well as in recognition of the current 
economic and political dynamics of the world, Eritrea has finally decided to 
reactivate its membership to IGAD effective 25th July 2011. 
(Andemariam, 2015, 368) 
Maalim reacted positively to Eritrea’s “historic letter” and circulated copies to 
all IGAD Members. On 30 July 2011 Eritrea’s Foreign Minister Osman Saleh 
sent a letter to Maalim notifying him that Ambassador Asmerom would represent 
Eritrea in IGAD. Andemariam (2015, 371) narrates a regrettable incident that 
occurred subsequently: 
On 24 August 2011, the 40th extraordinary session of the CoM was to con-
vene at the Sheraton Addis in Addis Ababa. The chargé d’affaires of the State 
of Eritrea to the AU and ECA, who had been delegated to attend the meeting, 
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was, however, informed that he would not be allowed to sit at the meeting 
and, following a brief altercation, was escorted out of the meeting hall by 
the hotel’s security personnel. The meeting then proceeded without Eritrea’s 
representative. 
The communiqué of the meeting referred to Eritrea’s application to reactivate its 
membership, stating that the CoM 
[r]eaffirms the credibility of IGAD as a regional organisation governed by 
established rules and procedures, and urges that these be followed in the con-
duct of its business; further underscores that the application of Eritrea for re-
admission to IGAD should follow appropriate rules and procedures including 
consideration of the summit of the IGAD Heads of State and Government. 
(IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, 2011) 
The incident provoked a series of condemnations from Eritrea. However, IGAD, 
mainly through its executive secretary – until at least as late as 2013, during a 
speech he made at Chatham House, London (Maalim, 2013) – continued to main-
tain that there were formalities that needed to be carried out before Eritrea could 
resume its participation in IGAD: specifically, a formal decision by the AHSG 
to welcome Eritrea back. Andemariam (2015) tried to show why IGAD’s posi-
tion did not make sense under international law nor by IGAD’s own constitutive 
agreement. Since August 2011, when the 40th Extraordinary Session of the CoM 
met, and 25 November 2011, when the 19th AHSG Extraordinary Session was 
held, no AHSG or CoM communiqué had raised the case of Eritrea’s coming back 
to IGAD. The most recent meetings on record that the author could find were the 
communiqué of the 56th Extraordinary Session of the CoM in July 2016, which 
was the CoM’s 16th extraordinary meeting since August 2011; and the commu-
niqué of the 29th Extraordinary Session of the AHSG in December 2016, which 
was the AHSG’s 10th extraordinary session since November 2011. In none of 
these at least 26 meetings of IGAD’s organs was the question of Eritrea’s re-entry 
into the organisation raised. However, as is described in the next section, Eritrea 
was discussed in these post-August 2011 IGAD meetings, among other reasons, 
to condemn its detention of Djiboutian prisoners of war and to welcome and call 
for additional UN sanctions against Eritrea. 
The impasse continues and Eritrea has yet to be welcomed back into IGAD. 
Eritrea blames no other IGAD member but Ethiopia for the impasse (Permanent 
Mission of Eritrea to the UN, 2012, 2). According to Mulugeta (2014, 3), “Ethiopia 
has also managed to drive regional agendas through the existing regional and con-
tinental organizations, namely [IGAD] and the African Union.” 
It is regrettable, indeed, that Ethiopia continues to hold – or refuses to abdicate, 
according to some observers – the chair of the AHSG, a position it has held since 
June 2008 (TesfaNews, 2013). Such a position has, it appears, helped Ethiopia 
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of IGAD’s organs. The reluctance of the other IGAD members to raise Eritrea’s 
case will, moreover, be counted as providing tacit support to Ethiopia’s alleged 
efforts not to welcome Eritrea back into IGAD. Following a change of govern-
ment in April 2018, and after ten years of incumbency, Ethiopia handed over the 
chairmanship of IGAD to Sudan in November 2019. 
Eritrea’s self-suspension from IGAD had – or could have – negative con-
sequences. The most notable of these was IGAD’s request, during Eritrea’s
absence, for the UN Security Council to sanction Eritrea for its involvement
in Somalia and the conflict with Djibouti. The Security Council in December
2009 issued a sanction to that effect. Eritrea’s inability to rejoin IGAD has also
kept it outside the organisation’s area of influence in situations where IGAD has
been active in matters concerning the Horn of Africa. For instance, Eritrea has
not been able to join the IGAD effort to resolve the conflict in South Sudan, a
country in the creation of which Eritrea made a significant contribution. Finally,
Eritrea’s being away from the IGAD table will deny it active participation in
shaping discussions involving the use and allocation of resources provided by
the international community to IGAD. For instance, in October 2014 a consor-
tium of donors – the World Bank, the EU, the African Development Bank, and
the Islamic Development Bank – announced it would provide USD $8 billion
in assistance to the Horn of Africa to support numerous social, educational, and
development efforts. IGAD will be at the heart of the implementation of these
ambitious projects (World Bank Group, 2014). It is difficult to see how, being
“on the outside,” Eritrea can actively cooperate in harnessing the benefits of this
initiative. Nevertheless, the role played by IGAD to isolate and marginalise it
has left such an indelible impact on Eritrea that, having now the possibility to
reactivate its membership, the country is still reluctant to do so and sees no worth
in rejoining.
UN sanctions against Eritrea 
On 23 December 2009, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1907, which 
stipulated an arms embargo, travel sanctions, and asset freezes on Eritrea and 
on select political and military officials for providing support to armed groups 
that were undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia – in particular, 
Al-Shabaab – and for not withdrawing its forces from Djibouti.5 
The narrations of these sanctions constitute a reminder, from the AU and the 
US, to Eritrea to desist from supporting terrorist groups in Somalia and to peace-
fully resolve its dispute with Djibouti, as well as a refusal from Eritrea to heed 
to such reminders. Finally, IGAD called upon the AU and the UN to work on 
imposing sanctions on Eritrea (Sharamo and Mesfin, 2011). For the first time in 
the history of the UN, a continental organisation – the AU Peace and Security 
Council – called on the UN Security Council to sanction one of its own member 
states (Eritrea) (Bogale, 2014). Eritrea, for its part, has referred to cable mes-
sages leaked by WikiLeaks in which the former US ambassador to the UN, Susan 
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proposed to the Security Council by Uganda, which was exactly what happened 
(Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the UN, 2012). 
Once again IGAD, during the 18th extraordinary session of AHSG in Addis 
Ababa on 4 July 2011, called on 
the AU and the UNSC to fully implement the existing sanctions [of December 
2009] and impose additional Sanctions selectively on the Eritrean Regime 
specially on those economic and mining sectors that the regime draws on 
including the Eritrean Diaspora as well as ensuring compliance with previous 
decisions of the UN. 
(IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government, 2011) 
Although this wish was not granted, the UN Security Council slightly toughened 
its 2009 sanction through Resolution 2023 (December 2011), urging companies 
involved in mining ventures in Eritrea to exercise further vigilance and due dili-
gence to ensure that money generated from mining is not used to destabilise the 
region. The AHSG, during its 19th Extraordinary Session (27 January 2012), 
“welcome[d] the resolution on additional sanctions against Eritrea for its contin-
ued destabilization activities in the region and calls for the expeditious implemen-
tation of the enhanced sanctions.” Mulugeta (2014, 29) states that, throughout the 
period of the sanctions, “Ethiopia was instrumental in the imposition of sanctions 
against Eritrea. It skilfully used its diplomacy to mobilize the support of the states 
in the region, the AU, and the UN Security Council to impose the sanctions.” 
Mosley (2014, 3) adds: 
Eritrea, a small state with limited resources, is using the Horn of Africa’s 
tried and trusted methods to undermine its perceived adversary. Meanwhile, 
Ethiopia, a much larger state on the path to unlocking its economic potential, 
is not only using traditional methods, but is also exploiting its international 
diplomatic position strategically in an effort to keep Eritrea (and the threat of 
instability that it poses to Ethiopia) isolated and contained. 
The experience of Eritrea’s dispute with Djibouti, which ended in peace at the 
border and the release of Djiboutian prisoners of war; Eritrea’s self-suspension 
from IGAD, which ended in Eritrea notifying IGAD of its intention to resume its 
participation in the organisation; as well as the UN Security Council sanctions, 
monitoring of which has shown that Eritrea’s involvement with Al-Shabaab has 
been discontinued, show a pattern whereby IGAD continues to put pressure on, or 
denounce, Eritrea whenever it takes actions contrary to peace and security in the 
region; but, ironically, keeps silent whenever Eritrea takes steps to remedy those 
actions. Moreover, IGAD or the UNSC have never attempted to put pressure on 
Ethiopia for not abiding by the International Court of Arbitration decision and 
thereby withdrawing from the Eritrean territories that it still occupies. This double 
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Eritrea–Ethiopia rivalry in IGAD 
Since 1997, when Eritrea and Ethiopia parted ways and engaged in a conflict that 
involved a bloody border war, Eritrea’s relationship with IGAD – narrated in the 
previous sections – has been defined by three key factors. 
Firstly, due to Eritrea’s continued clashes with its neighbours and the country’s 
resultant perception as a “geopolitical pariah in the Horn of Africa,” “prickly and 
difficult to deal with” (Müller, 2015), and a “bad neighbour” and “exporter of 
instability” (Mosley, 2014), it has become relatively easier for Ethiopia to use its 
influence against Eritrea through IGAD and the AU. 
Secondly, it should be mentioned that Ethiopia’s rise as a regional player had 
an impact on Eritrea–IGAD relations. Ethiopia’s military and economic strength 
has given it added leverage to use IGAD in the exercise of its policies against 
Eritrea. Similarly, Eritrea believes that IGAD is used as a Trojan horse by Ethiopia 
(Mulugeta, 2014) and that “Ethiopia is singlehandedly and illegally blocking, to 
date, Eritrea’s return to [IGAD]” (Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the UN, 2012, 
2). Bereketeab (2012, 185–186) concurs: 
the most conspicuous factor of [IGAD’s] negligence [to address the Eritrea– 
Ethiopian conflict] can be found in the fact that Ethiopia occupies a dominant 
position in the regional organization [i.e. IGAD]. Therefore any discussion, 
let alone decision, that would offend Ethiopia could not be entertained within 
IGAD […] Ethiopia persuaded IGAD to initiate a UN sanctions on Eritrea 
[…] This seriously taints the credibility and integrity of IGAD, since it has 
been deadly silent regarding the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA) on the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia which has been 
stalled for the last [13] years due to Ethiopia’s rejection while it invoked a 
border dispute with Djibouti to punish Eritrea. 
Thirdly, although of lesser significance, is the fact that since around 2010 most 
IGAD meetings have been held in Addis Ababa, not in Djibouti, which may have 
put additional pressure on Eritrean representatives to freely participate in IGAD 
meetings. The weakness of this observation may lie in the fact that Eritrea’s mis-
sion to the AU, which is also mandated to attend IGAD meetings, is based in 
Addis Ababa and has been freely attending AU meetings. The author invites fur-
ther inquiry into why Ethiopia did not care to stop Eritrea from rejoining the AU. 
Why focus on IGAD only and not also the AU? 
IGAD cannot present itself as an effective regional peacemaker unless it takes 
a hand in resolving the animosity between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It has been repeat-
edly noted that solving the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia is a litmus test 
for IGAD’s role as a regional peacemaker. Bereketeab (2012, 85) observes: 
The most glaring failure of IGAD regarding peace and security concerns the 
Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict. In spite of the fact that Article 18A on Conflict 
Resolution states that Member States shall “accept to deal with disputes 
between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before they 
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are referred to other regional or international organizations,” IGAD has not 
been able to do anything. IGAD has not been able to seriously, objectively 
and neutrally discuss the issue in spite of the fact that the conflict has been 
described as the epicentre of most of the conflicts in the region. Strangely, the 
IGAD conflict resolution mechanism was not even invoked. 
Healy (2009, 12–13) has also observed that: 
The region’s most enduring failure since the establishment of IGAD’s peace 
and security mandate has been the inability to dissuade Ethiopia and Eritrea 
from settling their differences on the battlefield in 1999 and 2000 […] IGAD 
has been powerless to persuade Ethiopia and Eritrea to normalise relations 
or to finalise a peace settlement. Their intense mutual hostility continues to 
poison regional relations and exacerbate other conflicts. It remains the key 
obstacle to any progress towards developing an improved regional security 
framework. 
Dersso (2014, 4) comments, “The resultant tension between [Eritrea and Ethiopia] 
not only spilled over into the existing conflicts in the region (primarily the Somali 
conflict), but it also has become a major stumbling block for IGAD’s regional 
integration mandate.” As Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, in Chapter 12 of this volume, 
notes, the president of Uganda, for instance, has repeatedly stated that Uganda 
would not allow itself to be drawn into the constant quarrels between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. Indeed, Uganda has increasingly been looking towards the East African 
Economic Community (EAC). 
The statements quoted above were selected to give context to the line of argu-
ment in this paper that Eritrea’s recent relations with IGAD have essentially been 
the reflection of its hostile, post-1998 relation with Ethiopia. In contravention 
of its statute, Ethiopia has occupied the chairpersonship of IGAD from 2008 to 
2019, inducing suspicion and mistrust among member states that the organisation 
became a tool of Ethiopia (see Berhanu’s chapter in this volume), while others 
opine that Ethiopia’s reluctance to hand over the chairpersonship was intended to 
block the Eritrean case from appearing in the agenda of the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government. 
Despite Ethiopia’s rise in regional influence, Eritrea has not totally gone into 
the darkness of irrelevance. Since 2016, Eritrea has been actively engaged in 
Yemen in a 34-state military coalition against Houthi rebels, allowing Saudi and 
Emirati warships and fighter planes to make use of its ports, airports, and air-
space, as well as to build new military bases (Gridneff, 2015). Ethiopia had made 
known its dislike of Eritrea’s military alliance with Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) (Geeskaafrika, 2016), since Eritrea’s new move could be 
interpreted as an action aimed at garnering more influence in and around the Horn. 
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn in 2015 warned Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE of the consequences should Eritrea use its new relations with them 
to destabilise the region (African Globe, 2015; Ngaish, 2015). Seen in light of a 
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July 2016 visit to Ethiopia by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016), the Eritrea–Ethiopia dispute has probably 
been elevated to an across-the-Red-Sea, if not a global, level. Despite being a 
sub-regional bloc immediately affected not only by the Yemeni conflict, but also 
the alliances mentioned above, IGAD’s continued silence on the Eritrea–Ethiopia 
dispute has damaged its reputation. 
Conclusion 
The change of government in Ethiopia in April 2018 was a landmark in the Horn 
of Africa region. It not only ended the 20 years of state of war between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia, but it also restructured inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa. 
Somalia and Eritrea opened diplomatic relations, the president of Eritrea and 
Djibouti met for the first time in ten years. Subsequently, Somalia, Ethiopia, and 
Eritrea convened several summits and agreed to work together on common issues 
of security, development, and regional integration. These are issues that are of 
central concern to IGAD, which could be facilitated under amicable relations 
among member states. 
IGAD has been pursuing regional integration since 1996 (IGAD, 2009, 2010) 
and has adopted its own Minimum Integration Plan that covers transport, indus-
try, information and communications technology, peace and security, agriculture, 
livestock and food security, environment and natural resources sectors, as well as 
cross-cutting sectors such as gender and health (Dersso, 2014). However, IGAD 
has been consistently identified as a low-performing regional economic commu-
nity in the African integration strategy, particularly in the economic/trade integra-
tion plan (Abdi and Seid, 2013; Gebeyehu, 2015; Abraha, 2013; Dersso 2014). 
This is partly due to festering conflicts among member states. 
Events and developments in the past few years have highlighted Eritrea as a 
country with huge mineral and agricultural resources (Thomas, 2012), signalling 
the potential for economic and trade development for the country. However, most 
of Eritrea’s exports have been to countries outside Africa. Since trade coopera-
tion has proven to be a catalyst to solving political conflict, engaging Eritrea in 
IGAD’s economic integration activities is an ineluctable solution. Moreover, it 
is imperative for IGAD to address peace, security, and development in the entire 
region. In order to do that IGAD needs to stay neutral and impartial with regard to 
treating its member states. Its treatment of Eritrea has tainted the image of IGAD. 
It is vital Eritrea is incorporated in the regional organisation, and for that to hap-
pen IGAD needs to earn Eritrea’s confidence. 
Following the Eritrea–Ethiopia rapprochement in 2018, the door is open for 
Eritrea to reactivate its membership. But, so far, Eritrea seems very reluctant 
to reinstate its membership. It might take a while for IGAD to gain the trust of 
Eritrea, but at the end, it is only through organic, mutual trust and genuine integra-
tion that the region will be able to deal with the convoluted problems the region 
faces. The image of IGAD has very much been tainted; populations in the region 
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a golden opportunity for IGAD to revitalise itself, make itself meaningful, and 
change its image. 
Notes 
1 See the communiqué of the 12th Ordinary Summit of the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD), held at the Sheraton Hotel Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 14 June 
2008. 
2 See, for example, IGAD Council of Ministers (2009, 2012); IGAD Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government (2011). 
3 In fact, the Commission of Inquiry established to investigate human rights abuses in 
Eritrea took note of the release of the prisoners of war in a report in June 2015 (United 
Nations Human Rights Council, 2015). 
4 See the unofficial translation of the letter by His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim 
bin Jabr AI-Thani, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, 
dated 6 June 2010. 
5 A monitoring group working under the Sanctions Committee has issued reports follow-
ing up implementation of the sanctions; its reports are available at https://www.un.org
/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/751/work-and-mandate/reports. 
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10 Lessons to be learned from 
IGAD’s involvement in the 
Sudan peace process (1993–2005) 
Nureldin Satti 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the circumstances that led to IGAD’s involvement in 
the Sudanese peace process; how that involvement was conducted; what chal-
lenges were encountered; how they were dealt with; and with what results and 
consequences for Sudan and, later, for South Sudan. The objective is to better 
understand the various facets of IGAD’s involvement, including the geopolitical 
context; the roles and positions of the IGAD member states; how IGAD medi-
ation was structured and in what circumstances; and how it was conducted to 
achieve the declared or sometimes undeclared objectives. The dynamic of the 
interactions between the two belligerents, the Government of Sudan and the rebel 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and how that interaction 
affected the evolution and conclusion of the peace process are examined. The role 
of international actors, particularly the United States (US) and other members of 
the “Troika Plus,” namely the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, and Italy; as well 
as how the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Nairobi, Kenya, on 
9 January 2005 was negotiated and concluded are interrogated. Finally, it exam-
ines the pitfalls of the implementation process and the reasons that led to a trun-
cated implementation of the agreement, which led to the secession/independence 
of South Sudan. 
How IGAD became involved 
It was the government of Sudan that requested IGAD to mediate in the conflict 
between it and the SPLM/A. Very quickly, it became evident that the government 
of Sudan and other IGAD members – particularly Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and 
Uganda – did not see eye to eye as to the root causes of the conflict and ways to 
resolve it. The disagreement became evident as early as 1993 when those coun-
tries proposed a Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed by the government of 
Kenya and the leadership of the SPLM/A in May 1994, with the government of 
Sudan refusing to sign it until it was practically coerced to in 1998 (El-Affendi, 
2001; Apuuli, 2015). The DOP epitomised all the issues that the Khartoum regime 
refused to recognise at that time, namely: clauses 2, 3, and 4 of the DOP relat-
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conditionalities linked to maintaining the unity of Sudan (curiously, the issue of 
self-determination was given precedence in the text over the unity of the country, 
which was nonetheless said to be a priority); and separation between religion 
and the state, an issue which has yet to be accepted by the government of Sudan. 
While seeking to find a compromise and to accommodate as much as possible 
the positions of the two belligerents, the DOP seemed to be more inclined to 
give preference to the SPLM/A’s demands. This is not to minimise the value of 
the DOP as a document in its own right but to say that it might have contributed 
to sowing the seeds of a methodology that had thrown a spanner into the peace 
process even before its inception. The methodology consisted of putting pressure 
on the Khartoum delegation to accept what was obviously unacceptable to them, 
with the delegation feigning to accept what it intended to find a way of circum-
venting in the future. 
Consistent with this approach to the negotiating process, Khartoum refused to 
sign the DOP, and when it did in 1998 it was obvious that it did so under pressure 
and against its own will. Actually, it accepted it, but did not believe in it. Thus, it 
was not meant to implement it. It was nothing more than a game that proved to be 
detrimental to the peace process. Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo recounted how Kenya’s 
President Daniel Arap Moi managed to “convince” al-Bashir to sign the DOP: as 
the elder statesman, Moi, guided Bashir to his office and tried to make him see 
reason. “These young men [meaning the relatively younger President of Uganda, 
the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, and the Eritrean President] mean what they are 
saying. They will do this to you, and this will only stoke the conflict,” Moi told 
Bashir. When he considered those words, he feared that the Heads of State whom 
he considered excitable could as well make good their threat (of invading Sudan). 
Bashir calmed down and decided to play along (Waihenya, 2006, 38). 
It was then, in July 1997, that the Heads of State present at State House in 
Nairobi decided to establish the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan and special envoys 
were appointed representing the IGAD member states. Gen. Sumbeiywo was 
appointed chair of the Technical Committee. Kenya’s Foreign Minister Kalonzo 
Musyoka was the chair of the Council of Ministers, as Kenya was the chair of the 
IGAD Sub-committee on Sudan (Woodward, 2013, 171; Young, 2012, 84). 
At the international level, following the end of the Cold War, the advent of 
George W. Bush coming to power in the US and the events of 9/11, the interna-
tional environment had changed and an aggressive push for the resolution of the 
problem of southern Sudan started (El-Affendi, 2001, 35). Senator John Danforth 
was appointed as the US Special Envoy to the Sudan Peace Process and the Sudan 
Peace Act was adopted by the US Congress in 1997 (Woodward, 2013, 171). The 
Peace Act clearly identified the culprit as being the Sudan government, or the NIF 
regime as it was customarily called in international media. For different reasons, 
the US Christian right and the Congressional Black Caucus lobbied for sanctions 
against Sudan and viewed the conflict as angels on one side and devils on the 
other, in line with the habitual Hollywood vision of conflict (Young, 2012, 89). 
Within Sudan itself, the opposition to the regime had organised itself, since the














which comprised northern and southern forces opposed to the regime, including
the National Democratic Union, the Umma Party, the SPLM/A, and other parties
(Johnson, 2016, 143). The SPLM/A, when it came to the negotiating table, com-
pletely ignored its fellow members in the NDA and engaged single-handedly in
negotiations with the government of Sudan, represented by the National Congress
Party (NCP). As a matter of fact, the NCP and the SPLM/A carefully excluded any
other political forces from the north or the south from the talks, which gave the talks
the aspect of a bilateral discussion between two belligerents who did not represent
the totality of the forces in play in the country. This exclusionary attitude proved
to have dire consequences on the future of the peace process and on the course of
events in the country, both before and after the independence of South Sudan.
From Machacos to Naivasha 
In 1993, Sudan first requested that IGAD mediate in the civil war between its 
northern and southern parts (Johnson, 2016, 145), and in 1994 the DOP was con-
cluded. It was signed by the SPLM/A in May 1994 but only by the government of 
Sudan four years later (Johnson, 2016, 157). The disagreement over the DOP was 
to foretell what was to come and probably carried the ingredients of the imminent 
failure of the peace process, despite the notable success in concluding the CPA in 
Naivasha, Kenya, on 31 December 2004 and its signing in a grand ceremony at 
Nyayo stadium in Nairobi on 9 January 2005 (Young, 2012). 
It was only in 2001 that that mediation, led by Kenya, started to bear fruit. 
President Moi visited Sudan in July 2001 and the late Bonaya Godana, then min-
ister of foreign affairs of Kenya, who accompanied the president on that visit, 
recounted that a few days later on the return flight from Khartoum, President Moi 
said that it was the first time he believed in peace in Sudan and the unity of Sudan. 
In his visit to Sudan, President Moi presented a seven-point proposal for peace in 
Sudan, dubbed by the Sudanese media “The President Moi Peace Plan” (Editorial 
by Mahgoub Irwan in Al-Sudan newspaper, July 2001). 
In June 2002, the first round of direct talks between the Government of Sudan 
and the SPLM/A took place in Machacos. Waihenya (2006, 84) had this to say 
about Gen. Sumeiywo’s first encounter with the negotiating environment: 
Sumbeiywo was also to realize that the negotiations had to be done in a situ-
ation where some parties, other than the two protagonists, were all suspicious 
of one another. There were envoys whose countries were not particularly 
at peace with others. The Ugandans, for instance, were at conflict with the 
Sudanese Government over the Lord Resistance Army which was fighting 
the Ugandan Government from its base in Sudan, and Eritrea and Ethiopia 
had just ended a war with each other. There was then a quiet internal con-
flict within the mediation team. There was also the international community 
which wanted to hijack the negotiations, and there was the IGAD Secretariat 
to take care of. Sumbeiywo had to balance all that within what he was later 
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In 2005, the CPA between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A was signed. 
It ultimately and inadvertently paved the way for the separation of South Sudan 
and its formation as an independent state on 9 July 2011. As mentioned earlier, the 
IGAD-led Sudan peace process revealed the strengths and weaknesses of IGAD 
as an intergovernmental organisation, the sometimes fierce competition for influ-
ence and prestige among its member states, and the intrusive role played by inter-
national partners. 
Judging by what it achieved in comparison to its declared objectives, the 
Naivasha CPA can be considered a success for IGAD (Young, 2012, 129). But 
like all successes in such complicated circumstances, it was a success the conse-
quences of which could only be measured in relation to the unfolding situation in 
Sudan, as well as in the new country created as a result of that same “success,” 
which is to say, South Sudan. It could be said that Naivasha, particularly the way 
it was implemented, succeeded in helping South Sudan to gain its independence 
while failing to keep Sudan together. But to be fair to IGAD and to the mediation 
team, even if some of them may have worked for the secession of South Sudan, 
they gave the belligerents an agreement that, if implemented differently, might 
have led to a united, democratic, and secular Sudan. 
IGAD’s mediation 
It is to be noted that when IGAD got involved in the Sudan peace process it had
no prior experience in mediation or conflict resolution. As indicated above, it
had barely reformed itself into a regional cooperation organisation and its media-
tion and conflict resolution capabilities were quite limited at the time. The IGAD
Secretariat was under-resourced and understaffed, and ill-adapted to undertake the
daunting task of mediating the various conflicts that were then starting to sprout in
the IGAD sub-region: Somalia in the early 1990s; the LRA problem in Uganda;
the Ethiopia–Eritrea war in 1998; and, of course, the Sudanese civil war in its sec-
ond phase, which erupted in 1983 (Johnson, 2016). The intra-IGAD politics made
it difficult for the organisation to play a role in the Somali conflict, that of the
LRA, or the Ethiopia–Eritrea war. Interestingly, in the case of the Sudan civil war,
it was the government of Sudan itself that invited IGAD to help find a solution to
the conflict. This request came at a time when many of the IGAD member states
were hostile to Sudan, mainly because they felt threatened by its radical Islamist
activities (Woodward, 2013, 161). In doing so, Sudan put its fate in the hands of
its fellow IGAD member states, who seized the opportunity to put an end to a con-
flict that was affecting the whole region, but also to coerce the Sudan regime into
changing its ways, even if the price was to be the division of the country.
The choice of Kenya to lead the negotiating process was dictated by the intra-
IGAD relations at that time. Kenya was the only country that had reasonably 
acceptable relations with both belligerents. It was not too far from the Sudanese 
government and not too close to the SPLM/A, while at the same time having 






The choice of Gen. Sumbeiywo as chief mediator was a judicious one. He was 
known to be a man of integrity, a military man who would understand the intrica-
cies of the conflict but at the same time had the requisite skills to lead the nego-
tiating process. The structure of the negotiating process was also done in such a 
way that the IGAD member states, mainly Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, would 
be represented through their envoys to the process to provide support to the chief 
negotiator and see to it that their interests were being observed. 
The regional and international setting prevailing at the time did not allow for 
a different structure for a peace process. The various stakeholders and interested 
parties needed to be represented in one way or another in the mechanisms that 
dealt with mediation. This included the member states represented at the level of 
heads of state, to guide the process and take strategic decisions; the ministerial 
level, which ensured the link between the technical level and the higher decision 
level and prepared the decisions to be taken at that level; the technical mediation 
level, the advisors and experts who provided technical, diplomatic, or academic 
advice; and the Secretariat, which ensured the smooth functioning of the whole 
process and provided support at all levels. 
The process excluded Sudan’s northern neighbours, in particular Egypt and 
Libya, who had their own peace initiative, judged by some observers as being 
more comprehensive as it included other political parties from northern and 
southern Sudan (Young, 2012, 87). It was probably for this reason that it was not 
accepted by the two belligerents, who were seeking to ensure their full monopoly 
and control of the process. This approach was supported by the mediating IGAD 
member states, who wanted to keep IGAD’s control over the process and to pre-
serve the “African” nature of the mediation. Critics of the CPA process, and of 
similar processes for that matter, argued that the model was flawed and described 
it as “a liberal peacemaking model” (Young, 2015). 
The Sudan peace process was initiated in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, when a triumphant West was entertaining ideas about the “End of 
History” (Fukuyama, 1992) and the “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington, 1993) 
and when the so-called “neocons” and the Christian right were carrying the day 
in the US. The conflict resolution model that was being promoted at that time 
was inevitably a liberal one based on the premises of human rights, democratic 
change, and the right to self-determination, which was an amended version of the 
model exercised during the era of decolonisation. IGAD member states had nei-
ther the resources nor the political or economic clout to challenge or even amend 
that model to suit the realities of their region. They exercised a copy-and-paste 
approach to the resolution of conflict in Sudan that sought to introduce democratic 
transformation and human rights in isolation from the real will of the people. The 
result was an accommodation of two anti-democratic and totalitarian bodies, the 
government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, who sought the same objective, albeit by 
different means, which was consolidation of their grip on power and resources, 
regardless of the will of the people. 
However, we must give the mediator, Gen. Sumbeiywo, his dues. He realised 
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southern Sudan and see for himself the tragic effects of the war. This was a step 
in the right direction, but it was not enough. No mediation or conflict resolution 
model had succeeded thus far in achieving the requisites of systematically and 
thoroughly bringing the views and concerns of the people into the peace process. 
Surprisingly, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A agreed to apply the con-
cept of “popular consultation” to the two areas – South Kordofan and the Blue 
Nile states – but did not want to apply them more widely in northern and south-
ern Sudan (Grawert, 2010; Wassara, 2010, 89). Popular consultation is perhaps 
the closest you can get to achieving the democratisation of a peace process. But 
popular consultation must be done as part and parcel of the peace process itself, 
as a mechanism of mediation and conflict resolution rather than an afterthought 
or an appendix to a peace agreement. But, of course, the question is how this can 
be done when you are dealing with those who are unwilling to listen to the will 
of the people. 
The conflict between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A was unique 
in many ways. It opposed an Islamist regime, seeking to spread its ideology 
beyond its borders to a movement initially inspired by Marxist–Leninist ideol-
ogy, but reformed itself into what was perceived to be a liberation movement 
with an opportunistic leadership with unclear objectives, ranging from creating 
a New Sudan to seeking the independence of South Sudan (Young, 2012, 62f). 
The agenda pursued by the government of Sudan at that time was resisted not 
only by the SPLM/A but also by a sizeable part of the Sudanese people and by the 
traditional political parties allied to the SPLM/A within the NDA. The problem of 
radical Islam is not only of concern to the Sudanese, but to the whole of the IGAD 
sub-region, to Africa, and to the world at large. A wider analysis was needed, 
and still is, to identify the inter-linkages and ramifications of the Sudan peace 
process and its medium- and long-term impact on regional peace and stability, as 
well as on the two Sudans. Western media, think tanks, and interest groups chan-
nelled the attention of the elite and decision-makers in the IGAD sub-region in 
one direction, which served the immediate interests and concerns of these circles 
and of their reading of the situation from a Western perspective, while ignoring 
the medium- and long-term ramifications that are now visible to all. 
Interaction between the two belligerents 
As indicated earlier, the two parties, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, 
had one goal in mind: to reinforce their positions and legitimise themselves in the 
eyes of the regional and international communities. The government was keen 
to preserve the Islamist nature of the regime while making minimal concessions 
to the regional and international communities. As it turned out later, the govern-
ment was prepared to sacrifice the unity of the country rather than compromise 
its hardline position. There was, of course, a constituency within the regime that 
would have preferred to keep the country together, whatever the cost, but it was 
the hardliners who carried the day. The SPLM/A, for its part, was not much dif-
ferent from the government: many years before the beginning of the Naivasha 
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talks, a struggle had started between unionists and separatists within the SPLM/A. 
Garang was said to be a unionist and had elaborated the vision of a New Sudan, 
which would be secular, democratic, and egalitarian. Another constituency within 
the SPLM/A, presumably led by the present president, Kiir, worked for the seces-
sion of South Sudan. This trend was supported by influential lobby groups in the 
US, led by the infamous “Friends of South Sudan,” who saw the future of South 
Sudan as a separate country. As we shall see later, there was no agreed policy 
within the US as to the future of South Sudan. Waihenya (2006) quotes an inter-
esting exchange of views and words between Gen. Sumbeiywo and Danforth on 
the issue of self-determination: 
A more feasible, and, I think, preferable view of self-determination would 
ensure the right of the people of Southern Sudan to live under a government 
that respects their religion and culture. Such a system would require robust 
internal and external guarantees so that any promises made by the govern-
ment in peace negotiations could not be ignored in practice. 
This view was not shared by the southerners. The SPLM/A had all along insisted 
that the southerners must be accorded a right to determine their future status in a 
referendum. But Danforth was trying to water down the meaning of self-determi-
nation as it related to the cause of Southern Sudan (Waihenya, 2006, 89). 
Was this prophetic? At that same time, there were other constituencies who 
considered the secession of South Sudan not only a preferred option but an objec-
tive they had been working to achieve for many years. In the aftermath of the 
Naivasha Agreement, former US ambassador to Sudan Tim Carney wrote: 
In 2001 and 2002 no great sophistication was needed to recognize that the 
United States did not have a unified position on how to deal with Sudan. 
Opposing views in the Congress, the National Security Council staff, and the 
State Department made it difficult for the United States to articulate a coher-
ent policy. U.S. agencies viewed Sudan through different lenses. Although 
the State Department had moved Sudan to its Africa Bureau in the late 1950s, 
other U.S. agencies kept it in their Middle East offices. 
Moreover, American non-governmental organisations (NGOs), churches, and 
journalists held strong views, often informed by only one party. Some lacked 
an understanding or willingness to try to grasp complicated Sudanese reali-
ties. Former President Jimmy Carter did, however, use his ties with evangelical 
Christians to ensure some breathing space for Senator Danforth’s efforts (Carney, 
2007, 5). 
This is probably another lesson to be learned: to what extent should we trust 
bigger powers to resolve our own conflicts when they themselves do not agree 
about the way to go about it? Too many conflicts around the world give us suf-
ficient evidence, if it were needed, that we better serve ourselves and should 
seek to resolve our own conflicts before they become intractable and require the 
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interference of the bigger powers. Their role should be a supportive one, giving us 
the right push at the right time. 
Arguably, South Sudan already had its self-determination during the interim 
period. It was governing itself, while participating in the government of the north 
with 32 percent share of power. The oil was flowing and the south was exempted 
from the application of Sharia legal code. This was as controversial in the north 
as it was in the south. People in the north developed the habit of living with it 
because even if that brand of political Islam was resisted in its own right, the real 
problem was the totalitarian police state hiding behind it. Proponents of political 
Islam now themselves recognise the failure of their project, which was based on 
rhetoric and empty slogans. 
The hardliners in the Islamist movement imagined that the south was an obsta-
cle in the way of consolidating their grip on the country and achieving their dream 
of a radical Islamist state in the Sudan. By getting rid of the south they imagined 
that they could make that dream come true. They were wrong: they have been able 
neither to consolidate their grip on power nor to fulfil their dream of an Islamist 
state because the basic premise was flawed. 
The CPA negotiations became associated with two names: Ali Osman 
Mohamed Taha, the former first vice president of Sudan, and the late Dr John 
Garang, former leader of the SPLM/A. Garang died in a helicopter crash in July 
2005 and Taha has lost his position in the government. The opponents of the 
CPA option for unity saw to it that the CPA did not achieve its two objectives 
of peace and unity. Taha and Garang became the scapegoats in the nightmarish 
worst-case scenario that we are living through now. South Sudan had an option to 
live in peace and harmony with (North) Sudan, but some of its leaders and their 
friends did not want that to happen. Making the north bleed was more important 
for some than making the south prosper. But this is not to absolve the hardliners in 
Khartoum of the responsibility, which is a shared one, as indicated earlier. 
The role of international partners 
The IGAD Partners Forum played an important role in providing support to the 
peace process. Most of the funding came from the EU and European countries, 
which also provided diplomatic support to the process. The Troika Plus, led by 
the US, the UK, Norway, and Italy equally provided considerable support to the 
process (El-Affendi, 2001; El-Battahani, 2013, 35; Ahmed, 2010, 7). In this pro-
cess, as in other African peace processes, questions about the role of international 
partners keep re-surfacing all the time. How can their influence on the process be 
controlled when their financial and diplomatic support to the process is sometimes 
vitally needed? How can we keep the independence of the mediation process and 
protect it from the interference of the bigger powers? The formula of African solu-
tions to African problems was introduced many years ago without Africans being 
able to gain full control of their own destiny or resolve their problems and con-
flicts without assistance or interference, sometimes robust, from the bigger pow-

















independence by funding conflict resolution initiatives themselves and build their 
own technical, logistical, and intellectual mediation and conflict resolution capac-
ities. This will be a first necessary step in the right direction. The AU launched 
such a process at its summit of Heads of State and Government in Kigali, Rwanda, 
on 18 July 2016, thus emulating the funding mechanism put in place by countries 
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) many years ago. 
This is necessary, but not enough. 
Reinforcing IGAD’s mediation capacities 
I had the privilege of taking part in a meeting for the formulation of the mediation 
strategy in Nairobi and was happy to see that some profoundly serious thinking 
and planning was put into the process. The strategy was to include an IGAD 
mediation and peacemaking model based on the realities, needs, and aspirations 
of the people of the region. This further required putting together a “brains trust” 
that would develop the mediation and conflict resolution model and keep updating 
it and adapting it to changing regional situations. 
In the current conditions of international relations, the role of bigger powers 
should never be underestimated. If you cannot have them with you, you should 
at least see to it that they are not working against you. The best you can do is 
try to maximise their benefits and minimise their harm. This is one of the hard 
realities of international relations today. Whether we want it or not, there is an 
international order structured around the United Nations (UN) and its funds and 
specialised agencies, continental and regional cooperation, and peace and secu-
rity organisations. IGAD and its member states must find their niche within this 
complex array of bodies, organisations, and institutions. The experience of the 
Naivasha peace process has shown that IGAD member states should do more to 
align their relations, concerns, and interests at the bilateral, regional, and interna-
tional levels. They need to agree on how to help a member of their family who 
is experiencing problems or in a state of turmoil or failure; and how to minimise 
competition over who will lead peace processes. 
Sudan was assisted in splitting apart, even when the writing on the wall was
only too clear. IGAD midwifed the process that led to this parting of ways. As the
saying goes, “You cannot blame the midwife for the sex or colour of the baby.”
But this is precisely the point: does IGAD’s role stop at the delivery of the baby, or
should it follow the process of its development and growth? In other words, what
was IGAD’s role in the implementation of the CPA? The answer is, very little. The
baby was taken out of IGAD’s hands and reared by others. But it is a well-known
fact that while reaching an agreement is important, implementing that agreement on
the ground is equally if not more important. In the case of Sudan, as in many other
conflict situations, implementation is handled by those who have the financial, tech-
nical, and logistical resources to do it. But they may not always garner the necessary
political consensus to do it or may not have correctly read local political or socio-
cultural intricacies. The established format is that of a pledging conference to which
are invited major donors, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UN
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are put in place, comprising a ceasefire commission, a monitoring and observation
commission, an assessment and evaluation commission, and other commissions
according to the various areas of concern of the peace agreement.
In the case of South Sudan, as in the case of many other countries in conflict, 
pledges have rarely been met: USD $7 billion dollars was pledged for a recon-
struction and development fund, only 20 percent of which was paid. Additionally, 
the international community seems to have run out of ideas as to how to deal with 
certain categories of conflict such as those plaguing the IGAD region. The usual 
recipe is that of financial and economic sanctions, which have little effect on the 
governing elite but add to the suffering of the population; or arms embargos, 
which are difficult to monitor or enforce in the current environment where the 
whole world is awash with all kinds of arms and when it is easier to get a gun 
in certain areas than to find a piece of bread. Human rights and democratisation 
are indeed noble ideals that need to be upheld, but in today’s world you can get 
away with crime if you have the right kind of connections. Is there here an issue 
of double standards? Probably, yes. 
Conclusions and lessons learned 
IGAD decided to involve itself in the conflict between the government of Sudan 
and the SPLM/A at the request of the former. That was the first experience of 
IGAD in mediation and conflict resolution. The agreement of the IGAD mem-
ber states to designate a single mediator supported by envoys from some of the 
member countries and to dedicate a technical secretariat facilitated the successful 
conclusion of the process. This was mainly due to the fact that there was minimal 
competition among the member states as to who should lead the process, as all 
those involved shared varying degrees of sympathy with the cause pursued by 
the SPLM/A and the common objective of putting pressure on the government of 
Sudan to change its ways. 
The methodology adopted by the mediator and his team turned out to be judi-
cious, in the sense that he was able to get together, face to face, the two people 
who were considered to be the decision-makers on either side, Garang and Taha. 
This method was helpful in reaching an agreement, despite the highly contentious 
issues and the mistrust that prevailed between the two sides. Paradoxically, what 
was seen as a positive aspect of the methodology of the talks turned into a dis-
advantage in the implementation phase, particularly after the death of Garang in 
2005 and the resistance of hardliners on both sides to the full implementation of 
the agreement, particularly the clauses on “Making Unity Attractive.” 
This highlights the importance of involving all stakeholders in peace talks, 
which has been difficult to achieve in the case of the CPA due to the refusal of the 
two belligerents to include other parties. This attitude continued into the imple-
mentation phase, where the two parties never sought to explain the agreement to 
the people or involve them in its implementation. On the contrary, they did every-
thing they could to render unity unattractive. 
Too many contentious issues were left unresolved during the interim period 





the oil-rich border area of Abyei and the popular consultations in South Kordofan 
and Blue Nile states; security arrangements and the development of the south; as 
well as passing some of the laws that were crucial for the implementation process, 
such as the National Security Law. Even though the CPA included detailed imple-
mentation protocols, IGAD’s role in the implementation phase was minimal. This 
poses the question as to whether more should have been done to ensure better 
integration and continuity between the negotiation phase and that of the imple-
mentation. This also takes us back to questions over the all-inclusiveness of the 
peace process, a better reading of the prevailing political situation, and a better 
assessment of the potential negative impact of the spoilers. 
The CPA talks have once more brought to the forefront the dependency of 
IGAD on external financial, technical, and intellectual assistance and attempts 
by IGAD partners to control or influence the process. While political influence is 
inevitable, whatever we do, due to the interlinkages between local, regional, and 
international affairs, all should be done to minimise that influence, particularly by 
ensuring the financial, technical, and intellectual independence of IGAD. 
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11 Kenya’s diplomacy and international 
relations within the IGAD region 
on matters of peace and security 
Growth, development, and prospects 
Kizito Sabala 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the role and contributions of the Kenyan government
on matters of peace and security within the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) region. Though it deliberately omits bilateral relations
with individual IGAD member states, it acknowledges that they do play out
within the collective decisions at the level of IGAD. The chapter largely uti-
lises secondary information in discussing relations with IGAD on matters of
peace and security, particularly in relation to Somalia, Sudan, and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLMoking at the future of the cou/A)
conflict, and presently South Sudan. It concludes by lontry’s diplomacy and
international relations with international organisations in a highly globalised
but equally competitive world, with emerging and more complex and sophis-
ticated security threats, as the country hopes to assert its influence among the
community of nations.
The creation of Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification
(IGADD) in 1986 should be viewed as a response to larger integration efforts
across the continent. The IGADD organisation was the brainchild of East
African leaders from Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia
in response to the shared problems associated with perennial ecological prob-
lems in the region, though almost three decades later, droughts, famine, floods,
and desertification still abound. The change of IGADD to IGAD in 1996 was
accompanied by an expansion of the organisation’s mandate to include engage-
ment in peace and security matters. Since then, Kenya has not only been an
active member, having been a founder of IGAD, but has been influential in help-
ing to transform the organisation to respond to a myriad of challenges, among
them peace and security in the region. Although the organisation has engaged
in other related peace and security challenges, such as transnational crimes,
maritime security, and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
(CEWARN), among others, the most pronounced has been its role and con-





Kenya and the IGAD peace and security norms and institutions 
The role and contributions of Kenya have been in tandem with the ever-changing 
peace and security architecture of the sub-region but also across the continent. 
Across the continent, Kenyans have been part of the UN peacekeeping opera-
tions in Namibia and Sierra Leone, and on the Eritrea–Ethiopia border. To be 
effectively engaged in peace and security, Kenya has been part and parcel of the 
development of relevant norms and institutions, including regional programmes. 
This includes the IGAD Security Sector Program (formerly the IGAD Capacity 
Building Program Against Terrorism), the 2002 Protocol on CEWARN, and the 
Mediation Support Unit (Sabala, 2013). In addition, Kenya has been involved in 
decisions at the highest policymaking level of the organisation to establish peace 
agreement implementation follow-up offices in Juba, Khartoum, and Mogadishu 
(IGAD Heads of State and Government Communiqués, 2008), following the real-
isation that on many occasions there was no sustained follow-up on the peace 
agreements once they have been signed. 
Apart from being an active member in norm- and institution-building at conti-
nental and regional levels, Kenya, under the astute and able leadership of President 
Daniel arap Moi, was active in resolving the long-standing and protracted political 
conflict between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. During the 25-year 
civil war between the National Congress Party and the SPLM/A, following the 
abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983 by Sudanese President 
Gaffar Nimeiri, Kenya chaired the IGAD Sub-Committee on Sudan that pushed 
for the acceptance of the Declaration of Principles (DOP), which defined the broad 
agenda for negotiations between the two principal parties to the conflict. Together 
with other regional leaders who were members of the sub-committee – namely, 
Presidents Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, and Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda – ensured the sustainability of the peace talks. According 
to Lesch and Wöndu (2000), the DOP moved negotiations in a different direction 
from Abuja, inasmuch as the issue of self-determination for the South Sudanese 
was concerned. The Abuja process that took place between May 1992 and May 
1993 is significant in two ways. First, it laid the foundation upon which the IGAD 
mediation proceeded, and secondly it brought the conflict in Sudan into interna-
tional limelight. Odera adds that until the formulation of the DOP, it appeared that 
the IGAD mediation would be a tool for the parties. 
The fact that mediators through the DOP had the courage to identify conten-
tious issues such as self-determination, unity, and separation of state and religion 
showed that there was a clear intention to delve deeper into the fundamental issues 
at the heart of the conflict. The sub-committee was supported by, among others, 
Friends of IGAD and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), which initially comprised 
the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Austria, Italy, Canada, the United States 
(US), and the United Kingdom. The main purpose of the IPF was to generate 
and galvanise international support for the IGAD-led mediation, but it was also 
instrumental in financing the process. After that, Kenya not only hosted a series 
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and Lake Bogoria, but also provided the special envoys – Dr Zachary Onyonka, 
Ambassador Daniel Mboya and Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo – who mediated the 
process on behalf of IGAD. The result of these efforts was the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 that ended one of the longest-standing civil wars 
in Africa. Before the process that led to the CPA, which officially and de facto
ended the civil war in Sudan, there were numerous attempts at peace-making in 
Sudan. These included negotiations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (August 1989); 
Nairobi, Kenya (September 1989); Abuja, Nigeria (May–June 1992, April–May 
1993); Nairobi (1993), and Frankfurt, Germany (January 1992) (Public Affairs 
Council, 2002). In 1993, the government of Sudan requested IGAD to mediate 
in the conflict following the collapse of the Abuja process which was attributed 
to what was termed the irreconcilable position of the two parties on the question 
of state and religion (Odera, 2002). According to Odera (2002), the mediators at 
Abuja performed a diagnostic role and were able to tease out the main issues on 
which resolution depended. 
Kenya was instrumental in preparing the ground for the IGAD mediation in 
Sudan (Communiqué, 1993). In its engagement in the Sudan–SPLM/A conflict, 
the country was guided by the principle of good neighbourliness, providing assis-
tance to its neighbours to be at peace with itself and with its neighbours, and 
seeking peaceful means such as dialogue to resolve disputes. In this regard, Kenya 
held meetings with Hassan El Turabi and Omar al-Bashir as the leaders of the 
National Congress Party (NCP) in Sudan and John Garang of SLPM/A in Addis 
Ababa and Nairobi where the latter was urged not to put all his “eggs in one 
basket,” a specific reference to the use of the military option alone, which he had 
sworn to employ in liberating the Southern Sudanese. Instead, Garang was con-
vinced to embrace both military action and dialogue to resolve the conflict. Kenya 
took it upon itself to raise awareness on the plight of the South Sudanese under 
discriminatory treatment by the NCP-led government in Khartoum at national, 
regional, and international levels. The IGAD Peace Initiative was established In 
September 1993 and launched in March 1994 to assist in bringing the conflict to 
an end. 
According to the interview the writer of this chapter had with Peter Marwa,
the former IGAD Head of Conflict Resolution and Bethwel Kiplagat in Nairobi,
in 2012, President Moi, in his capacity as the chair of the IGAD Sub-Committee
on Peace in Sudan was instrumental in ensuring that the process was sustained.
He convened numerous IGAD summits on Sudan, made several personal visits
to Khartoum, and met with Garang and Bashir to stress the importance of dia-
logue to resolve the conflict. Moi’s personal commitment to the process negated
the accusations levelled against IGAD that it was a dishonest and partial bro-
ker. His personal dedication also helped to galvanise and mobilise international
partners to support the process. Furthermore, he ensured that the conflict and
suffering of Sudan were kept alive on both regional and international agendas.
Even at the lowest point in the process, when some actors were being accused of
either bias or undermining the process, Garang and Bashir had something good

















President Moi maintained the unswerving support of the Kenya government
to the peace process to resolve the conflict between the government of Sudan and
SPLM/A. For instance, when the development partners questioned the transpar-
ency and accountability of the financial resources that were supporting the peace
process and suspended funding, the Kenyan government injected USD $66 mil-
lion to sustain the process until it was resumed (Sabala, 2012). Throughout the
entire process, Moi supported the IGAD special envoys and personally took over
leadership when the need arose to give it impetus. During the negotiations, Moi
ensured he was well equipped and informed with the latest accurate develop-
ments regarding the process, a situation that earned him respect and trust when
he proposed interventions to overcome any impasse. Even when he left power in
2002, not only did he continue to work on Sudan through the Moi Foundation,
but his successor Mwai Kibaki appointed him as his special envoy on Sudanese
matters. Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat noted that Moi was passionate about
peace in Sudan. His religious belief inspired this virtue in promoting peace and
a strong belief in the principle of African solutions to African problems and
prestige.1 
At some point during negotiations, when frustration-gripped infighting inten-
sified in parts of Sudan, and there was no significant progress on the mediation 
front, and the humanitarian situation was worsening, Moi sent a message to the 
two parties indicating that unless there was meaningful progress, he was not going 
to preside over the process. The statement, which carried both an appeal to the 
parties and a threat to withdraw, did not achieve its intended goal as the session 
ended in a stalemate. The CPA is a conglomeration of six protocols on various 
issues that include security arrangements, power and wealth sharing, and the ques-
tion of the oil-rich border area of Abyei, among other things, and two annexes. 
Furthermore, the Kenyan government provided financial resources to keep the 
process afloat when development partners delayed their support. 
Kenya and the South Sudan conflict 
During the crisis that broke out in South Sudan on 15 December 2013, Kenya 
hosted the first IGAD summit on 27 December on the matter, following a flurry of 
shuttle diplomacy that involved the country’s cabinet secretary for foreign affairs 
and the Ethiopian minister for foreign affairs. The summit laid the foundation for 
the commencement of negotiations between the SPLM in the Government and the 
SPLM in the Opposition (SPLM-IO), former detainees, and other political parties. 
The former detainees were, namely, Deng Alor Kuol, Gier Chuang, Kosti Manibe, 
Chol Tong Mayay, Cirino Hiteng, Madut Biar Yel, and John Luk Jok. The others 
were Pagan Amum Okiech, Majak D’Agoot, Oyai Deng Ajak, and Ezekiel Lol 
Gatkuoth. They were detained in Juba by the South Sudan government because 
they were accused of being part of the (Riek Machar of SPLM-IO) plot to over-
throw the government of Salva Kiir. When the crisis broke out on 15 December 
2013, the South Sudan government accused Riek Machar of plotting to overthrow 
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The negotiations took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, led by three special 
envoys – namely, Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Gen. Mohammed 
Ahmed Mustafa al-Dhabi of Sudan, and Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya – cul-
minated in the final Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic 
of South Sudan (ACRISS) in August 2015. During the negotiation process, the 
regional organisation in which Kenya served as the rapporteur and Ethiopia as 
the chair convened more than ten Extraordinary Summits of Heads of State and 
Governments on the question of South Sudan. 
The IGAD mediation process on South Sudan was structured as follows: the 
summit, which is the highest decision-making policy organ of the organisation 
and set the overall direction of the talks, met more than ten times – a clear demon-
stration of its political commitment to see the conflict end peacefully. With Kenya 
as the rapporteur and Ethiopia the chair, the involvement of Ugandan military 
and allegations that Sudan was siding with the opposition, the region’s collective 
voice had been undermined. The Council of Ministers consisted of the ministers 
of foreign affairs of the member states, and their meetings preceded every summit 
and the differences at summit level reflected what transpired at the council level. 
The Office of the Special Envoys on South Sudan (OSSESS) was the most 
critical organ in the mediation process. It oversaw day-to-day negotiations and 
reported to the council and the summit. It was created at the Nairobi summit 
of 27 December 2013 (IGAD, 2013) and comprised the three special envoys, 
chaired by Ambassador Mesfin. The IGAD Monitoring and Verification 
Mechanism (MVM) was provided for at the 23rd Extraordinary Session of the 
IGAD Assembly of Heads of State. It had headquarters in Juba, with teams in 
selected conflict zones, whose mandate was to monitor and verify violations of 
the cessation of hostilities agreement and report to the OSSESS. MVM was also 
responsible for monitoring and verification of humanitarian access, protection of 
civilians, and cessation of hostile propaganda. Moreover, the teams had the lever-
age to use their discretion and deploy verification missions on the basis of cred-
ible information, complaints submitted by the parties to the conflict, and/or direct 
requests from the IGAD special envoys; and monitor the activities of the parties 
and acts associated with their forces and armed groups and allied forces invited 
by either side. The final organ was the IGAD Secretariat, which continued to play 
a very peripheral role, despite having seconded the director of peace and security 
to be fully engaged in the process, while the whole mediation was supposed to be 
anchored within the newly established Mediation Support Unit. 
Kenya is part of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and Ceasefire 
and the Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), 
which are transitional structures that were expected to nurture and support the 
Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) in South Sudan in navigat-
ing through a transitional period. CTSAMM replaced the former Joint Technical 
Committee/MVM, which was monitoring the ceasefire agreements signed by the 
two parties before the 2015 agreement in which Kenya was participating. 
Furthermore, when a dispute broke out between soldiers allied to President 





Kenya hosted the First Extraordinary IGAD Council of Ministers on the situation 
in South Sudan to try and resolve the matter. Kenya was part of subsequent meet-
ings on the same matter on the side-lines of the AU summit in Kigali, Rwanda, in 
July and Addis Ababa in August. Even when violence broke out in Juba in July 
between the two factions, Kenya hosted the extraordinary IGAD council meet-
ing. The council’s hard-hitting communiqué (IGAD, 2016) was not only adopted 
by the AU Peace and Security Council but was further improved at the IGAD 
Extraordinary Summit in Kigali. 
In addition to the foregoing, Kenya contributed more than 1,300 peacekeepers 
to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and provided the force commander. 
A spat occurred following the dismissal from that role of Lt. General Johnson 
Ondiek. A UN investigation panel blamed poor leadership and judgment for 
attacks on Terrain Camp, a UN facility in the capital, Juba, which led to several 
deaths. Although the UN promptly requested that Kenya appoint a replacement, 
the country considered it unnecessarily punitive and refused. However, following 
consultations with the new UN Secretary-General António Guterres, the country, 
as an important interlocutor in drawn-out efforts to rescue South Sudan, recom-
mitted itself to supporting peace efforts there. 
Bilaterally, Kenya continued to engage and encourage the TGNU to respect 
the institutions that were established during this period. Kenya has continued to 
closely monitor the implementation of this agreement through Track II (back-
channel) diplomacy and ensure that that the parties to the agreements respected 
the accord reached in August in Addis Ababa. 
Kenya in Somalia 
Just as in South Sudan, Kenya has been an important player in trying to resolve 
the Somali conflict. The search for sustainable peace and security in that coun-
try, which has been without an effective government since the fall of Mohamed 
Siad Barre in 1991, has been particularly challenging and difficult. Against this 
backdrop, Kenya has been at the forefront of efforts to deal with more than two 
decades of state failure and political anarchy that allowed a culture of warlordism 
to become entrenched. This has since been replaced by Al-Shabaab’s militant 
Islamist extremism, which continues to make Somalia ungovernable; a situation 
that has been conducive to creating an environment where lawlessness, criminal 
activities, trafficking, and smuggling thrive. 
Kenya hosted, mediated, and led the process in Nairobi in 2004 that created the 
first semblance of a government in the post-Said Barre era. It provided the chief 
mediators, Elijah Mwangale and Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, who spearheaded 
the process. The country contributed 3,664 troops in Somalia (Daily Nation, 
2016) as part of the 22,000-strong African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) 
created in 2007 to help stabilise the war-torn country. Uganda had the highest 
contingent (6,223 troops), followed by Burundi (5,432), Ethiopia (4,395), and 
Djibouti (2,000), though lately there were concerns about the effectiveness of 
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However, there seems to be a need to re-examine Kenya’s military venture 
into Somalia, dubbed Operation Linda Nchi, given the heavy casualties that the 
country has sustained since its entry in 2011. Kenya has witnessed increased ter-
rorist attacks by the Al-Shabaab militant group on its soil, since the intervention 
of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in Somalia in 2011. The worst attack happened 
in 2016 when the Kenyan base at El Ade was attacked resulting in the death of 
more than 150 Kenyan soldiers (BBC 2016). 
Part of AMISOM, the presence of the Kenyan soldiers should be re-evaluated 
against the backdrop of allegations of its involvement in sugar and charcoal smug-
gling in Somalia. Its losses to Al-Shabaab, the implications of frequent terror-
ist attacks on the Kenyan economy, and the need for a reconstructed AMISOM 
also need evaluation. The UN report (Kelley, 2017) on the charcoal and sugar 
smuggling and its implications for the country’s military relationship – if any – 
with Al-Shabaab, requires crafting a face-saving policy of withdrawal or an exit 
strategy. 
Kenya hosts about 600,000 Somali refugees (Huffington Post, 2016) in Kakuma 
and Dadaab camps as it did southern Sudanese during the 21 years of the libera-
tion struggle in that country. In the recent past, Kenya has raised serious concerns 
about links between Somali refugees and national security and resolved to start a 
process of repatriation to their country. Discussions took place between the gov-
ernment and the UN on this issue. In response to perceived threats posed by the 
Somali refugees, Kenya hosted an IGAD summit on 26 and 27 March 2017 that 
discussed ways and means of addressing their problems within the confines of the 
international conventions relating to the protection, treatment, and repatriation of 
displaced persons. 
During the special summit, the IGAD Heads of State and Government,
which included the then newly elected Somali President Mohammed Abdullahi
“Farmajo” Mohamed and the AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat,
agreed to collectively pursue a comprehensive regional approach to deliver
durable solutions to the issues regarding Somali refugees. The summit also
appealed for the protection of refugees to respond effectively to the ravaging
drought situation in the sub-region, mobilise resources, and coordinate interna-
tional efforts. 
Kenya played a role in the formation of regional states or federal states in 
Somalia and supported capacity-building in various fields. It occasionally hosted 
various inter-community dialogues that led to the formation of the Jubaland 
Transitional Government. At bilateral and multilateral levels Kenya provided 
capacity-building to both Somalia and South Sudan using its institutions and sec-
onding civil servants in the areas of policing, banking, military intelligence, and 
ICT, among others. However, its efforts to resolve the Ugandan conflict was a 
failure. Before Kenya’s engagement in the Sudan–SPLM/A conflict, the country 
had tried to mediate in Uganda in the conflict between the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) and the government of Gen. Basilio Olara Okello. This pro-
cess did not see the light of the day, as the NRM took power in Uganda in 1985 on 






Kenya and IGAD 
After the post-electoral violence in 2007–2008 in the country and the eventual 
confirmation of charges (crimes against humanity) against President Uhuru 
Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto, by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which held that they had a case to answer, Kenya was able to lobby, mobi-
lise, and rally not only IGAD member states but also the AU on the question of 
the ICC. This should be situated within the broader debate of Africa–West rela-
tions and the whole notion of neo-colonialism, but also the specific context that 
Kenya was experiencing at that point in time. The country, through IGAD and the 
AU, successfully piled pressure on the ICC that later terminated the cases against 
Kenyatta, Ruto, and journalist Joshua Arap Sang, terming it a mistrial. Though the 
mobilisation kept the issue of Africa–ICC relations alive on the international and 
continental agenda, it received a blow during the July 2016 AU Summit in Kigali, 
which was sharply divided on the proposal for a mass withdrawal from the Rome 
Statute by the continent’s member states if it was not revised. 
Challenges and opportunities for Kenya’s 
diplomatic engagement 
One of the main challenges undermining the country’s path towards reclaiming its 
politically dominant space in the region is the fractured and deep-seated ethnically 
based political differences that continue to undermine the fabric of the country’s 
economy. The country’s political chessboard is highly ethnicised and built on 
unresolved historical injustices relating to land and political marginalisation in the 
pursuit of political power (Government Printer, 2008b). These issues that cloud 
and mask the country’s political scene have been swept under the carpet for politi-
cal greed and unless addressed could plunge the country into political and eco-
nomic instability and turmoil. These issues have polarised the country’s political 
landscape, particularly during the period heading into elections, a situation that 
potentially scares away long-term investors. 
A second challenge that impacts on the country’s international relations and 
diplomacy is occasional terrorist attacks. Apart from Somalia, the bedrock of the 
Al-Shabab militants in the Horn of Africa, Kenya has been hardest hit by terror 
attacks. This is attributed to weak institutional and capacity deficits to deal with 
the problem, though other reasons are a large Somali population that has kin and 
kith across the long, expansive border; and unemployment and high levels of pov-
erty, which make it easy for extremist groups to find recruits. 
There is also the problem of belonging to several regional groupings in the 
same geographical location with similar mandates and aspirations. For instance, 
the country belongs to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the EAC, and IGAD. The problem arises when states have to split 
their financial contributions to remain active in the affairs of these groupings, a fact 
that partly explains why so many of them are in arrears, but also why significant 
funding of programmes is at the benevolence of development partners. Another 
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challenge relates to the fact that Kenya’s relations with IGAD as an organisation 
must take into account the foreign policies and behaviour of individual member 
states, particularly where an individual member state seems to be driven by its 
own interests, unlike the collective ones as a regional grouping. 
Despite the challenges, there are several opportunities that the country can 
exploit to improve its regional and international engagement with the rest of the 
world. The main opportunity for addressing these fissures is the 2010 constitution 
that has come with various institutions; but the notion of the “tyranny of numbers” 
in a National Assembly allied to whoever assumes power in the country remains 
a serious threat to its implementation. This is because they use their numbers in 
the National Assembly to amend some of the clauses in the constitution to suit 
the ruling elite. 
The days when political elites will just make foreign policy decisions without 
convincing the populace that it is the right thing to do are over. In short, the coun-
try’s diplomacy and international relations must be a function of domestic politics 
and aspirations. This is partly due to a highly educated and active middle class, 
and a politically sensitive population that includes a strong civil society, religious 
community, and private sector, including a strong clique of Western diplomats 
who are ever vocal on matters that may threaten the stability of the nation. 
Kenya, with its extensive experience in regional, African, and global peace-
keeping missions and peace-making, remains a critical player in the East African 
security equation. It not only has massive experience in mediation, but also the 
country’s armed forces have been part of UN peacekeeping missions in Angola, 
Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the former Yugoslavia, to mention but a few. 
Concluding remarks 
There is no doubt that the country will continue playing a pivotal role in East 
Africa, given not only its strategic location but, more importantly, a relatively 
developed economy and a wealth of experience that it has culminated in host-
ing the Sudanese, South Sudanese, and Somalia peace talks and refugees. As a 
founding member of IGAD, Kenya is a major player in the sub-region’s peace and 
security architecture. Until recently, East Africa’s most advanced economy serves 
as a rapporteur of IGAD, which is mediating conflicts in the Horn of Africa, most 
recently during the strenuous negotiations between the warring parties in South 
Sudan. The country has also invested in South Sudanese service industries, such 
as insurance, banking, ICT, and hospitality. Also, there are many students not 
only in Kenya’s institutions of higher learning but also in basic education. 
The country needs to revisit its approach to regional and international politics, 
diplomacy, and international relations, but more importantly knock out sectar-
ian considerations from foreign relations. The country’s embassies should not 
be polarised on ethnic and sectarian lines if they are to take advantage of the 
tremendous academic and intellectual resources of Kenyans abroad. The process 
of building solid and effective diplomacy and international relations is seldom a 
smooth one and sometimes it is marred by terrible disappointments. Kenyans in 
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key positions in various international organisations such as the EAC, COMESA, 
IGAD, the AU, and the World Trade Organization, among others, need to be the 
country’s ambassadors to support the president and career diplomats to steer the 
country in international and regional arenas. 
The country’s relations with its neighbours have been premised on the princi-
ple of good neighbourliness and resolving disputes through dialogue and peaceful 
means. These principles and values are reiterated and reinforced in the country’s 
two documents on diplomacy and international relations, namely Kenya’s Foreign 
Policy (2014) and the Kenya Diaspora Policy (2014), the first of their kind to 
have been written and which elaborate how the nation has conducted international 
affairs since independence. The documents reaffirm the long-standing practice 
of promoting sub-regional and regional integration and cooperation, enhancing 
regional and global peace and security, and promoting international cooperation 
and multilateralism. This recognises that the country is an integral part of the 
African continent, whose national interests are intrinsically linked to Africa’s sta-
bility, unity, and prosperity. 
The above is aptly captured in the documents, the guiding value among them 
being the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means, which speaks to the peace 
and diplomacy pillar. Other pillars are economic, diaspora, environmental, and 
cultural. The objectives of the peace and diplomacy pillar are: (1) to promote the 
resolution of conflicts by peaceful means; (2) to collaborate with other African 
countries to strengthen the conflict prevention, management, and resolution 
capacity of regional institutions, including the EAC, IGAD, COMESA, and the 
AU (with the aim of promoting sustainable peace and development; (3) to support 
peace efforts by the AU and the UN through contributing troops and providing 
leadership in peacekeeping missions within the continent and globally; and (4) 
to create conflict analysis and prevention capacity nationally and in the region 
through the Foreign Service Academy. These values and principles should be 
the cornerstone of the country’s diplomacy and international relations in the next 
decade and beyond. 
Finally, this chapter concludes that the country’s foreign relations within the 
IGAD sub-region since independence, as with other actors in the international 
system, have been influenced by mainly six interrelated factors. These are coloni-
alism; Cold War politics; the principle of non-interference; good neighbourliness; 
the emerging globalisation; and the post-Cold War political climate, including the 
idiosyncratic beliefs and world views of the political elite that have dominated the 
county’s political terrain. The country’s foreign relations in the next decade and 
beyond will also be a function of the foreign policies and behaviour not only of its 
immediate neighbours within IGAD and the EAC but also the effect of globalisa-
tion and emerging actors in African affairs such as China, Japan, and India. This 
will be in addition to the political elite in the country and the 2014 Foreign Policy 
document. 
Kenya is a major interlocutor in the drawn-out efforts to rescue South Sudan 
and Somalia, having hosted numerous IGAD summits to set the stage for sev-
eral peace agreements, but it has also provided mediators. The country has also 
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contributed troops to AMISOM, as it has done to UNMISS, as well as to the 
UN mission in Darfur. In the case of Somalia, Kenya has remained a centre for 
coordinating and delivering much-needed relief to Somalis and some level of 
reconstruction and rebuilding programmes in the country. Kenya should continue 
engaging in the search for sustainable stability in the IGAD region to address 
both the challenges of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. These chal-
lenges in countries that have experienced long periods of civil war and destruction 
are enormous and include demilitarisation, disarmament, demobilisation and rein-
tegration, economic reconstruction, and social cohesion, and require both regional 
and international support. 
Note 
1 Author’s interview with Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat. 
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12 Uganda and the 
Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD) 
Kasaija Phillip Apuuli 
Introduction 
Uganda is a founding member of both the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Drought and Desertification (IGADD) and its successor the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD). This chapter discusses Uganda’s member-
ship of and relations with IGAD. While Uganda has benefitted from the organisa-
tion’s programmes, such as the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism 
(CEWARN), and participated in the peace processes in Sudan, Somalia, and South 
Sudan, in recent years the country has not been enthusiastic about its membership 
of IGAD. Firstly, IGAD has been absent in finding resolutions to the numerous 
conflicts that have rocked Uganda especially the Lord’s Resistance Amy (LRA) 
insurgency in the north of the country that lasted more than 20 years. Secondly, 
Uganda has accumulated arrears in the form of membership fees running to mil-
lions of US dollars. Thirdly, Uganda’s unilateral intervention in the South Sudan 
conflict in December 2013 resulted in tensions with other members of the organi-
sation. Fourthly, Uganda has had a cat and mouse relationship with Sudan over 
accusations that the two countries support rebels in each other’s territory, with 
IGAD not doing much about the arising tensions. Lastly, increasingly Uganda 
has focused on its membership of other regional economic communities (RECs), 
in particular the East African Community (EAC). Uganda’s stance on IGAD 
is possibly explained by two reasons: first, President Yoweri Museveni’s view 
that Uganda should not be party to the perennial quarrels between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea that continue to rock the organisation; and second, that the EAC, which 
Museveni is rumoured to wish to head when it is finally established, promises 
more to Uganda in the form of a political federation. 
IGAD and Uganda 
The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) 
As a founding member of IGAD, Uganda has been at the centre of the activities of 
the organisation. Specifically, IGAD has since 2003 been running the CEWARN 
project in the Karamoja Cluster. The Karamoja Cluster refers to an area of land 
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southeastern South Sudan, and northeastern Uganda (Aheri, 2010, 2). The area is 
populated by 15 pastoralist communities who share a common language, culture, 
and way of life.1 The Cluster is defined by the dominant mode of production prac-
tised by its people: pastoralism, or the use of rangeland for extensive livestock 
grazing by semi- or wholly nomadic communities (Bevan, 2008, 20). Rainfall 
is generally unpredictable and localised, making agriculture an unreliable sub-
sistence strategy (Aheri, 2010, 3). The main economic activity in the Karamoja 
Cluster is livestock herding and thus conflicts that present in the area are mainly 
about pastures and water points. The situation in the Cluster is exacerbated by 
the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), which are used by 
the population to protect their livestock and to engage in cattle rustling in other 
communities. The conflicts are often cross-border, at times planned in one coun-
try and executed in another (Aheri, 2010, 3). At other times, the conflicts are 
also internal to one country, but tension can seep into neighbouring countries. In 
general, the Karamoja Cluster is a marginalised zone, receiving proportionally 
less consideration in mainstream development programmes from the states of the 
region (USAID, 2005, 13). While governments have pursued policies that tend to 
brutalise and marginalise pastoralists, making pastoralists view state policies with 
serious misgivings, the pastoralist groups feel that their needs and interests are not 
adequately addressed in the general planning of national mainstream development 
(USAID, 2005, 15). 
It is within the context of ameliorating the situation in the Karamoja Cluster 
that CEWARN was designed as a system to cover both early warning and response 
with regard to conflicts that affect the people living in the Cluster. CEWARN 
is, among other things, aimed at gathering, verifying, processing, and analysing 
information about conflicts in the region; and communicating all such information 
and analyses to the decision-makers of IGAD policy organs and national govern-
ments of member states (IGAD, 2002, Article 5 (1)(a–c)). Upon receipt, policy-
makers are meant to craft responses to the conflicts that are brewing. 
Of all the conflict early warning systems that are being developed on the 
African continent, only CEWARN is building an integrated response mecha-
nism to include elements of mediation at local level (AU, 2010, para. 87). In this 
regard, it has worked with the Karamoja Development Agency (KDA), which 
has been succeeed by the Karamoja Integrated Disarmamemnt and Development 
Programme (KIDDP) (Government of Uganda, n.d.),2 the Ministry of Karamoja 
Affairs, and the Lutheran World Federation and World Vision, among others, to 
manage conflicts, especially pastoral ones within the Karamoja Cluster. 
Over the years, CEWARN has been producing quarterly reports analysing the 
nature, characteristics, and dynamics of national and cross-border pastoral and 
related conflicts, through data and analysis in the Karamoja Cluster (CEWARN, 
2008a, 2008b). The reports highlight the incidence and outcomes of violence in 
the Cluster, and outline the driving factors exacerbating and de-escalating con-
flicts therein. The mechanism uses a set of 52 socio-political indicators for two 
types of reports: (1) violent incident reports, with indicators on armed clashes, 
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the presence and status of communal relations, civil society activities, economic 
activities, governance and media, natural disasters, safety and security, and social 
services (Wulf and Diebel, 2009, 19). The main contributions of the reports are 
two-fold: first, recommendations to key stakeholders (governments, civil society 
organisations, and community-based organisations) contribute to mitigating and 
de-escalating conflicts; and second, they help to build confidence and collabora-
tion among the named stakeholders. Generally, CEWARN reports have provided 
a good basis for developing intervention options and mechanisms for response 
(CEWARN, 2006, 20). 
The main drawbacks of the mechanism include the fact that it has not yet 
managed to link its capacity of early warning with an effective mechanism for 
prevention of conflict or response to mitigate conflicts after they have broken 
out (CEWARN, 2006, 20). The mechanism lacks a response component or 
arrangement to avert imminent conflicts. The gap between early warning and 
early response has been glaringly exposed by the mechanism’s operations in the 
Karamoja Cluster. While the mechanism has excelled at providing timely, con-
stant, and accurate information on cross-border pastoralist conflicts in the Cluster, 
it has not managed to build response devices such as information-sharing, com-
munication, and cooperation between the various actors concerned. Conflict 
prevention, as the mechanism has realised, requires much more cooperation and 
input of stakeholders at the local, national, and regional levels, both in terms of 
information provision and implementation of responses (CEWARN, 2006, 21). 
Also, the mechanism’s activities have remained largely unknown, partly due 
to the remoteness and inaccessibility of the pilot areas (including the Karamoja 
Cluster). CEWARN has itself acknowledged that “the mechanism remains un-
known in the member states, in the region, and most importantly, among the local 
communities who are supposed to be the direct beneficiaries of the early warning 
and early response functions” (CEWARN, 2006, 21). In Uganda, for example, the 
government only became interested in the mechanism after the president’s wife 
became the Minister for Karamoja Affairs (Apuuli, 2013, 18). 
IGAD as a mechanism for conflict resolution 
in Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan 
The agreement establishing IGAD declares that the organisation’s key aim is to 
“promote peace and stability in the sub-region, and [create] mechanisms for the 
prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through 
dialogue” (IGAD, 1996, Article 7g). To test the efficacy of this mandate, the 
organisation became a mechanism for resolving conflicts in the member states of 
Sudan (2002), Somalia (2004), and South Sudan (2014–2015). The agreements 
reached to end the conflicts respectively have endured, albeit with challenges. 
These are: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (2005); the Agreement 
on Somalia Peace and National Reconciliation (2004); and the Agreement to 
resolve the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) (2015). Uganda has been part of all 
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participant. For example, when IGADD launched its peace initiative for Sudan 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in September 1993, it appointed a peace committee 
comprising the heads of state of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya (the chair), and Uganda 
(Apuuli, 2011, 352). This committee of heads of state guided a mediation commit-
tee made up of foreign ministers from the same countries. In the case of Somalia, 
the IGAD facilitation committee comprising of the special envoys of Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda performed the day-to-day running of the Somalia 
National Reconciliation Conference in Nairobi, Kenya (Apuuli, 2011, 357). Later 
on, when a decision was taken to deploy an African Union (AU) peace support 
mission to Somalia, Uganda became the initial contributor to the AU Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) in March 2007. 
Uganda’s unilateral intervention in the South Sudan conflict 
In South Sudan in mid-December 2013, tensions that had been simmering between 
President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar broke out into open vio-
lence. The fighting pitted factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ 
Army (SPLM/A) aligned to the two men. In the immediate aftermath of the out-
break of fighting in Juba, Uganda deployed elements of the army, the Uganda 
People’s Defence Force (UPDF), to secure Juba International Airport to enable 
foreigners to evacuate from South Sudan. As the conflict escalated, the Ugandan 
army became sucked into the fighting on the side of the South Sudan government 
(the Kiir forces). Ugandan troops were gradually increased up to an estimated 
level of between 2,000 and 5,000 soldiers (IRIN, 2014).3 Uganda’s military sup-
port to the Kiir forces included air support and tanks. 
Uganda’s strong links with the SPLM/A includes decades of joint military
deployments (International Crisis Group, 2014, 22). When the rebel National
Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) government came to power in Uganda,
it faced an insurgency in the north. The remnants of the defeated Ugandan army,
who had taken refuge in Sudan, subsequently launched attacks in Uganda from
their bases in Sudan. While the NRM/A was able to defeat a number of these
militia groups using military and peace talk strategies, including the Uganda
People’s Democratic Army and the Holy Spirit Movement I and II, the most
virulent insurgent group was the LRA led by Joseph Kony, which took root in
northern Uganda. 
Following the collapse of peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan gov-
ernment around 1993–1994, the LRA started getting military assistance from the 
Khartoum government. According to Dunn, 
the Sudanese government was instrumental in transforming [the] rag-tag 
group of rebels [of the LRA] into a coherent, well supplied military force, 
largely though training, sharing of logistics and the introduction of more 
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What prompted Khartoum’s support of the LRA was the support that the NRM/A 
government had extended to the SPLM/A. While Omach (2010, 294) has noted 
that the NRM/A government was sympathetic to the SPLA/M, Tripp (2010, 158) 
states that on 29 March 1989, a secret military cooperation agreement was signed 
between Uganda and Col. John Garang committing Uganda to provide equipment 
and training to the SPLA, as well as passports for travel abroad. Uganda also 
committed to providing the SPLA with free passage through the country while 
conducting its operations. 
When the LRA was forced to leave northern Uganda in the mid-2000s, it 
first relocated to South Sudan and then moved to Garamba National Park in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Later on, the remnants of the LRA moved 
to and started operating in the Central African Republic (CAR). Because of the 
regionalisation of the LRA problem, the AU formally designated the LRA as 
a terrorist group and authorised the establishment of the Regional Cooperation 
Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) in November 2011 (AU, 
2014). Member countries affected by the LRA, namely Uganda, South Sudan, 
the DRC, and the CAR, contributing to the RCI-LRA, were authorised to conduct 
counter-LRA operations to protect the local people. The mandated strength of the 
RCI-LRA in 2013 was 5,000 troops, with Uganda contributing 2,000, the DRC 
500, South Sudan 500, and the CAR 350 (Dersso, 2014, 61). The RCI-RTF was 
reinforced by United States military advisors. 
So when the South Sudan conflict broke out in December 2013, the UPDF was 
in a position to intervene as a result of long-standing engagements with the SPLA. 
Disagreements in IGAD on Uganda’s unilateral intervention 
Uganda’s military intervention in South Sudan was not welcomed by all IGAD 
countries. The first IGAD summit that was held in late December 2013 in the 
aftermath of Uganda’s intervention neither authorised nor endorsed Uganda’s 
intervention. The summit “commended Uganda’s efforts in securing critical 
infrastructure and installations in South Sudan and pledge[d] its support to these 
efforts” (IGAD, 2013, para. 13). When it was officially announced that Ugandan 
troops were fighting on behalf of South Sudan government forces against the 
rebels, a spokesperson of Ethiopia’s then Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn 
noted that Ugandan troops engaging in combat in South Sudan were “absolutely 
unwarranted” (The Daily Monitor, 2014, 4–14). Kenya, which was holding the 
chair of the EAC, also distanced itself from Uganda’s intervention, with Cabinet 
Secretary Phyllis Kandie noting that “Uganda’s decision to engage militarily in 
South Sudan was political and not supported by the EAC” (South Sudan News 
Agency, 2014). 
The intervention also exacerbated already strained relations between Uganda 
and the Sudan. In 1995, in the wake of failed peace talks between the LRA and the 
Ugandan government, and amid accusations of supporting dissidents in each oth-
er’s country, Uganda and Sudan broke off diplomatic relations (Papa, Mapendere, 
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support for the SPLA with, at one point, the group sharing military facilities with 
the Ugandan army (Omach, 2010, 298). In addition, Ugandan troops made peri-
odic incursions into Sudan in pursuit of the LRA and two other Ugandan rebel 
groups, the West Nile Bank Front and the Uganda National Rescue Front II, and 
also in support of the SPLA (Omach, 2010, 298). 
In 1999, the Sudan–Uganda peace process was initiated, following a request 
for assistance from the Carter Centre (TCC) by Museveni (Papa et al., 2010, 350). 
The process resulted in the signing of the December 1999 Nairobi Agreement 
(Carter Centre, 1999), which resulted in the normalisation of relations between 
the two countries. In March 2002, the government of Sudan allowed the Ugandan 
army to pursue the LRA rebels onto its territory in Operation Iron Fist (OIF). In 
July 2002, the Sudanese president announced his country’s forces would actively 
cooperate in joint military actions with the Ugandan army against the LRA 
(Feldman, 2008, 48). OIF had the effect of uprooting the LRA from its bases in 
South Sudan. The signing of the CPA between the SPLA/M and the Sudan gov-
ernment in 2005 did not result in an end to the involvement of Ugandan troops 
in that part of Sudan. According to LeRiche and Arnold (2012, 204), “during the 
first years of the CPA’s interim period, Uganda was allowed to use its army, the 
UPDF, inside Southern Sudan to conduct counter-insurgency operations against 
the LRA.” 
It is against this background that, at the 28th IGAD Extraordinary Summit 
meeting, Sudan threatened to enter the South Sudan conflict if Uganda did not 
withdraw from there (Foreign Service officer, 2014). The bad blood between 
Uganda and Sudan appears to have been precipitated by the presence in Kampala 
of rebels of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) who were fighting the Khartoum 
government.4 When President Omar al-Bashir requested Museveni to expel the 
SRF, Museveni argued that Bashir should first address the rebels’ problems so 
that Uganda would not have any reason to give them sanctuary (Foreign Service 
officer, 2014). 
Relations between Uganda and Sudan were further strained by the presence 
of rebels opposed to the Khartoum government in South Sudan supported by 
Uganda. In his report of February 2015 on the conflict in South Sudan to the UN 
Security Council, the UN Secretary-General pointed out that the regionalisation 
of the South Sudan conflict had been caused by the presence of a number of 
non-South Sudanese militia groups in the border areas between Sudan and South 
Sudan (Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Unity, and Upper Nile States), including cadres 
belonging to SPLM-North, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA) factions (UN Security Council, 2015, para. 23). 
In December 2014, the national security director of Sudan had warned that,
if required, the government would pursue Sudanese armed groups into South
Sudanese territory (UN Security Council, 2015, para. 23). In February 2015,
Sudanese Vice President Hasabo Mohammed Abdalla visited Uganda and held
talks with President Museveni (New Vision, 2015). Abdalla also met members of
parliament of the ruling NRM party and proposed an exchange of visits between








Uganda and IGAD 167 
the African solidarity and cooperation for the good of the people of the continent”
(New Vision, 2015). In September 2015, Museveni visited Khartoum and held talks
with Bashir (Sudan Tribune, 2015) in the aftermath of the signing of the IGAD-
mediated Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS).
Under the terms of the agreement, Ugandan troops withdrew from South Sudan. 
On the surface, it appears Uganda has patched up its relations with the other 
IGAD members in the aftermath of its unilateral military intervention in South 
Sudan. Even Ethiopia which was initially critical of Uganda’s fighting alongside 
SPLA forces against the rebels appears to have toned down its criticism, with 
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn making a state visit to Uganda (Uganda 
Today, 2017). 
Uganda’s stance towards IGAD 
Conflict in Uganda 
When Museveni took over power in Uganda in January 1986, many rebel groups 
were established to fight his government. While the government militarily 
defeated most of them, the LRA became a hard nut to crack. The LRA leader, 
Joseph Kony, proclaimed himself a messianic prophet and stated that he aimed 
to overthrow the Museveni regime and rule Uganda according to the biblical Ten 
Commandments. At no time during the LRA insurgency, which lasted slightly 
more than 20 years, did IGAD consider intervening to resolve the conflict in 
northern Uganda. Even when the government of Uganda started peace talks with 
the LRA in Juba in June 2006, IGAD was nowhere to be seen. The reason for 
this could be that Uganda argued that it was an internal affair that it had to deal 
with itself.5 But Healy (2009, 12) provides an explanation for IGAD’s no-show 
when she observes that the “authoritarian political culture of the regional leaders, 
militates against organizations [such as IGAD] playing a proactive role in peace 
and security [issues].” 
Membership financial contributions 
Uganda provided the second executive secretary of the IGADD,6 and a number of 
Ugandan nationals have been or are currently part of the staff of the organisation.7 
However, over the years Uganda’s financial contribution to IGAD has been dis-
mal. In fact, in the mid-2000s the organisation quietly refused to recruit Ugandan 
nationals due to the country’s non-payment of its membership dues. By the end 
of 2008, Uganda was one of the member states that had accumulated arrears in 
membership contributions running to millions of US dollars (Apuuli, 2011, 367). 
As of 2016, the financial arrears owed by Uganda had accumulated to over USD 
$8 million (Foreign Service officer, 2016). Uganda’s failure to pay its member-
ship contributions to IGAD is partly explained by the unofficial stance adopted by 
Museveni, who argued that the country should concentrate on building the EAC. 
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Uganda and the East African Community 
The integration of the East Africa region (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) started 
with the building of the Uganda Railway by British colonialists during the second 
half of 1890s. In the subsequent years up to 1961, the political economy of the 
region was integrated, with the establishment of an East African customs union, 
a common market, a single currency, high commission (comprising the colonial 
governors then ruling the three territories), and a common services organisation. 
Following the attainment of independence by the three countries, there was a pro-
posal to establish a federation; but the proposal did not gain traction in Uganda. 
In 1967, the three countries established the EAC, which unfortunately collapsed 
in 1977. While still fighting to capture power, Museveni and his NRM/A put 
the revival of East African integration among the top priorities if they captured 
power. Indeed, at his swearing-in ceremony in January 1986, Museveni observed: 
originally we had an East African market but it was messed up by the 
Excellences and Honourable ministers. It will be a cardinal point in our pro-
gramme to ensure that we encourage co-operation in economic matters, espe-
cially in transport and communication within the East African region. 
(Ugandan Diaspora, 2015) 
Indeed, beginning in the early 1990s, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda embarked 
on the revival of the EAC.8 The EAC Treaty came into force in 2000. Since 
then, a number of institutions have been established including the East African 
Legislative Assembly (EALA), the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), and the 
East African Community Secretariat. These institutions have been given powers 
affecting the member states to varying degrees. 
Museveni has been at the forefront of arguing for the political integration of 
the East African countries. In this regard, in a paper titled “Towards a closer 
cooperation in Africa” (Museveni, 1998), which was published when the draft 
EAC Treaty was being debated, he made a number of arguments suggesting that 
the region should deepen its integration into a political federation. First, he argued 
that economic integration could not take place in a context of political fragmenta-
tion. Thus, East African integration could not reach far since there was a lack of 
political superstructure necessary for the integration process to proceed. Given 
the present economically weak conditions of the regional countries, Museveni 
concluded that no single state could impose discipline on the others by economic 
or other forms of pressure. 
Second, a union would command more defence potential to guard African 
interests against encroachment by foreigners as “the present small African states 
individually, do not possess much defense capacity” (Museveni 1998). 
Thirdly, there were already basic linkages in Africa, in general, and in East 
Africa, in particular, through languages and culture. With regard to language, 
Museveni cited the example of the Luo language, which is spoken by Nilotic peo-
ples, who are found in Kenya, Uganda, Sudan Tanzania, and parts of Ethiopia and 
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and Southern Africa. He further argued that Africa must create a centre of gravity, 
just as the United States is a centre of gravity for Anglo-Saxon–Latin civilisa-
tion. The countries that would establish the initial vanguard of the union would 
be Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, because of the advantage of 
being geographically contiguous and sharing – to a certain degree – a common 
language (Swahili) and culture, he argued. Other countries would be encouraged 
to join, as long as they were geographically contiguous to the union. According 
to Museveni the union would be that of East and Central African states, with 
power being shared between the union government and the national governments. 
While the union government would be responsible for external defence, foreign 
affairs, common market affairs, common services – such as railways, harbours, 
and posts and telecommunications – and scientific research, the national govern-
ments would share responsibility with districts in the areas of justice, education, 
health, internal security, roads, wildlife, tourism, and agriculture, among others. 
Lastly, a union of Central and Eastern Africa states would command more 
respect from the world. For example, “an investor would be more attracted to 
invest in a united East Africa than in just Uganda because of the bigger market the 
former offers” (Museveni, 1998), he argued. 
Since first making the arguments for the integration of the East African region 
in 1998, Museveni has for the last 20 years been amplifying his vision for the 
region. In various speeches, and at different fora, he has made the case for deep-
ening the integration of the region. For example, while addressing the 16th 
COMESA summit meeting in 2012, he observed that “the people of East Africa 
have, for decades, been yearning for an East African Federation that would deal 
with both political and economic integration. This is the ultimate goal of EAC” 
(Museveni, 2012). More recently, Museveni noted that the revival of the EAC had 
created a bigger market for Ugandan products such as milk (Museveni, 2016). 
He added that the bigger market had enabled East Africa “to better negotiate for 
market access to other foreign markets e.g. USA, EU, China, India, Japan, Russia, 
the Gulf, etc. This is where the future of our prosperity lies” (Museveni, 2016). In 
summary, Museveni argued that 
regional integration, especially for the EAC, is crucial because of our strate-
gic security and survival as a free people […] The EAC, in its present state, 
is about the size of India in land area with a population of 160 million people. 
This is a good nucleus for a very powerful, in global terms, African State that 
would be the centre of gravity of the African people’s destiny as free peoples. 
(Museveni, 2016) 
Museveni’s enthusiasm for an integrated East African region has, however, raised 
suspicion about his intentions. For example, his 1998 paper referred to above was 
greeted with consternation at home and in regional capitals. At the time, Ugandan 
troops were preparing to invade the DRC for the second time, having helped 
install Laurent Kabila as president following the 1996–1997 civil war in what was 
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where he awarded medals to then vice president of Kenya Moody Awori, and 
the first president of Tanzania, the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere (Gyezaho and 
Muggaga, 2007; Kalinge-Nnyago, 2007). To some, the road trip was suspicious, 
and they construed it as the start of his campaign to become federal president of 
East Africa (Gyezaho and Muggaga, 2007). In its editorial of 15 July 2007, the 
Daily Nation newspaper of Kenya observed that Museveni’s move was being 
watched with puzzled interest in that country (Daily Nation, 2007). 
In the end, the seeming lack of interest in IGAD by Uganda (Museveni) should 
be seen within the above context. It suffices to note that only the EAC has a clear 
goal in mind for the end product of its integration (i.e. political federation). In 
contrast, IGAD has been struggling to even define its minimum integration plan.9 
Thus, the EAC seems to be more attractive to Uganda (Museveni) than IGAD. 
Conclusion 
Over the years, Uganda has exhibited an ambivalent stance towards IGAD. While 
the organisation afforded Uganda the opportunity to participate in the peace pro-
cesses in Sudan, Somalia, and South Sudan, it played no role in resolving the 
long-running insurgency by the LRA in northern Uganda. This could have dimin-
ished IGAD’s image in the eyes of the Ugandan leadership. 
Uganda has in the past fallen behind in paying its membership contributions 
to IGAD, which resulted in accumulated arrears running into several million US 
dollars. Uganda’s failure to pay is explained firstly by the sentiment expressed by 
Museveni that the organisation is preoccupied with the Ethiopia–Eritrea quarrels 
that Uganda should not be part of; and, secondly, Museveni’s view that Uganda 
should concentrate on building the EAC. On the latter point, it is rumoured that 
Museveni wants an integrated East African region because he wants to lead it. 
Lastly, Uganda’s unilateral military intervention in the South Sudan conflict 
divided IGAD as an organisation. The intervention precipitated criticism of 
Uganda from IGAD members such as Ethiopia and Kenya, while at the same 
exacerbating already strained relations with Sudan. Following the signing of 
the ARCSS in 2015, however, it seems IGAD members have patched up their 
differences. 
Notes 
1 They are: the Nyangatom and Merille of Ethiopia; Toposa and Didinga of South 
Sudan; Pokot and Turkana of Kenya; Jie, Pian, Matheniko, Tepeth, Dodoth, Nyaakwae, 
Bokora, Labwor, and Pokot of Uganda. 
2 The KIDDP harmonises the various development interventions by the government, 
bilateral and multilateral development partners, and international and national non-
governmental and community-based organisations. It represents an attempt by the 
government of Uganda to integrate gun collection (disarmament) with development 
interventions; conflict management; and peace building. 
3 Note that there was no official Ugandan government figure for the number of troops the 
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4 In February 2015, reports started filtering through that Uganda was expelling rebels 
opposed to the Khartoum government from its territory. 
5 See, for example, UN Security Council (2016) detailing the steps the government had 
taken to end the conflict. 
6 Dr David Muduuli was appointed in 1991. 
7 This author was a conflict prevention, management, and resolution advisor at the 
IGAD Secretariat in 2008, and assistant to the IGAD Facilitator for Somalia Peace 
and National Reconciliation in 2009. Other Ugandan nationals employed by IGAD 
included: Dr Were, Translator; Juliet Kamara, Programme Manager for Documentation; 
and Dr Ziiwa, Programme Manager for Agriculture. 
8 The membership of the EAC has increased with Burundi and Rwanda being admitted 
in 2007, and South Sudan in 2016. 
9 The author knows this very well, as in 2008 he was asked to write a position paper on 
the same. 
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13 Peacebuilding in the context 
of Ethiopia–IGAD relations 
Kassahun Berhanu 
Introduction 
During the Cold War, intense superpower rivalry hindered peaceful settlement of 
conflicts intractable on the African continent generally. However, since the end 
of the Cold War, hope has risen that conflicts in the region would be resolved 
through forging cooperation and sustained partnership among stakeholders. 
According to de Waal (2007, 1), extricating the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) region out of a predicament characterised by an absence 
of peace calls for credible and sustained democratisation, resolution of intra-state 
conflicts, a stable inter-state order, autonomous and capable institutions, and 
benevolent engagement in peacebuilding. The end of the protracted conflicts that 
had ravaged Ethiopia and Somalia and the termination of prolonged armed insur-
gencies in Eritrea and Sudan from the early to mid-1990s gave the initial impres-
sion that the logic of mutual intervention-cum-destabilisation could be done away 
with through fostering possibilities for a concerted and institutionalised mecha-
nism for conflict management. This was bolstered by IGAD’s expanded mandate 
for dealing with outstanding issues surrounding peaceful settlement of recurrent 
intra- and inter-state conflicts that rocked the fabric of societal life in several 
member countries. Emerging new developments, notwithstanding, opportunities 
that paved the way for developing a common security framework, which was 
expected to entrench stability and overall normalcy, were not captured and taken 
advantage of for a variety of reasons. These included the 1998–2000 border con-
flict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the persistent absence of peace in Somalia 
which subsequently entailed Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention. As a consequence, 
the vacuum that resulted from the subsiding superpower rivalry has now spurred 
competition between state actors who pursued divergent and contradictory aspi-
rations that affected the workings of IGAD. Ethiopia was foremost among those 
endeavouring to exert their influence on IGAD’s mode of executing its conflict 
resolution mandate. 
Conflicts that affect Ethiopia easily assume regional dimensions and often get 
internationalised. The ongoing conflict in Somalia between the Somali Federal 
Government (SFG) and Islamist insurgents has implications for Ethiopia’s role 
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disaffected protagonists from the Somali civil war, who suspect Ethiopia’s inten-
tions are driven by ulterior motives and self-interest. The prevailing situation 
in Somalia, underpinned by polarisation among Somali belligerents, entailed 
Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention in 2006. The intervention put Ethiopia at log-
gerheads with Somali Islamist insurgents and prompted Eritrea to view Ethiopia’s 
stance as doing the bidding of extra-regional powers such as the United States 
(US), bent on influencing developments in the Horn of Africa to their liking. 
Eritrea’s disposition, in this regard, became highly visible following its 1998– 
2000 unresolved boundary conflict with Ethiopia. It is to be recalled that the 
regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea pursued policies aimed at weakening each other 
by resorting to mutual and reciprocal subversion and forging alliances presumed 
to promote their respective goals. This was to be changed. 
In April 2018, a change of leadership occurred in Ethiopia sparked by months 
of resilient youth uprising. The new leadership conducted sweeping politi-
cal changes in the country. These changes included declaring general amnesty, 
releasing prisoners, allowing political parties to operate freely, allowing rebel 
movements that were declared terrorist to return and operate as legal political 
parties, and easing restrictions on internet, media, gathering, demonstration, etc. 
These internal changes were reinforced by changes in external relations. The most 
significant change in external relation occurred in Ethiopia–Eritrea relations. The 
new leader extended an olive branch to archenemy Eritrea that received posi-
tive response from the latter. The Prime Minister announced that his government 
accepted and would implement the Algiers Agreement entirely and uncondition-
ally and appealed to the Eritrean government to accept his invitation and end the 
state of war that existed between the countries for the previous 20 years. The 
positive response from the Eritrean side led to visits by leaders of the two coun-
tries and the signing of the Ethiopia–Eritrean rapprochement in July 2018. The 
agreement’s central five points are: 
1. The state of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has come to an end. A new era 
of peace and friendship has been opened; 
2. The two governments will endeavor to forge intimate political, economic, 
social, cultural and security cooperation that serves and advances the vital 
interests of their peoples; 
3. Transport, trade and communications links between the two countries will 
resume; diplomatic ties and activities will restart; 
4. The decision on the boundary between the two countries will be implemented; 
5. Both countries will jointly endeavor to ensure regional peace, development 
and cooperation. 
(Joint Declaration 2018) 
The agreement was a game-changer in the region. The Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict 
was perceived to be the epicentre of conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The verac-
ity of the perception was evidenced in the rapid changes in the inter-state rela-






trilateral Somalia–Ethiopia–Eritrea agreement. Eritrea and Somalia renewed their 
diplomatic relation. The president of Djibouti and Eritrea met for the first time in 
ten years. Generally, it could be said, a reconfiguration of relations took place in 
the Horn of Africa. Yet, serious challenges remain to be addressed. One of these 
challenges pertain to the Ethiopia–Eritrea border issue. The flashpoint of the war, 
the village of Badme, remains under Ethiopian control, casting a dark shadow on 
the rapprochement. A great hope is placed on the Ethiopia–Eritrea rapprochement 
that it will revitalise IGAD thereby contributing to security, peace, regional inte-
gration, and development in the region. 
This chapter examines relations between Ethiopia and IGAD and their ramifi-
cations for peacebuilding in the sub-region. Based on a review of relevant second-
ary sources, an attempt is made to address the following issues that are in line with 
the theme under study: 
·· The implications of IGAD’s failure to dissuade Ethiopia and some member 
states from making unilateral interventions in conflict situations in the sub-
region in a manner that undermines concerted efforts aimed at entrenching 
peace and security; 
·· The impact of Ethiopia’s assertive stances and roles in the activities of IGAD 
on the efficacy and credibility of the organisation; and 
·· An exploration of the means and ways through which Ethiopia can ensure 
trust and acceptance as a potentially genuine agent of peace in the sub-region 
in the eyes of IGAD member states. 
Major trajectories of Ethiopia–IGAD relations in peacebuilding 
IGAD has embarked on several peacebuilding initiatives in recent years to resolve 
conflicts between countries that include Eritrea and Ethiopia, and within member 
states such as Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan. Nevertheless, the complexity of 
conflicts in the sub-region and disagreements over a range of issues among the 
mainstream actors in IGAD have tended to undermine the organisation’s potential 
capacity in terms of promoting an agenda for comprehensive peace (El-Affendi, 
2001). The failed Somali reconciliation process sponsored by Djibouti in 2001, 
flaws that underpin the mediation process in Sudan and South Sudan, and the 
stalemate between Eritrea and Ethiopia over the contested boundary issue, all of 
which IGAD is involved in to varying degrees, are cases in point in this regard. 
Taking note of the aforementioned and other similar factors militating against 
conflict resolution efforts, Samatar and Manchaka (2006, 51) argue that the qual-
ity of leadership and system of governance prevalent in each member country are 
important elements in dealing effectively with lack of peace at local, national, and 
regional levels. This is stated on the presumption that peacebuilding efforts in the 
geographic area where the IGAD region is located could be advanced only through 
stewardship of effective and legitimate political regimes that are ready to act in 
concert to attain shared goals pertaining to peacebuilding. Hence, peacebuilding 
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legitimate interests of societies that are adversely affected by the outcomes of 
conflict episodes. The question then is whether political regimes in the IGAD sub-
region, including Ethiopia, qualify as ones that are endowed with such attributes 
that could enable them to meaningfully contribute to peacebuilding efforts either 
by themselves or working in tandem with IGAD as a collective entity. For exam-
ple, in spite of the potential strength that the Ethiopian government commands, a 
number of evolving developments1 have tended to make achieving the wellbeing 
and legitimate interests of societies unrealistic, and labelling the peacebuilding 
efforts effective and acceptable impossible. 
If the core area of the Horn of Africa is limited to constituting IGAD member 
countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, Ethiopia’s significance 
would be considerable when viewed in terms of territorial and population size, 
and military prowess. Theoretically, the country’s endowments in these terms 
could present it as a potentially dominant actor that could influence developments 
in the region. In practice, however, this may not be easy to attain given a plethora 
of factors that militate against stabilisation efforts taking place in the Horn of 
Africa. Notably, the IGAD region comprises states whose borders are often con-
tested and intra- and inter-state conflicts persist. According to Kłosowicz (2015), 
Ethiopia stands as a formidable actor in the Horn of Africa, in general, and the 
IGAD sub-region, in particular, due to the aforementioned factors. This is but-
tressed by the wide recognition it enjoys resulting from its proactive engagement 
in regional and continental peacekeeping2 and the fast economic growth that it has 
registered during the past decade. It is also worth noting that Ethiopia is viewed as 
one of the most important international actors in the region, particularly following 
the arrival on the scene of an urge to combat terrorism and Islamist extremism. As 
a result, it enjoys the backing of Western powers, notably the European Union and 
the US, as allies in the fight against forces labelled as extremists, whose drivers 
are taken as inimical to the overriding interests of powerful actors in the interna-
tional system. 
Nonetheless, Ethiopia has not qualified yet to emerge as a regional hegemon 
in the same fashion as others, such as Nigeria and South Africa, which are influ-
encing peacebuilding initiatives in their own sub-regional organisations, like the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), respectively. Nevertheless, apart from 
its role as one of those who facilitated IGAD’s formation, Ethiopia plays signifi-
cant roles in the organisation’s major activities in the area of conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding. This is propelled by a number of factors that are also driven 
by self-interest: the country’s sharing of boundaries with all IGAD member coun-
tries (except Uganda); the perpetual simmering of intra- and inter-state conflicts 
in a number of IGAD countries, with the potential of spilling over across com-
mon borders; contested security issues shaping Ethiopia’s relations with member 
countries such as Somalia and Eritrea; and ongoing domestic conflicts between 
the government and a plethora of insurgent groups of varying persuasions. Hence 
Ethiopia–IGAD relations need to be examined taking all the above-mentioned 





Ethiopia’s role in peacebuilding and inter-
state relations within IGAD 
As mentioned, conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa have often posed chal-
lenges in the quest for potential candidates to assume a hegemonic position in 
the IGAD region. Conflicts in the sub-region are often interlinked, as a result of 
which security interdependence is viewed as an overriding imperative. In the con-
text of the prevalent complex conflict system that characterises the state of affairs 
in the IGAD sub-region, smaller state actors often attempt to forge alliances and 
counter-alliances by supporting proxies opposed to the regime in Ethiopia, with 
a view to challenging its aspiration to qualify as a dominant player (Dehez, 2008, 
10). In this connection, Ethiopia’s relations with a number of member countries 
following the revitalisation of IGADD in 1996 are worth considering in arriving 
at an understanding of its role in peacebuilding in the region. 
It is to be recalled that Ethiopia fought two full-scale wars against the irredentist 
moves of neighbouring Somalia (in 1963–1964 and in 1977–1978) and Eritrea (in 
1998–2000). In December 2006, Ethiopia deployed armed contingents in Somalia 
to defend the beleaguered TFG from impending threats from the UIC, which cul-
minated in the emergence of the radical Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab. 
At the same time, Ethiopia has been active in working towards resolution of the 
post-1991 conflict in Somalia, as signified by its hosting of successive peace con-
ferences bringing together different parties to the conflict. Despite security threats 
from insurgent groups in Somalia, Ethiopia has persistently endeavoured to ensure 
stability in that country in anticipation that a friendly group could assume power 
and spearhead the process of reinstituting a responsible government. It is to be 
recalled that following Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention in Somalia in December 
2006, the security situation in Mogadishu deteriorated sharply as Islamist insur-
gents mobilised against the Ethiopian presence. Ethiopia responded with massive 
military operations, which US-based Human Rights Watch (2007) claims resulted 
in the killing of hundreds of people and displacement of tens of thousands. 
At the height of turbulence in the failed state, hundreds of thousands of refu-
gees from Somalia found a safe haven in Ethiopia. Amid the intensified extremist 
threat against its security in the mid-2000s originating from Somalia, the Ethiopian 
government embarked on a military intervention in December 2006 to rescue the 
TFG from being unseated by the UIC, which controlled several territories. This 
intervention culminated in the ousting of the UIC, which was forced to abandon 
most of the areas under its control, thereby paving the way for the TFG to move 
to the capital Mogadishu (Kidist, 2008). The issue then is whether Ethiopia could 
be viewed as a neutral actor in mediating peacebuilding in Somalia, in the face of 
its partisan position favouring some factions at the expense of others that remain 
disaffected by its unilateral intervention. 
It should also be noted that the response of IGAD member countries to the 
emergence of the UIC as a de facto and effective power in Somalia diverged. 
While Sudan and Djibouti were implicitly supportive of the UIC’s ascendance, 
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intensely apprehensive of its (TFG’s) leverage as a belligerent to be reckoned 
with. It is also worth mentioning that the UIC also gambled when it threatened 
to wage jihad against Ethiopia and called for the return of Somali-inhabited 
parts of Ethiopia to Somalia. In doing so, it provided Ethiopia with the excuse to 
militarily intervene. Though the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in December 
2006 was “legitimised” by the invitation of the weak TFG, the UIC’s preponder-
ance prompted a feeling in Ethiopian and Western policy circles that if Somalia 
remained under the control of this group, foreign Al-Qaeda operatives could use 
it as a base for embarking on terrorist activities that were detrimental to their 
interests (Bryden, 2007, 16). Moreover, Ethiopia’s quick military victory over 
the UIC did not translate into political victory, as its radical wing, Al-Shabaab, 
continued to wage guerrilla warfare against Ethiopia, TFG forces, and AU con-
tingents deployed at a later stage. Concurrently, the TFG, which had survived 
the UIC’s onslaught, was affected by endless internal divisions over political 
power, thereby rendering Ethiopia’s peacebuilding position in Somalia precari-
ous. Menkhaus (2007) observed that Islamist insurgency grew in violence and 
popularity as a manifestation of a nationalist reaction to what was portrayed as 
Ethiopian occupation. 
The subsequent resistance of Al-Shabaab, in Somalia as well as the 1998–2000 
Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict, and the continued engagement of the two in proxy wars, 
is evidence of instances where smaller and weaker states and non-state actors, 
either separately or working in tandem, strive to counterbalance Ethiopia’s desire 
to influence developments in the region (Kidist, 2014). Another round of Ethiopian 
military intervention in 2011 boosted prospects for peacebuilding in Somalia by 
pushing Al-Shabaab from its main strongholds. Reportedly, the Ethiopian Air 
Force inflicted serious damage on Al-Shabaab forces, which resulted in the libera-
tion of a number of rural areas and urban centres in south-central Somalia where 
local administrations were formed in the localities abandoned by the insurgents 
(The East African, 2012). However, progress in this regard appears to be slow and 
reverses have at times been experienced. In light of this, Ethiopia’s peacebuilding 
efforts in the country seem unlikely to materialise in the short run. 
Following the outbreak of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, the 
two countries continued to engage in proxy wars, not only in and around their com-
mon borders but also in other areas such as Somalia and reportedly South Sudan. 
It is alleged that Eritrea even went to the extent of supporting militant Islamist 
Somali groups such as Al-Shabaab in their bid to undermine Ethiopia’s influ-
ence, anticipating that it could take advantage of any weakening of its adversary 
resulting therefrom. That is why Eritrea was designated as a “regional spoiler” 
that sought to take advantage of any possible Ethiopian fragility in the Somali 
conflict. In this connection, it should be remembered that the Eritrean regime also 
supported the formation of a Somali opposition group known as the Alliance for 
the Re-Liberation of Somalia in the aftermath of the 2006 Ethiopian intervention 
(Clapham, 2007) in the name of supporting the TFG, which was recognised by the 
UN, the AU, and IGAD. According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and 






2005 onwards, reaching a peak prior to Ethiopia’s intervention. Hence, two IGAD 
member states were actively engaged in undermining the IGAD peace process. 
According to Healy (2008, 14), Eritrea in particular found it difficult to accept 
the reality on the ground regarding its weak international standing compared with 
the position that its adversary, Ethiopia, enjoyed. It is to be recalled that ever since 
the independent state of Eritrea was founded in the early 1990s, in general, and 
following the outbreak of the 1998 Ethiopia–Eritrea war, in particular, the country 
became one of the few most populous countries without access to the sea. This 
became one of the determinants of the country’s foreign policy, driven by the urge 
to secure port services (Tafesse, 2009, 15–16). By way of reciprocating Eritrea’s 
belligerent stance on a wide range of issues, the Ethiopian regime repeatedly 
vowed to pursue a tougher policy towards Eritrea. This was concretely expressed 
by supporting the Eritrean opposition, which aspired to effect regime change, 
which Eritrea likewise reciprocated. By and large, there has been no change for 
the better in relations between the two countries; and the internal conflict in South 
Sudan is becoming a new area of rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Plaut, 
2013). Healy (2008) is of the view that IGAD remained powerless to convince 
Ethiopia and Eritrea to normalise relations or implement a peace settlement on 
the basis of adhering to the 2000 Algiers Agreement that established the EEBC, 
whose rulings on the contested boundary issue were to be final and binding. 
Intense mutual hostility between the two countries continued to adversely impact 
on regional relations and exacerbate other conflicts. As a result, the situation 
became a key obstacle to any progress towards developing an improved regional 
security framework. Eritrea, disillusioned by IGAD’s indifference in inducing 
Ethiopia to adhere to the terms of the Algiers Agreement and its subservience 
to Ethiopia’s unilateral intervention in Somalia, announced the suspension of its 
membership of IGAD in 2007. 
Ethiopia–Sudan relations between the mid-1990s and 1998 were far from 
amicable and cordial. Ethiopia accused Sudan on various occasions of exporting 
Islamic radicalism, which it presented as the greatest security threat to stability in 
the country. This prompted Ethiopia to respond by enhancing its support of the 
rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, joining Eritrea and Uganda in 
a US-led coalition of frontline states against Sudan (Shinn, 2004, 6). During the 
period in question, Ethiopia and Eritrea were among the few African states the 
US identified as major post-Cold War partners on the continent. The animosity 
that characterised Ethiopia–Sudan relations thus adversely impacted on IGAD’s 
peacebuilding initiatives and Ethiopia’s proactive engagement in the organisa-
tion’s activities. Ethiopia and Eritrea contributed troops and artillery that were 
transported to join the Ugandan contingent aimed at boosting operations to attack 
Sudanese government defence forces (Asnake, 2015). 
It was amid this that the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict erupted on 12 May 1998. 
This was at a time when the Sudanese government was seeking opportunities 
to improve its relations with Ethiopia in particular. Meanwhile, however, both 
Ethiopia and Eritrea were striving to curry Sudan’s favour in anticipation of 
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the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict were forced to relax their previously hard-line posi-
tion against Sudan in order to at least neutralise its stance against them. On top of 
this, the Ethiopian government, having become extremely occupied by its dispute 
with Eritrea, could not devote much time and energy to settling issues with Sudan. 
The new developments in Ethiopia–Eritrea relations are thus believed to have 
served as a turning point in easing and ultimately normalising Ethiopia–Sudan 
relations. 
Ethiopia and Djibouti, whose bilateral relations are largely cordial and ami-
cable, got into a row over the outcomes of the Arta Conference in 2000, alleg-
edly sponsored by Egypt, resulting in the formation of Somalia’s short-lived 
Transitional National Government in 2001. Nevertheless, Ethiopia–Djibouti rela-
tions remained intact due to a number of factors including geographic contiguity, 
common affinity, close economic cooperation, and the alleged threats posed by 
their common enemy, the Eritrean regime. 
The turbulence and bloodletting caused by conflict between different factions 
of South Sudan’s leadership around the end of 2013 appears to have resulted in 
divergent interests among IGAD member states, including Ethiopia. According 
to IRIN (2014), although Ethiopia’s economic interests in South Sudan are less 
pronounced than those of Uganda and Kenya, it has security and strategic interests 
that could be best served by resolution of the underlying causes that led to the 
fighting in the new polity. Ethiopia has enough on its hands dealing with problems 
in Somalia on its eastern border and hence is keen to avoid the same thing hap-
pening in another adjacent locality in the west. It is worth noting in this regard 
that Ethiopia’s western border region of Gambella is home to the same ethnic 
groups that inhabit South Sudan. Among these are the Nuer, who are purport-
edly supporting opposition leader Riek Machar’s faction in the struggle against 
Kiir’s group, which controls the government in South Sudan. Hence, Ethiopia’s 
concern in this regard is understandable given that some of its citizens could pro-
vide support or shelter to South Sudanese rebels or even join the fight. Moreover, 
the 2013 conflict in South Sudan has already produced more than 60,000 refu-
gees (currently reaching hundreds of thousands), who fled to Ethiopia across their 
shared border. 
There are allegations that Eritrea and Sudan are covertly providing support 
to South Sudanese opposition forces, whereas Uganda has openly intervened on 
the side of the Kiir regime, deploying armed contingents. Ethiopia claimed to 
be neutral3 and embarked on mediation efforts under the auspices of IGAD in 
the course of which it has emphatically called on Uganda to withdraw its troops. 
The Ethiopian prime minister, in his capacity as current chair of IGAD, also 
publicly demanded that Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni should withdraw 
the troops he unilaterally deployed in South Sudan in support of the government 
(Daily Nation, 2014). For its part, Uganda indirectly responded to this by stating 
that it was concerned with the possibility of rebel group the Lord’s Resistance 
Army taking advantage of state failure in South Sudan to continue with its armed 
insurgency against the Museveni regime. It is, therefore, envisaged that unhealthy 




competition, which could complicate the role of IGAD, in general, and Ethiopia, in 
particular, in brokering a peace agreement in South Sudan. Moreover, Ethiopia’s 
neutrality in the conflict could be questioned by the Kiir regime, rendering the 
acceptance of Ethiopia as a genuine mediator susceptible to mistrust due to the 
latter’s insistence on withdrawal of Ugandan support. 
Misgivings in Ethiopia’s peacebuilding initiatives 
Ethiopia’s proactive involvement in IGAD’s activities pertaining to peacebuild-
ing in the sub-region is perceived by some as aimed at promoting self-interest 
to the detriment of others. This perception is prompted by a host of factors that 
include its holding of the position of chair of IGAD and the IGAD Executive 
Council since 2008. Ethiopia’s perpetuation as IGAD’s chair was precipitated, 
among other things, by the international isolation of President Omar al-Bashir 
of Sudan, resulting from his indictment by the International Criminal Court, and 
continued instability in Somalia and South Sudan. Other IGAD members, such 
as Eritrea, view this as part of a trend, with the organisation increasingly becom-
ing an arm for expediting Ethiopia’s foreign policy and increasingly subservi-
ent to doing Ethiopia’s bidding. Such a trend also seems to have strengthened 
existing mistrust and scepticism among other members, compounded by asso-
ciated occurrences such as Ethiopian nationals successively holding leadership 
positions in IGAD’s Peace and Security Division; and the location of different 
agencies of the organisation – the Peace and Security Division, the Conflict Early 
Warning and Response Mechanism, the Facilitator’s Office for Somalia, and the 
IGAD Parliamentary Union – in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. Moreover, 
the appointment of Ethiopia’s ex-foreign minister, Seyoum Mesfin, as IGAD’s 
special envoy to lead the mediation between South Sudan’s warring factions may 
have fuelled existing apprehension regarding Ethiopia’s role. It is widely believed 
that all these factors give Ethiopia leverage to exert considerable influence as 
regards regional security matters, including peacebuilding, within the framework 
of the organisation.
In view of the fact that no member country has yet managed to single-hand-
edly play dominant and hegemonic roles in IGAD, there exists implicit competi-
tion between Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya, each of which commands different 
strengths and comparative advantages in various areas. Ethiopia’s military action 
in 2006 to oust the UIC and its subsequent engagement against Al-Shabaab dem-
onstrate that it harbours undeclared ambitions to behave as a regional hegemon 
by deploying peacekeepers to trouble spots in the sub-region under the auspices 
of either international and continental (UN and AU) or sub-regional (IGAD) ini-
tiatives. These actions imply that Ethiopia continues to be an influential actor in 
IGAD’s peacebuilding efforts by making use of its multifaceted leverages. 
It is also worth noting that Ethiopia is mistakenly perceived to be a Christian 
enclave despite its population comprising a large number of Muslim citizens. 
This has led to Ethiopia’s acceptance as a dominant regional power by Muslim-
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above-discussed reservations on the part of other IGAD members regarding the 
role of Ethiopia are further exacerbated by the disposition of extra-regional actors 
such as Egypt, which enjoys intimate relations with IGAD member countries such 
as Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and some Somali factions that view Ethiopia’s peace-
building initiatives warily. Worthy of note in this regard is that Egypt is obsessed 
with a belief that an unstable and weakened Ethiopia is a sine qua non for main-
taining the status quo in respect of the utilisation of the water from the River Nile, 
to which Ethiopia is opposed (Kidist, 2014). 
Another factor that poses challenges to Ethiopia’s peacebuilding role within 
the framework of IGAD pertains to dual and conflicting membership of several 
member states in other regional organisations. Of the eight current IGAD mem-
bers, Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan are also members of the East African 
Community (EAC), while Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti hold membership in the 
Arab League. As a result, IGAD members have competing loyalties and areas 
of focus. Ethiopia is one of the very few IGAD member countries that does not 
belong to other regional groupings, which partly explains why it was at the fore-
front of the few that endeavoured to ensure the revitalisation of IGADD in 1996. 
In light of the foregoing, it could be argued that the foreign policy issues with 
which Ethiopia is grappling in the short and medium terms are closely tied up with 
its interests in a manner that could relegate its contribution to IGAD’s peacebuild-
ing initiatives to the background. The problem in Somalia; the intra-state conflict 
in South Sudan; a border dispute over the oil-rich Abyei area located between 
Sudan and South Sudan; the controversy surrounding the utilisation of the Nile 
waters, particularly in relation to Egypt; the quest for a secure and sustained 
access to ports in Djibouti, Somaliland, and Kenya; and the persistent standoff 
with Eritrea (Asnake, 2015) are some of the primary areas with which Ethiopia’s 
foreign policy direction is primarily concerned. Hence, there is a need for Ethiopia 
to actively strive to foster trust and nurture a sense of common belonging among 
IGAD member states. This serves as an entry point to induce a collective endeav-
our to transform the sub-regional organisation into a viable institution that could 
broker peace with relative ease and convenience. Expediting peacebuilding ven-
tures in this manner calls for sincere engagement that is free from exerting undue 
influence aimed at attaining short-term objectives that militate against the efficacy 
and credibility of ongoing efforts of peacebuilding. Short of this, perceived and 
actual scepticism of Ethiopia’s role on the part of those affected due to a pleth-
ora of short-sighted manoeuvrings by Ethiopia would likely result in weakening 
IGAD, which does not benefit anyone in the long run. 
Concluding remarks 
The IGAD region continues to be rocked by instability, despite relative improve-
ments experienced in recent years. There is widespread crisis propelled by conflicts 
in the different member countries, including Ethiopia itself, which is compounded 
by soured relations between the regime in power and other IGAD members. As 







feeding into each other and assuming sub-regional, regional, and international 
dimensions. The maxim “My enemy’s enemy is my friend” has often shaped 
intra- and inter-state politics in the Horn of Africa. This appears still to be very 
much at work in a manner that is reminiscent of the state of affairs during the Cold 
War era. By and large, such a mindset among political regimes in the sub-region 
is bound to render futile efforts aimed at peacebuilding and drives towards politi-
cal and socio-economic transformation. As things stand, the absence of peace and 
stability in individual countries is mainly driven by the imperatives of regime 
perpetuation and survival that tend to preoccupy state actors in the sub-region, 
with the resultant effect of often deploying the energy, focus, and resources of 
member countries in a manner that shapes the direction of their engagements and 
interventions. By and large, such dispositions have proved inimical to expedit-
ing peacebuilding initiatives that are underway. Hopefully, the rapprochement 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea will contribute to a better peace, stability, regional 
integration, and development. 
The unabated persistence of complexities and intricacies surrounding peace-
building ventures that characterise the existing state of affairs in the sub-region 
has the propensity to make Ethiopia’s contribution to the peaceful settlement of 
conflicts on the domestic front and beyond a daunting task. It is believed that 
developments experienced in this regard are underpinned by the entrenchment of 
mistrust and scepticism caused by the quest to enhance vested interests to the det-
riment of other stakeholders and protagonists. Under the prevailing circumstances 
in the IGAD sub-region, what is in store during the years to come is uncertain, 
given the aspects of change and continuity that surround the dynamic nature of 
conflicts and alignment and realignment of forces in the Horn of Africa. There is 
no doubt that Ethiopia is one of the key players in terms of spearheading peace-
building initiatives in the IGAD sub-region and beyond, due to leverage that it 
commands. However, building sustainable peace can be successful only under 
conditions characterised by enhanced trust, and by proven acceptance and legiti-
mation of its role. It is hoped that progress will be made in this regard that enables 
stakeholders to erase doubts and misconceptions that ulterior motives and self-
aggrandisement constitute the drivers behind Ethiopia’s interventions in resolving 
conflicts under the auspices of IGAD. 
Notes 
1 By the Ethiopian government’s own admission, emerging trends of governance failure, 
corruption, intergroup rivalry, communal unrest, and the taking shape of a legitimacy 
crisis could undermine prospects for its effectiveness. 
2 Since the mid-1990s, Ethiopia has deployed peacekeeping missions in conflict-rid-
den countries in the IGAD sub-region (Sudan, Somalia, South Sudan), East Africa 
(Rwanda, Burundi), and West Africa (Liberia). 
3 The government of South Sudan reportedly questioned Ethiopia’s neutrality and 
requested the peace talks be moved to Kenya (Daily Nation, 2015). It was also reported 
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14 The big elephant in the room 
The meddling and machinations of IGAD and 
Ethiopia in Somalia 
Mohamed Haji Ingiriis 
Introduction 
The Horn of Africa is probably the most challenging region for close cooperation
between neighbouring states due to various lateral layers of prolonged armed
conflicts, continual political contestations, and chronic intra- and inter-state
military confrontations. Sudanese scholar Abdelwahab El-Affendi has boldly
asserted that “the Horn of Africa is not the best area for testing the potential of
regional co-operation” (El-Affendi, 2001, 581). Relations between Horn of Africa
countries have been overshadowed by long-term conflicts between Somalia and
Ethiopia on one hand and Eritrea and Ethiopia on the other. Any cooperation
between the Horn countries has been particularly and profoundly hampered by
the fact that Somalia remains a battleground for Ethiopia and Eritrea. Only when
those two countries come to a peaceful resolution of their differences can peace
return to Somalia and elsewhere in the sub-region. Ethiopia, with the assistance
of the United States (US), acts as a regional partner in the Western project of the
“war on terror.” In contrast, Eritrea holds another perspective shared by Egypt
and several Arab states, based on their view of Somalia’s geostrategic value as a
potential partner in the Horn regarding resistance to Ethiopian domination. Not
only Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt, but also Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan have fol-
lowed Somalia in applying closer scrutiny to protecting their security and strate-
gic interests in the Horn. 
Ever since the collapse of the central Somali state structures in 1991, the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played a critical role 
in the reconciliation processes in post-Cold War Somalia. With mixed feelings 
about whether it is a hindrance or offers help (Healy, 2015), IGAD’s involve-
ment has been politicised and is popularly considered locally as having much 
more destructive long-term political consequences than any other regional organ-
isation. Previous scholarship has not sufficiently shown how the expansion of 
IGAD has contributed to the regional political projects and security strategies 
concerning Somalia. Some have examined IGAD’s role in the Sudan and South 
Sudan (Abbink, 2003; Apuuli, 2015; Tekle, 2010), as well as its role in Somalia 
and Sudan (Malito and Ylönen, 2013; Murithi, 2009). As in West Africa, where 
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(ECOWAS) military mission in Liberia, Ethiopia laboured to lead the IGAD 
political (and military) project in Somalia. Even as Nigeria, blamed for its hegem-
onic interest in ECOWAS (Adibe, 1997; Aning, 1999; Ofuatey‐Kodjoe, 1994), 
has shaped the course of ECOWAS’s activities, Ethiopia endeavoured to own the 
IGAD mission in the Horn. 
IGAD and Ethiopia became two intertwined political power machines and 
the organisation has become an instrument for Ethiopian rulers to resolve their 
security concerns in Somalia and secure predominance in the Horn. Under the 
banner of IGAD, Ethiopian rulers have heavily influenced – and continue to influ-
ence – the regional political space to by seeking to establish remote-controlled 
states in Somalia and Eritrea. During the Cold War, the role of IGAD in Somalia 
was limited to the development sector, but since the total collapse of a unitary 
national Somali state it has broadened its mandate and added a political compo-
nent. Although the name of IGAD has not been used in the Ethiopian military 
interventions in Somalia, Ethiopia has managed to project itself as a hegemonic 
regional power through IGAD. The pursuit of hegemonic regional power in the 
Horn by current rulers in Ethiopia is intensely contested by Eritrea, Somalia, and 
Sudan. Examining Ethiopian foreign policies since the regime of Mengistu Halie 
Mariam illustrates how IGAD as a regional organisation has become useful to 
Ethiopian rulers in legitimising their involvement in peacebuilding projects in 
Somalia and South Sudan. Reflecting on international relations and political sci-
ence theories that suggest “shared sovereignty” (Krasner, 2004, 2005) is neces-
sary for the reconstruction of post-conflict countries; it is not unusual that the 
relationship between Somalia and IGAD has recently transformed into a patron– 
client relationship. 
This chapter addresses the changing relationship between Somalia and IGAD 
from a new perspective. It seeks to understand the interplay between the politics 
of peacebuilding, the lenses of regional power dynamics from which the notion 
of hegemony cannot be taken out. The chapter approaches the concept of shared 
sovereignty from a regional perspective, defining the IGAD mission in Somalia 
as a politically contingent hegemony marred by contestation and conflict that 
serves Ethiopian interests in Somalia. To unpack these complex dynamics beyond 
IGAD as an organisation, the chapter critically evaluates how Ethiopian interests 
in Somalia have overtaken the IGAD political project in the country. The chapter 
traces the unexplored issue of Ethiopia as a regional actor and its intrusion into 
Somali affairs through an empirical analysis, using the politics of peacebuilding in 
the IGAD regional organisation as a lens through which it is possible to approach 
the question of hegemonic power in post-Cold War Africa (Bamfo, 2010; Seifert, 
2008). By specifically analysing the regional political dynamics, new insights into 
the nature of recurrent conflict in the Horn are gained by assessing the extent to 
which Ethiopia remains a riparian state which cannot be isolated from the aus-
pices of IGAD. Drawing on ethnographic historical research in Somalia, as well 
as interviews with senior Somali government officials and IGAD sources, this 
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Ethiopianisation in the name of IGAD 
With the immediacy and imminent adoption of an instrument of power, what do 
we consider “regional power” to mean in the Horn of Africa sub-region? Given 
the long territorial disputes within the region (Keller, 1991; Yuusuf, 1976), Kenya 
and Ethiopia have succeeded in advancing their interests more than other coun-
tries, despite their contested neighbourliness with Somalia. Each has preserved 
– and continues to preserve – its own interest in Somalia peace projects through 
close cooperation, to lead such processes for its own benefit. The two common 
factors and features of recent Somali reconciliation projects are internal politics 
and external intervention. As Apuuli (2010, 277) observed, 
every peace initiative in Somalia has been carefully watched by immedi-
ate and far-afield neighbours to make sure that any Somali administration 
that emerges does not damage their interests. Efforts to rebuild the Somali 
state have thus been marred by both brutal internal opportunists and external 
actors who can act as spoilers. 
It was within this contrapuntal context that, in June 1991, Djibouti organised the 
first reconciliation conference for Somalia without involving other Horn of Africa 
countries. Barely two years later, Ethiopia, in partnership with the United Nations 
(UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), hosted another conference 
for Somalia, with the involvement of the international community. In the name 
of IGAD, Ethiopia has organised – and continues to organise – numerous peace 
conferences for Somalia and for Sudan and South Sudan. 
The existence of IGAD, albeit remote from regional political dynamics, helped
Ethiopia ensure the protection for its interests in Somalia. In the 1980s, IGAD was
formed at a time Somalia was going through a brutal (un)civil war between the
military regime and armed resistance groups. IGAD was not initially an effective
organisation capable of politically and militarily intervening in Somalia when the
central state disintegrated in 1991. The end of the Cold War led to a change of
military regimes in Somalia and Ethiopia. Both countries underwent a process of
political upheaval: the dictatorial regimes of Mohamed Siad Barre and Mengistu
were forcefully overthrown in 1991, in January and May, respectively. The politi-
cal transition that Ethiopia went through was profoundly distinct from Somalia’s:
while Ethiopia was “saved” by the West (Orizio and Bardoni, 2001), in Somalia,
a seamless progression of violence followed Siad Barre’s ouster (Ingiriis, 2016a).
Like Liberia, Somalia became a “forgotten country” fighting a “forgotten war”
(West Africa, cited in Aning, 1999, 336). This meant that, where Ethiopia evaded
outside interference in maintaining its statehood, Somalia was drawn into a long
process of peacebuilding and state-building projects initiated from outside. The US
assisted in tense transitional peacebuilding processes in Ethiopia, which saw the
safe departure of Mengistu from Addis Ababa. The US never attempted to facili-
tate mediation between Siad Barre and the Somali armed movements, as it had
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In 1992, four years prior to the restructuring of IGAD as a reformed organisa-
tion, Ethiopia convinced both the OAU and IGAD to designate the new authori-
ties in Addis Ababa as the main coordinators of the Somali peace processes 
(Xildhiban Publications, 2012).2 In addition, Ethiopia obtained the approval of the 
regional heads of states to be the chair of the Horn of Africa Standing Committee 
on Somalia. This move “formed the basis of Ethiopia’s mandate to broker peace 
in Somalia” (Apuuli, 2010, 263). The Ethiopian rulers emerged immediately as 
mediators between the non-state Somali armed groups. IGAD was instrumental-
ised to apply in practice the long-held Ethiopian foreign policy action plan for 
Somalia set in motion during the Haile Selassie years and violently pursued during 
the Mengistu regime. In other words, IGAD as an organisation formed the basis 
of and became a political platform for Ethiopia to advance its interests in Somalia 
(Elmi and Barise, 2006). While IGAD’s efforts at peacebuilding in Somalia were 
superseded by the Ethiopian agenda, IGAD policymakers failed to articulate a 
clear and coherent policy of their own for Somalia. Instead, they adopted the 
Ethiopian policy towards Somalia to deal with the ongoing armed conflict in the 
country. Although Ethiopia was part of the Somali political conflicts well before 
the fall of the Siad Barre regime (Lewis, 1987), by the mid-1990s it had become 
the main engine driving the Somali peace processes in a direction beneficial to 
its own security interests. To entrust Ethiopia with the restoration of peace to 
Somalia was seen by many Somalis, echoing the animosity between the two coun-
tries, as entrusting a hyena with the task of guarding the sheep (Field interviews, 
Mogadishu, April–July, 2016). 
IGAD: tool or electricity? 
From early on, IGAD adopted the Ethiopian policy of dealing with the leaders 
of Somali political factions – the so-called “warlords” – as state actors. There 
were more factional contenders for power in Somalia than in the rest of the Horn. 
Rather than isolating them, IGAD accommodated these factional leaders and rec-
ognised them as the official representatives of the Somali people, based on the fact 
that many had been army generals and former members of the Siad Barre regime 
(Ingiriis, 2016). Ethiopia, by this time, had nothing much to worry about, as it had 
full control of IGAD. As one Somali official aptly put it, “IGAD has always been 
an envelope of Ethiopia” and “Ethiopia is the elephant behind IGAD” (Interview 
with a Somali government official, A. R. B., Mogadishu, 2 July 2016). In 1996, 
Ethiopia used IGAD’s auspices to authorise itself as the only caretaker for peace 
and reconciliation in Somalia. A caretaker, Ethiopia would not allow any other 
power (e.g. Egypt) to enter the Somali political landscape to play a pivotal role as 
a patron in the Somali peace processes or act as a benevolent parent. In January 
1997, at the Ethiopian resort town of Sodere, Somali political factions formed 
the National Salvation Council (NSC), which was tasked with the establishment 
of a transitional central authority in Somalia. The NSC was discredited because 
it was remote-controlled by Ethiopia, and operated out of Addis Ababa, which 
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263). The formation of this council was the first success of the Ethiopian rulers in 
exerting their influence on Somali politics under IGAD auspices. This was not the 
case in Eritrea, as Ethiopia did not find the time to use IGAD against the regime 
of Isaias Afewerki after the outbreak of war in 1998.3 Reconciliation conferences 
for Somalia held in Addis Ababa since the 1990s have always been structured 
through the faction-based peace process. At no point has Ethiopia facilitated the 
formation of a Somali government – whether transitional or interim – to be estab-
lished in Addis Ababa. Indeed, all Somali governments formed outside the coun-
try have been announced in either Djibouti or Kenya. 
Somalia was proving to be a real albatross around everyone’s neck by the late 
1990s and remained a disconcerting reminder to the UN and other international 
bodies, due in large part to the failure of most – if not all – the numerous (inter-
national and regional) peace and reconciliation attempts. In September 1999, 
newly elected President of Djibouti Ismail Omar Geelle went to the UN General 
Assembly to urge the world not to abandon Somalia (Anonymous, 2002; Lortan, 
2000). Geelle’s historic speech revived the lost confidence that Somalis could ever 
come together to reconcile by themselves. In the summer of 2000, in the small hot 
town of Arte, the Djibouti government hosted a well-attended peace and recon-
ciliation conference for Somalia – or, as two Somali scholars observed, the largest 
Somali-owned peace conference ever to have been held (Elmi and Barise, 2006, 
40; Anonymous, 2002; Lortan, 2000). The Arte Conference was a watershed and 
game changer in Somali politics. With the direct advice of Somali intellectuals and 
indirect advice from non-Somali academics such as British anthropologist Ioan 
M. Lewis (Lewis and Mayall, 1995), Djibouti mobilised traditional clan leaders 
to form a government of Somalia by selecting a national parliament, which would 
in turn elect a president.4 Although this alternative approach of involving civil 
society groups in Somali peace conferences was first attempted by Ambassador 
Mohamed Sahnoun, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to Somalia (Sahnoun 1994), Djibouti adopted it with a particularly 
rigorous attempt at building peace without armed factions. 
The election of Abdikassim Salaad Hassan as the first internationally recog-
nised president of Somalia sparked anxiety in the inner circles of the Ethiopian 
regime, unlike in other IGAD member states – Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, 
and Uganda – which welcomed the outcome (AFP 2000a, 2000b). Ethiopia con-
sidered Salaad and the new government members as remnants of the former Siad 
Barre regime intent on renewing the idea of Greater Somalia (Pan-Somalism). 
To discredit the new Somali leadership in the eyes of the suspicious US authori-
ties, the Ethiopian authorities branded Salaad and his government members as 
“Islamists,” adamant they would align with Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya, with whom 
they shared the common Somali belief that the Somali state was incomplete; 
which is to say, there are lost Somali lands occupied by Ethiopia and Kenya. 
Salaad and his government unwittingly substantiated Ethiopian apprehension by 
using nationalist rhetoric, reminding Meles Zenawi and other Ethiopian rulers 
of the fact that Somalia belongs to all Somalis. Like Eritrea’s Afewerki, Zenawi 
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as shown on Djibouti television (RTD), suggested that Zenawi was becoming 
increasingly unhappy about the new development. Amid growing suspicion, 
Salaad initially attempted to appease Ethiopia and asked his presidential rival 
Ambassador Abdullahi Ahmed Addow to lead a delegation of high-ranking offi-
cials, including presidential adviser Col. Omar Haashi Aden and then ambassador 
to Egypt Abdullahi Hassan Mohamoud, to travel to Addis Ababa to persuade 
Zenawi and his regime to maintain good relations with the new Somali govern-
ment. In a memorandum of understanding signed at the end of meetings with the 
Somali delegation, the Ethiopian authorities included a clause pledging that they 
would continue supporting the Somali political factions. This was a clear sign 
that Ambassador Addow’s diplomatic efforts had not borne fruit. In an interview 
between the author and Salaad in his makeshift presidential palace near the for-
mer Banaadir Secondary School in the capital Mogadishu, soon after the delega-
tion had returned, Salaad insisted, with a bit of optimism, that supporting armed 
political factions opposed to his government would not mean Ethiopia was not 
bound by the memorandum of understanding. Instead of appreciating the friendly 
gesture, Zenawi responded by providing support to disparate armed groups to 
form the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in opposition 
to Salaad’s government. The leadership structure of the SRRC was based on co-
chairs, one of whom was Hussein Mohamed Aideed, son of the once powerful 
Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed. Anyone familiar with factional Somali politics 
might not have been surprised to learn that Hussein Aideed, once aligned with 
Eritrea because Ethiopia had supported his rivals, went to Addis Ababa, for the 
first time, to join the Ethiopia-backed SSRC. 
The aftermath of the Arte Conference 
The Ethiopian rulers learned a lesson from the Djibouti peace process: that they 
must change their strategy of exploiting non-state Somali actors. Drawing on the 
Djibouti experiment on Somalia, the Ethiopian rulers had to attempt another route 
from now on to move from shaker to shaper to manufacture the future state of 
Somalia, instead of remaining the main stakeholder (The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 
2006). In doing so, they proved to be successful in restructuring the type of Somali 
government by which Somalia was going to be ruled, while formulating for them-
selves the form and the face of the Somali state. This was intrinsically aimed at 
re-engineering the systemic state structure and even re-designing what the state 
should look like. By realising that, sooner or later, a group most likely hostile to 
their policies on the Horn could rise to the top of Somali politics, the Ethiopian 
rulers had to act swiftly. The Addis Ababa policymakers approved the formation 
of a weak Somali state for Ethiopia by Ethiopia, principally a pro-Ethiopian one 
led by pro-Ethiopian elements. The issue of restructuring the Somali state to suit 
Ethiopian interests was made easier by Somali actors seeking to seize power and 
resources. The weak state structure put in place could force any Somali leader to 
be a pro-Ethiopian political sycophant. To proceed with the actual implementa-
tion of this project, Ethiopia hijacked the Somali peace conference in Kenya and 
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ensured it would have a strong hand in selecting delegates for the event, first held 
in Eldoret and later in Mbagathi from 2002 until 2004.5 The conference resulted 
in the selection of a certain group of factional leaders attached to the Ethiopian 
regime. This was the policy behind a carefully planned arrangement that culmi-
nated in the election of Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as president. The election 
result outraged many Somalis who might have anticipated a less war-weary presi-
dent than a “warlord” backed by – and heavily reliant on – Ethiopian patronage 
(International Crisis Group, 2004). Not only was Yusuf not an ally of Ethiopia in 
its war on the Salaad government, he was also a member of the armed opposition 
groups fighting against Ethiopia.6 In his first trip to Addis Ababa, Yusuf asked for 
aggressive military support from the IGAD countries, known as the “front-line 
states” (Interviews with a former minister of the Abdullahi Yusuf government, 
Mogadishu, 7 July 2016; BBC World Service, 2005). Apart from splitting the 
Somali parliament into pro-Ethiopian elements versus anti-Ethiopian advocates, 
the move led to a movie-style parliamentary brawl in March 2005, when both 
camps used their chairs to hit each other. This was an interesting political drama 
and the chair-throwing brawl was widely watched on television. 
The crucial advice Yusuf had received from Ethiopian authorities was to appeal 
to IGAD countries for a 20,000-strong force to establish his government in the 
capital Mogadishu, then ruled by opposing armed Hawiye clan-group factions. In 
less than three months after Yusuf had been declared president, Ethiopia imme-
diately lobbied on his behalf at the African Union (AU) meeting held in Abuja, 
Nigeria, in January 2005. On the sidelines of the AU conference, the IGAD heads 
of states decided “to provide security to enable the newly established government 
of Somalia to relocate back home” (IGAD, 2005). It was agreed that the IGAD 
military mission to Somalia should be named the IGAD Peace Support Mission 
in Somalia (IGASOM). No time was lost in assembling the IGAD ministers of 
defence at Entebbe, Uganda, to draw up a deployment plan for the military mis-
sion (The Indian Ocean Newsletter, 2005). The AU was always in line with the 
IGAD plan and immediately authorised: 
the deployment of IGASOM to provide support to the Yusuf government to 
ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace 
process, and assist with the re-establishment of peace and security by helping 
in the formation of the Somalia police and army. 
(African Union, 2005) 
Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, who served as a conflict prevention, management, and 
resolution advisor at the IGAD Secretariat, explains three legal and structural dif-
ficulties that IGASOM encountered: 
First, the fact that the Agreement that establishes IGAD did not provide 
authority for the organisation to undertake a peace support mission in a 
member state. Secondly, the IGAD Secretariat lacked the capacity (both 
human and financial) to handle a peace support operation. Thirdly, and most 
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importantly, IGAD member state Eritrea, in tense relations with co-member 
Ethiopia after their 1998–2000 border war, objected to the deployment. 
(Apuuli, 2010, 264) 
The unusual political manoeuvre to deploy military forces in the name of IGAD 
was driven by two political developments that occurred in Mogadishu: (1) the 
emerging power in 2005 of the clan-based Islamic courts, which united under the 
banner of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in reaction to a US hijack-and-kill 
campaign against Somali and non-Somali Afghanistan war veterans the UIC was 
hosting in Mogadishu; and (2) the declaration in February 2006 of the Alliance 
for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (APRCT), a motley coalition of 
nine Hawiye political players, brokers, and businesspeople who profited from the 
war economy in and around Mogadishu, including Bashiir Raage Shiiraar, Abdi 
Hassan Awale “Qaybdiid,” Muuse Suudi Yalahow, Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, 
Omar Mohamoud Mohamed “Omar Finish,” Bootaan Iise Aalin, Abdi Nuurre 
Siyaad, Abdirashid Shire Ilqeyte, Abdi-Shukri Ali Hersi, and Ibrahim Jeebe. 
They were later reinforced by Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Mohamed Dheere,” who 
at first had condemned but later apologised and joined them, apparently under 
pressure from US and Ethiopian intelligence agencies (Ingiriis, 2006a, 2006b; 
Menkhaus, 2007). 
The rise of the UIC proved profoundly significant in shaping the Somali polit-
ical scene. Taking advantage of intense public grievances against the APRCT 
members to get rid of them, the UIC leaders attracted sympathy among influential 
opinion shapers from the British Conservative Party who blasted 10 Downing 
Street for not having known better than to follow US policy on Somalia (Dowden, 
2011). However, the Ethiopian authorities successfully managed to exploit the US 
power machinery to destroy two major Somali-owned peacebuilding and state-
building initiatives – which is to say, the evolution of the Salaad government and 
the emergence of the UIC. Ethiopian threats against both initiatives later turned 
out to be propaganda (Warbrick and Yihdego, 2007, 674). The UIC authorities 
acted like political novices and deserve their own share of the blame. In addition 
to reverting to reckless military acts and making thoughtless political speeches on 
the media, they failed not only to critically rethink global political dimensions, 
but to consider regional political dynamics when making life-and-death decisions. 
Worst of all, they embraced emotional proposals by Somali diaspora academics in 
the US, who gave them radical guidance on standing up to Ethiopia (Field notes, 
Minneapolis, May–August 2008).7 
IGAD and the AU, having invested in the unpopular Yusuf government, were 
unwilling to recognise the UIC as a government, unlike the European Union, which 
ostensibly did, sending a high-level delegation, led by European Commissioner 
for Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel, to Mogadishu for serious negotiations (BBC 
News, 2006). Michel managed to convince the UIC leaders, especially those 
labelled “hardliners” such as Sheikh Col. Hassan Dahir Aweys, to sign a nine-
point memorandum of understanding and agree to hold talks with Yusuf’s gov-






The big elephant in the room 195 
their differences” (BBC News, 2006). The Ethiopians attacked the UIC forces 
while Michel was mediating between competing Somali forces in Mogadishu and 
Baydhabo. 
Militarisation of IGAD: the notion of IGASOM 
The peace-making element of IGAD was reinvigorated by the US authorities, 
who wanted local partners in their “war on terror.” As one Somali government 
official highlighted, other than socio-economic development programmes, a mili-
tary mandate was never included in IGAD’s legal obligations (Interview with a 
Somali government official, A. R. B., Mogadishu, 2 July 2016). On top of the 
military mandate, politics and diplomacy, which were not uncommonly used in 
the regional body to manipulate Somali factional groups, were also included in the 
IGAD operations. The AU echoed the same IGAD proposal directed by Ethiopia 
(The Ethiopian Herald, 2007a). In a special session in September 2006, the AU 
approved a peacekeeping mission to Somalia in the name of IGAD (Seifert, 2008, 
36). The UN Security Council, by lifting an arms embargo imposed on Somalia 
since 1992, joined the AU and IGAD in December 2006 to authorise the deploy-
ment of military force to support the Yusuf government.8 While the IGAD charter 
does not stipulate the conduct of military deployment, the backing of the UN 
Security Council was sought to provide the necessary legitimisation to deploy 
forces in IGAD’s name. Ethiopia did not wait for the bureaucratic UN system 
and soon sent a strong force to Somalia to face the UIC threat. When the ten-
sion between the Yusuf government and the UIC quickly escalated in late 2006 
(Africa Confidential, 2006), it was agreed that the IGASOM project be discarded 
altogether and replaced by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).9 
Assisted by Ethiopian forces, the AMISOM forces were enlarged to protect a gov-
ernment seen by most Somalis as a puppet of Ethiopia (Bamfo, 2010).10 
When an insurgency and a series of uprisings were sparked in the capital 
Mogadishu in 2007 and 2008, the US authorities acknowledged the need to legiti-
mise the Somali government Ethiopia’s rulers were trying to install in Somalia.11 
Aside from using IGAD, which was seen as an Ethiopia-dominated organisation, 
the US authorities tasked the UN office in Somalia with organising a reconcili-
ation conference in Djibouti for leaders of the UIC and the Transitional Federal 
Government, who had failed to resolve their political conflict at a conference in 
Khartoum, Sudan, and Sana’a, Yemen. The shift in US diplomacy in Somalia 
forced Ethiopia to accept the participation of the “moderate” wing of the UIC in a 
new political power-sharing arrangement with the Ethiopia-backed government. 
Yusuf refused to accept the new conciliatory approach, but the IGAD Council of 
Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa on 18 November 2008 threatened him with 
the imposition of “targeted sanctions including travel bans and freezing of assets 
among others, on all those in and outside Somalia who had become obstacles to the 
achievement of peace in Somalia” (IGAD, 2008). Yusuf had only three options: 
(1) to accept the outcome of the conference without interference; (2) to dismiss 
Prime Minister Nuur Hassan Hussein “Nuur Adde,” who was delegated to lead 
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the government delegation to the Djibouti conference; or (3) to resign from the 
presidency. Yusuf decided to sack Nuur Adde, appointing Mohamed Mohamoud 
Guuleed “Ga’madheere” instead. This did not work out the way it had done when 
Yusuf had insisted on the departure of Ali Mohamed Geeddi as prime minis-
ter in October 2007. As a consequence of his decision, which went against US 
and Ethiopian interests, Yusuf was himself pressed to resign in December 2008 
(Interview with Mohamed Mohamoud Guuleed “Ga’madheere,” Mogadishu, 
22 April 2016). It was thought likely that Yusuf’s successor would be a hardliner 
from the UIC like Sheikh Aweys, but Ethiopia as the chief orchestrator of IGAD 
would never have accepted him as president of Somalia because of his previous 
Islamist links (Interview with senior IGAD diplomat, Abuja, 2 September 2016). 
It should be noted that the label “Islamist” is a broad term in Somali politics, 
which makes it easy to target political enemies to attack and eliminate them. 
The Djibouti conference ended with the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 
Ahmed as president in January 2009. The prediction of many Somalis and the 
international community was that Nuur Adde would be president. Even though 
they could not dictate the outcome, the Ethiopian rulers favoured Sheikh Sharif 
for the sole reason that he would be able to separate the “moderates” from the 
“extremists.” His election officially divided the disjointed groups of the UIC 
into three warring factions: the group-turned-government led by Sheikh Sharif 
himself; Hisbul Islam led by Sheikh Aweys; and Al-Shabaab, the most power-
ful of all. Sheikh Sharif’s tenure ended while he was still busy with deal with 
the Al-Shabaab particularly following it full retreat from the capital (Discussions 
with Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Oxford, November 2014 to March 2015). The 
fragile new government led by Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, who came to power 
in September 2012, was increasingly unable to deal with Al-Shabaab and became 
dependent on Ethiopia and AMISOM for protection and assistance. The new 
regime went as far as to intertwine the military policies of Somalia and Ethiopia 
(Ethiopian News Agency, 2016).12 Under IGAD’s auspices, Ethiopia restarted the 
unending mediation sessions between the warring Somali groups, including the 
government. The Ethiopian military forces in Somalia began using a different mil-
itary and political approach than other AMISOM forces (Qaranimo Online, 2016; 
AMISOM, 2016). From 2012, the rumour in Mogadishu was that the Ethiopian 
representative of the IGAD mission in Mogadishu, Gen. Gabre Adhana, was more 
powerful and influential than the Ethiopian ambassador to Somalia (Field notes, 
Mogadishu, April to August 2016; Shabelle News 2016). 
Conclusion 
The election of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo” as president in 
Somalia in February 2017 was clear evidence that the Ethiopian policy towards 
Somalia cannot be successful when it comes to supporting backing a favourite 
candidate to sit the Villa Somalia, the presidential palace. In Mogadishu, Farmaajo 
campaigned on a slogan of reviving lost Somali nationalism, which would cre-
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not be underestimated. At best, they are politically adept at influencing things to 
their own advantage, regardless of whoever comes to power in Somalia. At worst, 
although they are now in a weaker position owing to the recent domestic political 
challenges, they are still militarily capable of sabotaging any Somali leadership 
that attempts to challenge their broader regional interests. 
Two power structures are helpful for Ethiopia to ensure preservation of its 
objectives in Somalia in this regard. Apart from IGAD, the “republican” federal 
system in Somalia, where each major clan demands its own state, gives Ethiopia 
influence over the Somali leadership. Ethiopia has benefitted directly and indi-
rectly as the IGAD gatekeeper in Somalia and remains the main beneficiary of the 
federal system in Somalia. Over four years (2012–2016), IGAD played a leading 
role in the facilitation of state-building processes in south-central Somalia. The 
prevailing political perception is that those areas most likely will continue even 
when “federalism” is abolished. 
The current federal state structure of Somalia has stemmed from the Ethiopian 
conception of federalising Somalia into various discrete mini-state entities. As an 
IGAD press release (2014, 1) plainly revealed: “We support the ongoing efforts 
of the FGS [Federal Government of Somalia] in ensuring the establishment of the 
pillars for the federal system of the country.” The government in Mogadishu was 
directed to concentrate on forming new states “in a manner that does not under-
mine the existing federal states” (IGAD, 2014, 1). The suggestion and the support 
were in line with the “building block approach” project proposed by Ethiopia in 
1998, which was first applied in northeast Somalia and resulted in the formation 
of Puntland State (Bryden, 1999).13 According to the IGAD press release: “The 
IGAD Special Envoy added that the country was indeed moving towards attain-
ing the goals of federalism as enshrined in the vision of 2016 aimed at building 
a strong, peaceful, prosperous, united and sovereign Somalia” (IGAD, 2014, 1). 
Even though the system of federalism was clearly stipulated in the provincial con-
stitution for Somalia, the IGAD press statement was used to make its point more 
relevant to the present political reality by referring to the so-called Vision 2016, a 
new deal project for Somalia supported by international donors. One Somali elder 
has posed some critical questions worthy of further study: 
Who has given Ethiopia [permission] to federate Somalia without a public 
referendum? Basically, without asking people whether they prefer a federal 
system or centralised state system? How do they impose undefined federal-
ism on a people who had not asked for [it] in the first place? 
(Discussions with B. H. D., Mogadishu, 29 May 
2016). 
The answer is buried in the Ethiopianisation of IGAD. 
Notes 
1 This chapter was first presented as a paper at the conference titled “Policy Dialogue 
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Conflict Resolution, Abuja, Nigeria, 1–2 September 2016. I thank the attendees for their 
positive comments and encouragement. I am also grateful to Nordic Africa Institute for 
the invitation to attend the conference. 
2 Between 0m:20s and 1m:24s. 
3 Eritrea suspended its IGAD membership temporarily on 27 April 2007 but tried with 
no avail to reactivate it on 25 July 2011. For more on the Eritrean “in” and “out” rela-
tionship with IGAD, see Andemariam (2015); for the Ethiopia–Eritrea proxy war in 
Somalia, see Menkhaus (2007). 
4 Geelle invited 30 Somali intellectuals from around the world. At the time of the confer-
ence, a series of publications by Lewis suggested the restoration of traditional leaders 
in contrast with the so-called “warlords” (Lewis and Mayall, 1995). 
5 For an overview of the Mbagathi conference, see Webersik (2014). 
6 Days later, influential MPs who were opposed to Col. Yusuf won a vote in parliament 
that compelled the new president to select the prime minister from within parliament. 
7 For a discussion of the “ebb and flow” of the UIC, see Abbink (2009). 
8 It should be noted that, despite a UN monitoring group’s revelations, the Ethiopian 
authorities continued to violate an arms embargo imposed on Somalia by the UN 
Security Council in 1992 (Associated Press, 2006). 
9 There were also calls from Djibouti urging Ethiopia to pull its troops out to ease tension 
(Shabelle Media Network, 2007). The Ethiopian government position was that “threat 
not ambition drove it into war” (Ethiopian News Agency, 2007). 
10 For celebratory accounts of AMISOM, see Fahlén (2015) and Freear and de Coning 
(2013). For critical analysis, see Anderson (2014); Fisher (2012); Hesse (2015); 
Williams (2009, 2013a, 2013b, 2014). 
11 The official name of the government was the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
In a joint operation between Ethiopia and Kenya, the TFG was used as a legitimis-
ing device to extradite alleged foreign supporters of the UIC (The Ethiopian Herald, 
2007b). 
12 A document released by Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdisalam Hadliye states that 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Investment Promotion of the Federal 
Republic of Somalia is working tirelessly to establish, renew and strengthen all 
partnerships of mutual interest which serves our interests and that of our neigh-
bours and allies across the globe. 
Press Release, for Immediate Release, 6 July 2016, 
Mogadishu, Somalia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2016). 
13 Puntland followed a similar yet dissimilar pattern from Somaliland by allowing itself 
to be part of Somalia under a federal system. For the differences between Somaliland 
and Puntland, see Hesse (2010, 343–362). 
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15 “You don’t own peace” 
The coward state, South Sudan, and IGAD 
relations 
Jacob D. Chol 
Introduction 
On 15 December 2013, South Sudan descended into bitter political violence and 
chaos, emanating from the disputes within the leadership of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) over political power and wealth. According to 
Amnesty International, the violence led to the deaths of over 100,000 people, 
particularly in the Juba, Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity states. Many pundits and 
political analysts have pointed to the root cause of violence as a power struggle 
within the SPLM family. However, the government line is that the political vio-
lence was triggered by a failed coup d’état led by Vice President Riek Machar and 
his apologists, thirsty for power and prestige. However, the government anecdote 
of a foiled coup has been highly discredited by the international community and 
the 2013 African Union (AU) Commission of Inquiry Report. 
As the result of the civil strife, a delegation representing the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) Council of Minsters flew to the capital of 
South Sudan, Juba, on 19 December 2013, for an emergency three-day visit in 
order to get a first-hand impression of the political crisis and violence that had 
rocked the country since the night of 15 December. The move led to a subse-
quent meeting of the IGAD Heads of State and Government in Nairobi, Kenya, 
on 27 December, culminating in the establishment of IGAD’s peace mediation. 
Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo of Kenya, 
and Ambassador Gen. Mohammed Ahmed El-Dabi of Sudan were nominated as 
IGAD envoys. 
Given the complex and tiring mediation process, having missed a 5 March 
2015 deadline, the IGAD Heads of State and Government consented to the 
expansion of IGAD to IGAD-Plus to include the AU Commission, China, the 
European Union, Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and 
the United Nations (UN). With regional and international pressures, IGAD-Plus 
convinced the conflicting parties to sign the Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) on 17 and 26 August 2015, 
respectively. However, the implementation of the ARCISS has sharply exposed 
the working relations between the Transitional Government of South Sudan and 
IGAD. While many political scientists and peace scholars have been examining 
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the role of IGAD in South Sudan’s peace mediation and the challenges bedevil-
ling the organisation, none of the scholars has studied the relationship between 
IGAD and the government of South Sudan (GRSS). This chapter aims to fill this 
gap in knowledge. 
The chapter argues that South Sudan is a “coward state” in its relations with 
IGAD. In expounding this central argument, the chapter is organised as follows: 
section one explores and explains the concept of the “coward state” and advances 
neoliberal peace theory in analysing the relations of South Sudan with IGAD; 
section two examines the friendly and unfriendly relations between IGAD and 
South Sudan. In explaining this, the chapter unpacks the delicate and intractable 
links between IGAD and its member states. In doing so, it discusses the Ugandan 
military intervention at the behest of the Kiir faction in the conflicts in December 
2013 and its impact on South Sudan–IGAD relations. Section three tackles the 
suspicious and ambiguous relations between IGAD and South Sudan in imple-
menting the ARCISS. Section four analyses the roles played by Ethiopia, Sudan, 
and Kenya in South Sudan’s efforts directed towards resolving the political cri-
sis. Section five concludes by pointing to areas for further research and offering 
policy recommendations for managing South Sudan–IGAD relations. 
South Sudan, the coward state 
The concept of a coward state concept is derived from Murphy’s (2011) seminal 
proposition of a “courageous state.” He argues that to have a courageous state, a 
coward state must also exist. Murphy notes that a coward state is one that forces 
poor citizens who have never been part of an economic or political crisis to pay 
for it while the rich and powerful who created it from within benefit from the 
mess (Murphy, 2011, 4). While this state squeezes out the poor, it does not grant a 
future to the next generation. This is a state that is failing its young population by 
putting them in crisis by not securing their education and socio-economic wellbe-
ing, which could enhance their prosperity (Murphy, 2011, 5). Richard Murphy 
continues to lament that a coward state does not have the courage to provide its 
young people with jobs, its old people with secure care, its population with pro-
tection against unemployment and unforeseen events, or its children with decent 
schools (Murphy, 2011, 5). A coward state is a state that instigates chaos and 
violence and fails to bring order, security, and tranquillity. In essence, a coward 
state roars loudly and fails to take important diplomatic, political, and economic 
steps, particularly towards building peace. 
As Murphy argues, South Sudan perfectly fits the prescription of a coward 
state. It is a state that loudly announces its plans but fails to provide services to its 
citizens including public security. To unpack the complexities of failed coward 
states, Kraxberger (2012) characterises them under two main categories: effec-
tiveness and legitimacy of political institutions. By “effectiveness,” Kraxberger 
refers to the degree to which governments fulfil minimal expectations for deliver-
ing public goods and services; “legitimacy of political institutions” addresses the 




204 Jacob D. Chol
2012, 1). Fulfilment of minimal expectations and legitimacy depend on physical 
security, which is a core problem for fragile coward states. Failed coward states 
are extremely violent places, though violence can come in different forms. Rebels 
or warlords may control large chunks of territory or engage in fighting with gov-
ernment forces; and government security personnel may prey upon ordinary citi-
zens, whether due to greed, organised repression, or poor training (Kraxberger, 
2012, 1). 
Also, failed coward states do not have functioning social services. Kraxberger 
argues that these states provide little in the field of education, for instance. 
Educational systems suffer from quantitative and qualitative deficiencies 
(Kraxberger, 2012, 1). Staff are not paid and are routinely absent from their posts; 
school buildings are in varying states of neglect or are often abandoned; school 
fees serve as an accessibility barrier and may be squandered once collected; and 
those students who do attend school often receive only a rudimentary primary 
education, with few learning resources (Kraxberger, 2012, 1). 
Apart from deficiencies in the areas of education, health, and economic and 
environmental degradation, as well as the failure of public security, South Sudan 
has exhibited cowardice in its relationship with IGAD. After signing the ARCISS, 
the GRSS argued for a list of reservations in the peace text. These reservations 
have been used to either reject or delay the implementation of the ARCISS. The 
outcome has been the suspicion of IGAD and IGAD-Plus, which are blamed for 
allegedly championing regime change in the nascent state. This attitude shows 
that South Sudan is a coward state. It is a state that shouted about providing ser-
vices to the citizens, voluntarily signed the ARCISS, and blamed its failure on 
IGAD and IGAD-Plus member states. It is a state that proclaims its responsibility 
and runs away from it (Murphy, 2011, 6). 
Liberal peacebuilding associates state security and peace with democratic 
development and institutions, the rule of law, human rights, and a market econ-
omy, which are usually undertaken or established by international organisations 
or actors, mainly the UN and/or others (Franks and Richmond, 2008). The idea 
is that if these post-conflict states manage to successfully develop and maintain a 
functional democracy – at least to a certain extent – they will then become part of 
the greater family of interdependent democracies around the world, and thus have 
more chances for peace, security, and economic growth, and fewer chances for 
instability and underdevelopment. Therefore, the theory goes, this model works 
not only as a peace builder but also as a conflict preventer (Ramsbotham et al., 
2010, 116). 
In the context of South Sudan–IGAD relations, neoliberal peace theory helps 
in analysing the GRSS’s conundrum in the implementation of the ARCISS. 
Although rule of law, equality, institutionalism, economic development, and, 
above all, democracy should have existed for South Sudan to realise meaningful 
peace, the GRSS has eschewed providing these ingredients and in lieu developed 
a tendency towards cowardice that has hampered relations with IGAD. Thus, the 
undoing of South Sudan’s peace deal is the suspicion in the country’s relations 
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The neoliberal approach has not successfully helped in advancing sustainable 
peace in the Greater Horn of Africa. Other alternative approaches, such as tradi-
tional peace initiatives and conflict resolution mechanisms, have been advanced 
and South Sudan has benefited from these efforts so far. The stitching together 
of a social fabric between the Nuer and Dinka peoples after the 1991 SPLM split 
was addressed through the Wunlit Peace Accord of 1999. This accord was mostly 
mediated and negotiated by traditional leaders and the clergy. It is probable that 
Dinka and Nuer ethnic feuds would require traditional conflict resolution mecha-
nisms and not the neoliberal approach. 
Outbreak of violence and early efforts at peace-making 
The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was 
established in 1986, with a focus on drought and desertification; and relaunched in 
1996 as IGAD, with an expanded mandate that included conflict resolution (Adar, 
2000, 43). It comprises Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, South 
Sudan, and Eritrea, although Eritrea is currently suspended. The decision to revi-
talise IGAD was made by the IGAD Heads of State and Government at a meeting 
held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 18 April 1995. At the 12th Ordinary Summit 
in 2008, the Heads of State and Government again expanded IGAD’s mandate 
to include regional economic integration (Medhane, 2004, 121). The expansion 
of the mandate was due in part to IGAD member states’ long history of coopera-
tion and conflict with one another. IGAD’s involvement in conflict resolution has 
historically focused on the north–south conflict in Sudan – and now the south– 
south conflict – and various conflicts in Somalia (Healy, 2011, 54). An IGAD 
peace process to resolve Sudan’s long-running second civil war (1983–2005) was 
launched in the early 1990s and gained traction in the late 1990s when Kenya 
held the IGAD chair. IGAD’s mediation, led by Gen. Sumbeiywo, received sig-
nificant support from the “Troika” (the US, the UK, and Norway), particularly at 
the end of the process. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed 
in 2005 and paved the way for South Sudan’s independence in 2011. 
In December 2013 when violence broke out in South Sudan, IGAD responded 
quickly and its first-hand reading of the situation culminated in the establishment of 
South Sudan’s IGAD peace mediation. The complex and tiring mediation process 
and unsuccessful negotiations made the IGAD Heads of State and Government 
consent to expanding IGAD to IGAD-Plus to include the AU Commission, China, 
the EU, Norway, the UK, the US, the UN, and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF).1 
With regional and international pressures, IGAD-Plus reined in the warring 
parties to sign the ARCISS. Thus, the former vice president, Riek Machar and 
President Salva Kiir eventually signed the peace agreement on 17 and 26 August 
2015, respectively. Yet, South Sudan relations with IGAD have been a bitter-
sweet puzzle, as the former views the latter as a friend, enemy, and suspicious 
agent of regime change. Given the South Sudanese government’s mixed view of 
IGAD, relations between the two bodies have been defined by cowardice. 
Before 2013, the GRSS had regarded IGAD as a buddy and a caring organi-
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government troops by the rebels, the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army 
in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), which made the GRSS call in the Uganda People’s 
Defence Forces (UPDF), significantly changed the context of GRSS–IGAD rela-
tions. President Salva Kiir later admitted to Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni 
that “Uganda is a friend indeed and that without your intervention, my govern-
ment would have gone, and I sincerely thank you for this.”2 
Uganda’s role as interested party 
As violence intensified in South Sudan, Museveni sent troops to support Kiir. 
Uganda has remained a staunch ally and has often sought to benefit financially 
and politically from foreign military activities. Therefore, its deployment of 
soldiers to South Sudan should be seen in the same context (Schomerus, 2012, 
114). Uganda’s intervention, which appeared initially as a one-off event with the 
dispatch of a company of UPDF soldiers to South Sudan to secure the evacua-
tion of Ugandan citizens from the country (Kasaija, 2014, 1), turned out to be 
detailed and comprehensive and involved securing critical infrastructures, pro-
tecting Ugandan nationals (Clottey, 2014), and fighting the rebels in and around 
Bor, the capital of Jonglei. Controversial methods were used, including aerial 
bombardment involving the use of cluster bombs. The UPDF fought alongside 
the government army, the SPLA, but Uganda’s intervention was associated with 
attempted rebel advances from South Bor towards Juba city. Also, the UPDF 
provided the GRSS with advisers and logistical support. Its main base was near 
Juba airport, but soldiers were also stationed in Bor and Nisitu to guard vital 
installations, including the main trade route to Uganda, the Juba–Nimule highway 
(Sudan Tribune, 2014). However, as the conflict escalated, Ugandan troops were 
increased to an estimated level of between 2,000 and 5,000 soldiers. 
Uganda’s link to the conflict in South Sudan has made Kampala a belligerent 
party who is more focused on securing its interests in-country than on the Addis 
Ababa peace talks (Crisis Group, 2015). It therefore had no representative among 
the special envoys (from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan) appointed by the IGAD 
Council of Ministers in December 2013. Uganda is seen by many as the king-
maker in Juba (Vlassenroot et al., 2012, 236). However, political indecisiveness, 
displeasure with the options on the table, and relative acceptance of the status 
quo meant that Uganda’s military influence did not translate into the regional 
political leadership needed to end a conflict that could not be won on the battle-
field (Crisis Group, 2015). Uganda’s posture is shaped by deep animosity towards 
Sudan and visceral dislike of former South Sudan vice president and head of the 
SPLM/A-IO, Dr Riek Machar. At the same time, officials would often disparage 
Kiir’s government. While the intervention was an endeavour of military friend-
ship, it involved a lot of economic interests, as the GRSS is alleged to have paid 
USD $800 million to the government of Uganda for the intervention package. 
The UPDF’s involvement in South Sudan’s bloody civil war raises enormous 
questions over whether it was a legitimate undertaking or driven by other paro-
chial interests. The Ugandan government argues that it intervened to secure vital 
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installations to rescue its nationals, who were trapped in the conflict. However, 
the same Uganda government argues it was invited by the GRSS to intervene, 
with authorisation from IGAD. The claim that the actions were taken to “rescue 
trapped Ugandans” (Kasaija, 2014, 7) was popular in Uganda especially in the 
official circles (Mugerwa and Nalugo, 2014; Walusimbi, 2014). 
There is no basis in existing international protocol or treaty that authorises 
a foreign country to just send troops to another country to rescue its nationals. 
The UN Charter provides some leeway for military intervention to be done by 
members of the UN after it has been sanctioned by the UN Security Council. 
In the case of South Sudan, Uganda’s intervention seems to have gone beyond 
rescuing Ugandans caught up in the fighting. The announcement that the UPDF 
was fighting alongside GRSS forces against the rebel troops supporting Machar 
clearly violates the requirement of proportionality, which demands that action 
taken must not be excessive. The UPDF fighting on behalf of one of the factions 
in the conflict points to an abuse of this state practice, as there exists no right of 
states to rescue their nationals caught up in conflicts mainly because such a right 
is subject to abuse. 
A democratically elected government such as South Sudan’s has the legitimate 
authority to carry out state functions, including inviting another country’s forces 
to come to its aid if its legitimacy is challenged (Kasaija, 2014, 6). However, in 
such a situation the agreement to be of any legal effect must be clearly estab-
lished; really expressed (which precludes merely presumed consent); internation-
ally attributable to the state; and anterior to the commission of the act to which it 
refers (United Nations, 1999, para. 234). In the case of South Sudan, the GRSS 
had been democratically elected and is the only legitimate government. Wherever 
the incumbent government controls the political apparatus of the state, it may 
request external assistance or even military intervention to assist it in maintain-
ing control of the state (Wippman, 1996, 228). Shaw (2003, 23) has observed: 
“It would appear that in general, aid to the government authorities to repress a 
revolt is perfectly legitimate, provided of course it was requested by the govern-
ment.” The example of France’s intervention in Mali in 2013, upon the invitation 
of the interim transitional government of Mali, to halt the advance of the Islamic 
jihadists who were threatening to take over the capital Bamako came in handy 
(Bannelier and Christakis, 2013, 856; Coco, Kaboré, and Maillart, 2013, 91). 
The UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with 
the Charter of the UN states that “No State has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other 
State” (United Nations General Assembly, 1970, 123). This would presuppose 
that a state’s intervention in a civil war in another state is prohibited. However, 
while there exists the suggestion that intervention in a civil war on the side of the 
government at its request is unlawful, there is little support for this in practice 
(Chatham House, 2007).3 However, under the 1975 Wiesbaden Resolution on the 
Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars (1975) of the Institute of International 
Law (IDI), which is non-binding, Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan was 
  
 
208 Jacob D. Chol
illegal, as the resolution, in particular, prohibits third-party states from assisting 
parties to a civil war, such as “sending armed forces […] to any party to a civil 
war, or allowing them to be sent or to set out.” However, in practice, it only seems 
to prohibit intervention on the side of those opposing the government. Since 
Uganda intervened on the side of the GRSS, its intervention was viewed as legal. 
The debate about the justification for the intervention of Ugandan troops in 
South Sudan continues. There are claims and counterclaims about the purported 
letter from Kiir to Museveni requesting the intervention (Arinaitwe, 2014; Tajuba, 
2014). Also, there has been a reference to the military pact signed by GRSS 
Uganda, which came after the UPDF had already started fighting in South Sudan 
alongside the troops of President Salva Kiir. However, the interesting twist is the 
claim by the Ugandan government officials that the invitation was with IGAD’s 
approval, and consent of the member states of IGAD (Mukisa, 2014, 5). Closely 
related is the claim that Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan was justified under 
the IGAD Peace and Security Mechanism (Musisi, 2014, 8). Arguably, IGAD 
commended Uganda’s intervention only to help secure critical infrastructure and 
installations but did not authorise it to intervene in the bloody conflict. The word-
ing of IGAD’s 27 December 2013 communiqué does not suggest that the organi-
sation intended to support Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan beyond what 
was stated (Kasaija, 2014, 10). It is a requirement of international law that agree-
ments between states should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of a treaty (United Nations, 1969). If 
IGAD had intended to support Uganda’s efforts beyond those stated in the com-
muniqué, it should have stated so (Kasaija, 2014, 10). 
Roles of IGAD and IGAD-Plus 
South Sudan is the eighth member of the regional organisation. But the GRSS 
views IGAD as an enemy that is working for regime change in the nascent state. 
The expansion of the IGAD mediation initiative to the US, the UK, and Norway, 
known as the “Troika,” further complicated the relationship between the GRSS 
and IGAD. The GRSS views Western countries as yearning for regime change 
in the young nation. This view has been held for a very long time by the GRSS. 
Although the GRSS signed the peace deal on 26 August 2015, ending nearly three 
years of protracted war, it immediately backed out arguing that it had not signed 
the agreement willingly and in good faith which led to the continuation of the 
conflict. The president’s statement after signing the deal points to the existence of 
22 reservations in the text that were to be attached to the agreement as an adden-
dum. However, the US rightly rejected all the reservations after signing. Susan 
Rice, then the US national security adviser, was reported as saying “we do not 
recognize any reservations or addendums to that agreement” (Guardian, 2015). 
With its rejection of the reservations to the peace agreement, the GRSS sin-
gled out the US as championing regime change. This allegation has led to wors-
ening relations between the two countries and many ugly incidents have taken 
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residence, killing the longest-serving security guard. On 7 July, a group of SPLA 
soldiers shot at a US diplomatic car, which was carrying seven diplomats, in the 
capital Juba. Luckily, the diplomats survived because the car was armoured and 
bulletproof (Radio Tamazuj, 2016). 
The GRSS views Western nations as advocates of regime change in South 
Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2016; Alfonse, 2016). The regime change phobia is 
dominantly present in the GRSS’s perception of IGAD’s role. For example, the 
IGAD Council of Ministers met in Nairobi on 11 July at the 56th extraordinary 
session on South Sudan, and demanded, among other things, the re-opening of 
Juba International Airport to be protected by regional forces. It also asked for 
urgent revision of the UNMISS mandate to establish an intervention brigade and 
increase numbers of troops from the region to secure Juba (Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development, 2016). This resolution sent a wave of protests against 
placing South Sudan under trusteeship to the GRSS, leading Kiir to sack the dep-
uty Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Cirino Hiteng, arguing that he failed to reject 
IGAD’s demands. Hiteng was nominated as deputy minister on an SPLM Former 
Political Detainees (FPDs) ticket, in accordance with the ARCISS power-sharing 
formula. His sacking by Kiir contradicted the peace deal. But it is imperative to 
note that Kiir’s swift action was influenced by the thinking that IGAD was slowly 
taking over South Sudan to manage it as a trustee. Kiir revealed this in an inter-
view with Al Jazeera on 12 July 2016. “I am just like a child being ordered by 
everybody” (Ndushabandi, 2016), he said, referring to IGAD’s strongly worded 
communiqué. Furthermore, Kiir expressed fears and frustrations on the surviva-
bility of the peace agreement after the July 2016 skirmishes (Ndushabandi, 2016). 
However, the IGAD Heads of State and Government meeting in Kigali, 
Rwanda, resolved to send regional troops to South Sudan to help protect civil-
ians and vital installations. This final resolution of IGAD Heads of State and 
Government reiterated what the 56th extraordinary session of Council of Ministers 
had said. Nonetheless, the GRSS argued that it had been let down by IGAD and 
felt isolated as a member state.4 Makuei accused IGAD member states of support-
ing military intervention in South Sudan. He argued that IGAD had been support-
ing Machar, with whom they were in daily contact. Makuei warned that South 
Sudan was also capable of supporting proxy rebellions in IGAD member states 
and of causing havoc. Above all, he indicated that all IGAD member states had 
their problems and their own rebels, not just South Sudan (Wol, 2016). 
Role(s) of regional actors 
Ethiopia is an important player in regional politics, has military power, and can 
be a stabilising and potentially destabilising factor. The country has long-stand-
ing ties with the SPLM but also links through shared border communities (e.g. 
the Nuer–Nuer relationship in the Gambella region) and hosts South Sudanese 
refugees. Not only did Ethiopia host the negotiations on the South Sudan politi-
cal crisis and ensure the ARCISS was signed, it remains a key player, given its 
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In the same vein, it chairs the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism and 
the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Ambassador Mesfin, the 
chair of the three special envoys, is an Ethiopian and Tedros Adanhom, the coun-
try’s foreign minister, was on the IGAD fact-finding mission that visited Juba 
immediately after the outbreak of violence in 2013. Ethiopia hosted Machar but 
backed away from hosting him after the July 2016 political violence. Ethiopia is a 
major troop-contributing country in peacekeeping missions for Sudan and South 
Sudan, UNISFA, and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Ethiopia is 
also the leader of the Regional Protection Force that was sanctioned by UNSC 
Resolution Number 2304 to stabilise South Sudan. 
Ethiopia has economic, security, and strategic interests in South Sudan that 
relate partly to power generation from a dam 40 km from the border and an oil 
refinery that should supply Ethiopia with refined fuels from Pagak in South Sudan. 
There are also other projects such as the construction of the Gambella–Pagak– 
Paloch road to connect the two countries, in particular, to ferry fuels to Ethiopia. 
Whether these projects will be viable or not it will depend on the resources the 
two countries commit. Moreover, the nexus between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the 
question of Islamic extremists infiltrating the region, will remain of interest not 
only to Ethiopia but also to IGAD and Western countries, and Ethiopia will be a 
key player in the fight against terror. 
However, Ethiopia must deal with the growing perception that it supports 
Machar’s rebellion and should make sure that resolution of South Sudanese 
political impasse is not only seen as an Ethiopia-led initiative but an IGAD-Plus 
one by encouraging consensus among the parties through reassuring statements. 
Ethiopians have numerous investments in South Sudan, particularly in the hospi-
tality sector. However, Ethiopia would be acting in South Sudan’s interests – and 
particularly the GRSS’s broad interests – when it supports the Ethiopian stand 
on the Grand Renaissance Dam. This is a long-running standoff in hydro-politics 
between Egypt and Ethiopia. 
Sudan is regarded as the “mother” of all the problems relating to the inde-
pendence of South Sudan. It has been alleged that since its independence, Sudan
has endeavoured to ensure South Sudan has been in a state of perpetual instabil-
ity to demonstrate that it cannot govern itself. Following the outbreak of vio-
lence in South Sudan, the Sudanese president, Omar al- Bashir, visited Juba in
what analysts described as a ritual act rather than one of substance. With vast
knowledge of the country, Sudan has the potential to play both positive and
negative role(s).
Sudan has expertise and military resilience, but also great economic interest 
related to the flow of oil, because it hosts oil infrastructure. The Abyei issue is one 
of the outstanding post-referendum issues. The country has genuine political and 
security interests that relate to the un-demarcated border and proxy wars involv-
ing various armed opposition groups in both South Sudan and Sudan. 
Sudan’s role is of course contingent on links between and among political 
groupings of the National Congress Party, SPLA, SPLM, M23, and the Sudanese 
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unfinished business with South Sudan, emanating from the CPA and, ironically, it 
now hosts numerous South Sudanese refugees. 
Sudan has played a critical role in conflict resolution in South Sudan. Gen. 
El-Dabi, the retired Sudanese diplomat-cum-military officer, is serving as a third 
special envoy in IGAD’s mediation initiative. On several occasions, South Sudan 
officials have called for the expulsion of Khartoum’s representatives from peace 
talks, claiming that South Sudanese rebels are being trained, armed, and con-
trolled by Sudan.5 
Kenya has political, security, economic, and cultural interests and historical 
links with South Sudan and the whole push for a regional integration process in 
the sub-region. The country remains important, having hosted the CPA process; 
but, also, the first IGAD summit on the crisis was held at the country’s state 
house on 27 December 2013. Apart from Gen. Sumbeiywo, the country has a 
special envoy to South Sudan, Dalmas Otieno. The former minister was among 
the first international delegation that called on Juba when the conflict broke out on 
15 December. The country is also the IGAD rapporteur. 
Kenya is a troop-contributing country to UNMISS. About 1,000 Kenyan sol-
diers serve in the mission, deployed in Bhar el Ghazal in South Sudan. Kenya 
is willing to contribute more soldiers for the mission. Kenya not only has a 
regional integration, economic, trade, and business agenda in Juba, including the 
Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor Project, but 
also Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta wishes to portray himself as a regional 
powerbroker. Kenyatta was not only instrumental in the release of 11 political 
detainees, but he was also ready to receive and host them at the state house upon 
their release. At present, some of the FPDs are hosted in Kenya, in addition to 
hosting numerous South Sudanese refugees. Several high-ranking officials in 
South Sudan not only have their families living in Nairobi but also businesses 
located in the city. South Sudanese elites also patronise health facilities in Nairobi. 
Furthermore, there are a lot of South Sudanese in Kenya’s institutions of higher 
learning, including refugees, in addition to having cultural links through shared 
border communities. 
Conclusion 
Relations between the GRSS and IGAD have been characterised by cowardly
action on the part of the former. Relations have been characterised by blame,
tension, and suspicion. South Sudan’s behaviour is one of a coward state. It
agreed to sign a peace agreement and immediately backtracked, pointing the
finger at the international community for pressuring its president into signing.
South Sudan’s relations with IGAD are rather ambivalent, friendly but char-
acterised by suspicion and tension. According to the GRSS, IGAD is a friend
indeed because of Uganda’s intervention in South Sudan’s conflicts, with sol-
diers fighting alongside Kiir in December 2013. However, the GRSS views the
same relationship with suspicion, given perceptions that IGAD-Plus is alleg-
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as Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya have their own varied interests in the South
Sudanese political debacle. 
With South Sudan being far from an ideal neoliberal peace implementation 
case, relations between South Sudan and IGAD could get worse. The best way to 
improve working relations between South Sudan and IGAD is for South Sudan to 
develop trust mechanisms and build confidence within itself to relate on a sincere 
basis with both IGAD and IGAD-Plus. Given that IGAD or IGAD-Plus medi-
ate in South Sudan’s conflicts, the GRSS should avoid its cowardly perspective 
to their relationship and implement the provisions of ARCISS to the letter and 
spirit. At the same time, IGAD or IGAD-Plus should close loopholes where the 
GRSS views it as not impartial. For instance, the intervention of UPDF soldiers 
during the political crisis of 15 December, with the blessings of the IGAD Heads 
of State and Government, brought into question the credibility and impartiality of 
the IGAD member states. Although this seems to be a positive achievement for 
the GRSS, the intervention is seriously detested by South Sudanese people. The 
chapter hereby recommends further research to exhaustively document and ana-
lyse the relationship between the GRSS and the Troika countries in the voyage of 
implementing the August 2015 peace agreement. 
Notes 
1 The IPF largely comprises IGAD’s donor partners and has three levels of membership:
ministerial, ambassadorial, and technical. The IPF is currently co-chaired by the Italian
government and comprises the following members: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK, the US, the European Commission, the International Organization
for Migration, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank. 
2 Kiir’s Speech during the third anniversary of independence, 9 July 2014, at Dr John 
Garang’s Mausoleum. 
3 The full text of the non-intervention resolution can be found at http://www.idi iil.org/id
iE/resolutionsE/1975_wies_03_en.pdf. 
4 Senior Presidential Advisor, Nhial Deng Nhial’s press statement after Kigali’s meeting. 
5 South Sudan’s Deputy Ambassador to Kenya James P. Morgan claimed in an interview 
with the Kenyan newspaper Daily Nation [What is the full reference for this?] that 
South Sudanese rebels were being trained, armed, and controlled by Khartoum. The 
diplomat also called for its [What does its refer to?] expulsion from the IGAD media-
tion team. 
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